Cline v. Rogers Farm Enters., LLC

87 N.E.3d 637

2017 Ohio 1379

Leslie U. CLINE, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellees,

v.ROGERS FARM ENTERPRISES, LLC, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 16CA7

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Pickaway County.

DATE JOURNALIZED: March 30, 2017

H. Ritchey Hollenbaugh, Columbus, Ohio, for appellant.

Troy A. Callicoat and Amanda Stacy Hartman, Dublin, Ohio, for appellees.

DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

ABELE, J.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Pickaway County Common Pleas Court judgment that quieted title to a 3.956 acre strip of land. The trial court determined that Leslie U. and Ethel Cline, plaintiffs below and appellees herein, acquired title to the land by adverse possession.¹ Rogers Farm Enterprises, LLC, defendant below and appellant herein, assigns the following errors for review:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

"THE COURT ERRED IN TACKING MARTIN'S USE TO PLAINTIFFS' USE OF THE DISPUTED STRIP."

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

"THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MARTIN'S USE MET THE ELEMENTS OF ADVERSE POSSESSION."

{¶ 2} This case concerns a dispute regarding the ownership of a 3.956–acre strip of land that rests on the south side of State Route 316, in Pickaway County. The land adjoins appellees' approximately 141–acre property to the south (the southern property) and appellant's approximately 399–acre property to the north (the northern property). Since 1987, when appellees purchased the southern property, appellees have treated State Route 316 as the dividing line between the two properties. Appellees subsequently learned, however, that they were mistaken as to the dividing line between the two properties. A survey revealed that the southern property did not include a 3.956–acre parcel that rests to the south of State Route 316. Instead, the survey showed that the 3.956–acre parcel on the south side of State Route 316 belonged to the northern parcel. The remaining land comprising the northern parcel sits to the north of State Route 316.

{¶ 3} After attempts to resolve the dispute proved unsuccessful, appellees filed a complaint that requested a declaratory judgment and quiet title to the 3.956 parcel and alleged that they had acquired title by adverse possession. They additionally requested the court to declare them the lawful owners of the disputed parcel. Appellees alternatively asserted that they had acquired a prescriptive easement or an easement-by-necessity over the land.

{¶ 4} Appellant answered and filed a counterclaim for quiet title and declaratory judgment asserting that they are the lawful owners of the land.

{¶ 5} The parties tried the matter before a magistrate. At trial, appellees attempted to establish that they have adversely, continuously, openly, notoriously, and exclusively possessed the land between their March 1987 date of purchase and the filing of their complaint in 2013, a period in excess of twenty-one years. Mrs. Cline admitted that in 2006, she contacted appellant in an attempt to resolve the matter, but claimed that her 2006 discussion with appellant did not destroy the nature of appellees' adverse use.

{¶ 6} Additional evidence showed that before appellees purchased the southern property, Donald M. Martin lived on the property. Martin explained that he also presumed that State Route 316 was the boundary line between the southern and northern properties. Martin stated that he started renting the southern property in 1970 and continuously farmed the land, including the disputed parcel. Martin testified that in 1976, he purchased the property and continued to live on and farm the property. In 1984, however, Martin executed a deed in lieu of foreclosure to The Federal Land Bank of Louisville (FLB).

{¶ 7} Dawn Noble testified that between 1983 and 1998, she and her husband lived on the northern property. She stated that until a 1997 survey, she believed State Route 316 was the dividing line between the two properties.

{¶ 8} Appellant presented evidence that it used the disputed land since acquiring the property in 2000, and that it had implicitly permitted appellees to use the land. Carolyn Loxley, one of appellant's members, testified that when appellant purchased the property, she believed the property included the strip of land appellees claim to have acquired by adverse possession. Mrs. Loxley stated she was aware appellees used the disputed strip of land and alleged that they had appellant's implicit permission to use the land. Mrs. Loxley additionally testified that she traversed the disputed strip of land at least a couple of times each year.

{¶ 9} After the trial, both parties submitted briefs that outlined their positions. Appellant asserted that appellees did not demonstrate that they continuously adversely possessed the property for twenty- one years. Appellant noted that Mrs. Cline testified that in 2006, she learned of the boundary line issue and contacted appellant in an attempt to resolve the matter. Appellant claimed that appellees' use after Mrs. Cline's 2006 contact with appellant was no longer adverse. Appellant additionally argued that appellees' could not tack Martin's use in order to satisfy the continuous-twenty-one-year requirement. Appellant contended that (1) Martin's deed transfer to FLB interrupted any period of adverse use, and (2) the evidence failed to show that Martin had actually used the land when FLB owned it. Appellant pointed out that appellees' son, Chad Cline, testified that when appellees purchased the property from FLB in 1987, the land was overgrown and needed substantial maintenance. Appellant argued that Chad's testimony establishes that Martin did not use the land.

{¶ 10} In their post-trial brief, appellees asserted that they could tack Martin's use in order to satisfy the continuous-twenty-one-year requirement. Appellees claimed that even though Martin deeded the property to FLB, he continued to reside on the property. They thus argued that tacking was appropriate.

{¶ 11} On August 25, 2015, the magistrate issued a decision that recommended the trial court deny appellees' adverse possession claim, deny their easement by necessity claim, grant appellees a prescriptive easement, and grant appellant quiet title to the land. In reaching her decision, the magistrate determined that appellees failed to establish that they adversely possessed the land for twenty-one years. The magistrate believed that FLB's ownership of the land between 1984 and 1987 interrupted Martin's adverse use of the property. The magistrate found: "There was no testimony provided as to any open, notorious, adverse use of the subject strip by The Federal Land Bank or its agents during that period." The magistrate thus concluded that appellees could not tack Martin's use of the property in order to establish the twenty-one-year requirement.

{¶ 12} Appellees subsequently filed both a motion to set aside² the magistrate's decision and objections to the magistrate's decision. They asserted that the magistrate incorrectly determined an interruption in adverse use occurred between 1984 and 1987, when FLB held title to the land. Appellees asserted that even though Martin conveyed title to the land to FLB, he continued to use the property. Appellees further claimed that the testimony shows that Martin farmed the land from 1970 to 1987. They additionally disputed the magistrate's findings that appellant gave appellees permission to use the disputed land and that appellant exerted ownership and possession of the strip of land.

{¶ 13} In response, appellant asserted that the magistrate correctly determined that FLB's ownership interrupted any adverse use between Martin and appellees. Appellant argued that appellees could not tack Martin's alleged adverse use of the strip to appellees' use when the evidence failed to establish that (1) Martin farmed or otherwise used the strip during FLB's ownership, or (2) Martin was in privity with FLB. Appellant also disputed appellees' claim that Martin was FLB's tenant between 1984 and 1987 so as to permit tacking. Appellant contended that appellees failed to present any evidence of a lease between Martin and FLB so as to demonstrate privity and to permit tacking. Appellant additionally claimed that appellees failed to show that they were in privity with Martin. Appellant asserted that the mere successive possession between Martin and appellees did not establish the privity necessary to support an adverse possession claim.

{¶ 14} Appellant also countered appellees' objection to the magistrate's finding that appellant permitted appellees to use the land. Appellant claimed that both of its members, Carolyn Loxley and James Rogers, testified that in the late summer of 2004, "the Clines explicitly acknowledged that the strip did not belong to them * * * and implicitly asked for, and were granted, temporary permission to use the strip."

{¶ 15} In reply, appellees asserted that the trial testimony shows that since at least 1970, the disputed strip of land has been used as if it were part of the southern property. Appellees claimed that Martin used the land, either as tenant or owner, between 1970 and 1987. They further contended that they were not required to present evidence of a lease agreement between Martin and FLB.

{¶ 16} After reviewing the parties' objections, the trial court decided to hear additional evidence regarding Martin's use of the land between 1984 and 1987, when FLB held title to the property, because, the trial court noted, that Martin's use of the land between 1984 and 1987 could be dispositive. At the hearing, Martin testified that although he owned the property from the mid 1970s until 1984 or 1985, he lived on and farmed the property from 1970 to 1987. Martin explained that he believed State Route 316 was the boundary line between the northern and southern parcels. Martin stated that he had several uses for the disputed land throughout his occupation of the adjoining parcel: (1) he used the corn crib;³ (2) he stored equipment on the property; and (3) he planted crops on...