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Modern Law Review
DOI:10.1111/1468-2230.12744
Closing the Floodgates on Privacy Class Actions:
Lloyd vGoogle LLC
Yanni Goutzamanis∗
In Lloyd vGoogle LLC [2021] UKSC 50, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal’s
decision, which had allowed a claim under the Data Protection Act 1998 to proceed as a rep-
resentative action under CPR 19.6. This is signicant because the Court of Appeal’s decision
arguably paved the way for further data protection/privacy claims to be brought as opt-out
‘class actions’ using this procedure. This case note summarises the Supreme Court decision and
assesses its implications for both the procedural law of collective redress and the substantive law
of privacy in England. It argues that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in relation to both of these
areas is sound as a matter of precedent and statutory construction. As a matter of public policy,
the decision is likely to re-enliven debate about the availability of collective redress in English
law and whether the existing collective proceedings regime should be broadened.
INTRODUCTION
Following the Court of Appeal’s decision in Lloyd vGoogle LLC,1much of the
commentary considered whether the proverbial oodgates had been opened
on privacy class actions in the UK. Indeed, multiple representative actions
premised on alleged data protection breaches were commenced in its wake.2
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lloyd vGoogle LLC3– which overturned
the Court of Appeal’s decision – now appears to have tightened the oodgates,
though it may not have closed them completely.
In the Supreme Court, a panel of ve judges unanimously held that Mr
Lloyd’s claim could not proceed as a representative action because Lloyd was
impermissibly attempting to recover compensation under section 13 of the Data
Protection Act 1998 (DPA 1998) without showing that Google LLC (Google)
made unlawful use of any individual’s personal data or that any individual suf-
fered damage as a result of such unlawful use.In reaching this conclusion, the
Court rejected the proposition that a claimant is entitled to compensation for
∗Barrister, Victorian Bar. I am grateful to Dr Eleni Katsampouka, Tim Ancev, Mohammud Jaamae
Hafeez-Baig, Jakub Patela for their comments and suggestions. All errors and omissions are my own.
1 [2019] EWCA Civ 1599; [2020] QB 747 (Appeal Judgment).
2 These include claims against TikTok, Facebook and Marr iott Hotels: see D. Barker, ‘Lloyd
v Google: Supreme Court Unanimously Rejects Claimant’s Representative Action’ Pinsent
Masons, 2021 at https://www.pinsentmasons.com/out-law/analysis/lloyd-v-google-supreme-
court-representative-action (last visited 8 January2022). These claims have been on hold pending
resolution of this litigation in the Supreme Court.
3 [2021] UKSC 50; [2021] WLR 1268 (Lloyd vGoogle).
© 2022 The Author.The Modern Law Review © 2022 The Modern Law Review Limited. (2023) 86(1) MLR 249–262
