Cnty. of Allegheny v. Allegheny Cnty. Prison Emps. Indep. Union

245 A.3d 333

COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY, Pennsylvania, Appellant

v.ALLEGHENY COUNTY PRISON EMPLOYEES INDEPENDENT UNION

No. 1469 C.D. 2019

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued October 13, 2020

Decided November 19, 2020

Publication Ordered January 7, 2021

Diego Correa, Pittsburgh, for Appellant.

Eric C. Stoltenberg, Pittsburgh, for Appellee.

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge, HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge, HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON

The County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania (County) appeals the September 17, 2019 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) that denied the County's Petition to Vacate an arbitration award entered under the Public Employe Relations Act (PERA),¹ that sustained a grievance filed by the Allegheny County Prison Employees Independent Union (Union) seeking reinstatement of a terminated corrections officer Union member. Upon review, we affirm.

The underlying facts of this matter are not in dispute. On the evening of June 3, 2017, Kenneth Goings (Goings) was working as a corrections officer on the medical unit of the Allegheny County Jail.² See Arbitration Decision and Award dated December 12, 2018 (Arbitration Award) at 2. Among Goings’ duties as a corrections officer on the medical unit was a requirement that he perform guard tours³ twice hourly. See Arbitration Award at 3. This guard tour requirement appeared in the medical unit's post orders,⁴ which are orders posted in each pod that list all the required duties of the corrections officers assigned to the specific pod. See Arbitration Award at 3. Each corrections officer was required to read the post orders for their assigned pod on a daily basis and sign a sheet indicating they had done so. See id. When Goings began as a corrections officer on the medical unit in mid-2015, the post orders at the time had been in effect since July 6, 2015, and required only one guard tour per hour. See Arbitration Award at 3. The medical unit post orders were amended effective February 22, 2017, however, to require two guard tours per hour instead of one. See id. Despite regularly certifying by signing a sign-in sheet, as required, that he had read the post orders, Goings remained unaware of the change in the number of required guard tours by virtue of not having read the amended post orders. See id.

Sometime between Goings’ 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. guard tours on the evening of June 3, 2017, an Allegheny County Jail inmate committed suicide in his cell on the medical unit. See Arbitration Award at 4. As he usually did, Goings had signed the post order sign-in sheet, thereby indicating that he had read the post orders on June 3, 2017, despite the fact that he had not actually done so. See id. at 3.

Following a disciplinary hearing conducted on June 6, 2017, the County discharged Goings for failing to complete mandatory guard tours and for falsifying post order sign-in sheets that indicated Goings had daily read the post orders as required. See Arbitration Award at 4 & 9; Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion dated January 6, 2020 (Trial Court Opinion) at 2. On June 7, 2017, the Union filed a grievance on Goings’ behalf that alleged the County lacked just cause to discharge Goings and seeking Goings’ reinstatement as a corrections officer with full back pay. See Arbitration Award at 2; see also Grievance filed June 7, 2017 (Grievance), Trial Court Reproduced Record (T.C.R.R.) at R133-34. After the Grievance was denied,⁵ the Union sought to arbitrate the matter per the collective bargaining agreement in force between the County and the Union from 2014 through 2019 (CBA).

An arbitrator conducted a hearing on August 15, 2018, at which both Goings and the County were represented by counsel and presented evidence. See Arbitration Award at 2. On December 12, 2018, the arbitrator issued the Arbitration Award, which sustained the Grievance in part. See Arbitration Award at 2 & 12-13; Trial Court Opinion at 2. The arbitrator found Goings guilty of violating the post order requirement that he conduct two guard tours per hour and of repeatedly falsifying the daily post order sign-in sheet indicating that he had read the post orders. See Arbitration Award at 9-12. The arbitrator determined that these violations represented significant misconduct that justified disciplinary action against Goings. See id. However, after examining multiple mitigating factors, the arbitrator determined that the County lacked just cause for terminating Goings’ employment and converted Goings’ termination to a 30-day unpaid suspension. See id. at 12. Accordingly, the arbitrator converted Goings’ discharge to a 30-day suspension without pay and awarded Goings back pay.⁶ See id. at 12-13.

The County filed a Petition to Vacate, which the trial court denied by order dated September 17, 2019. See Trial Court Order dated September 17, 2019 (Trial Court Order). In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained that the Arbitration Award in this matter satisfied the essence test in that the issue presented – termination for just cause – was within the terms of the CBA, and that the arbitrator's decision logically flowed from the terms of the CBA. See Trial Court Opinion at 4. Further, the trial court declined to invoke the public policy exception to the essence test, explaining that

[t]he facts of this case, including the remedy imposed by the arbitrator (i.e. , mitigation of the discipline from termination to a thirty-day suspension and back pay), do not implicate a well-defined, dominant public policy warranting interference with the arbitrator's decision. Moreover, the arbitrator's decision in this case does not compel [the] County to violate any such policy.

Trial Court Opinion at 4. The County appealed the Trial Court Order to this Court.

On appeal, the County claims that the trial court erred by denying its Petition to Vacate. Specifically, the County alleges that Goings’ misrepresentations that he read post orders daily as required and his alleged false statements during testimony before the arbitrator represent violations of public policy that should have served as grounds for the trial court to vacate the Arbitration Award. See County's Brief at 3, 11-24.

Appellate review of a grievance arbitration award is generally conducted pursuant to the two-part "essence test." Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Phila. Fed'n of Teachers , 164 A.3d 546, 552 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). Under the essence test,

[f]irst, the court shall determine if the issue as properly defined is within the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Second, if the issue is embraced by the agreement, and thus, appropriately before the arbitrator, the arbitrator's award will be upheld if the arbitrator's interpretation can rationally be derived from the collective bargaining agreement. That is to say, a court will only vacate an arbitrator's award where the award indisputably and genuinely is without foundation in, or fails to logically flow from, the collective bargaining agreement.

State Sys. of Higher Educ. (Cheyney Univ.) v. State Coll. Univ. Prof'l Ass'n (PSEA-NEA) , 560 Pa. 135, 743 A.2d 405, 413 (1999) ; see also Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 v. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 Classroom Assistants Educ. Support Pers. Ass'n, PSEA/NEA , 595 Pa. 648, 939 A.2d 855, 863 (2007) ( Westmoreland I ). Thus, "[a]n arbitrator's award must be sustained ‘if it is based on anything that can be gleaned as the "essence" of the [collective bargaining agreement].’ " Pa. State Sys. of Higher Educ. v. Ass'n of Pa. State Coll. & Univ. Faculties , 98 A.3d 5, 14 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (quoting Am. Fed'n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Dist. Council 84, AFL–CIO v. City of Beaver Falls , 74 Pa.Cmwlth. 136, 459 A.2d 863, 865 (1983) ). Further, "[t]he essence test does not permit this Court to vacate an arbitrator's award even if we disagree with the arbitrator's interpretation of the [collective bargaining agreement]." Am. Fed'n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Dist. Council 87 v. Cty. of Lackawanna , 102 A.3d 1285, 1290 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (citing Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit Educ. Ass'n v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit # 16 , 74 Pa.Cmwlth. 248, 459 A.2d 889, 890 (1983) ). "The essence test is an exceptionally deferential standard, because binding arbitration is a highly favored method of dispute resolution." Dep't of Corr., State Corr. Inst. at Forest v. Pa. State Corr. Officers Ass'n , 173 A.3d 854, 858 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (citing Northumberland Cty. Comm'rs v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., AFL–CIO Local 2016, Council 86 , 71 A.3d 367, 374 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) ). The party challenging an arbitration award bears the "burden of proving the award does not draw its essence from the [collective bargaining agreement]." See Pa. State Sys. of Higher Educ. , 98 A.3d at 14.

However, even where an arbitration award satisfies the essence test, our Supreme Court has delineated a discreet exception whereby a reviewing court may still vacate the award if it violates public policy. See Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Millcreek Twp. Educ. Support Pers. Ass'n , ––– Pa. ––––, 210 A.3d 993, 1007-11 (2019) ; see also Westmoreland I , 939 A.2d at 865-66. The application of this public policy exception requires that "[s]uch public policy ... must be well-defined, dominant, and ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests." Westmoreland I , 939 A.2d at 866. Additionally, unlike the deferential standard of review employed to review determinations under the essence test, appellate review of the public policy exception "lies in the proper application of the public policy exception to the essence test. This is a pure question of law; [the] standard of review is de novo, and [the] scope of review is plenary." Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Dist. Council 33, Local 934 , 617 Pa....