COACHELLA VALLEY MOSQUITO CONTROL v. PERB

29 Cal.Rptr.3d 234

35 Cal.4th 1072

112 P.3d 623

COACHELLA VALLEY MOSQUITO AND VECTOR CONTROL DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Defendant and Respondent;

California School Employees Association et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. S122060.

Supreme Court of California.

June 9, 2005.

Lisa Garvin Copeland, Palm Desert, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Jack L. White, City Attorney (Anaheim), and Carol J. Flynn, Assistant City Attorney for the Cities of Anaheim, Carlsbad, Indian Wells, Monterey, Redlands, San Buenaventura, San Luis Obispo, San Pablo, Santa Paula, Walnut Creek, the California Association of Sanitation Agencies, the Orange County Vector Control District and the Sunline Transit Agency as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Ben Allamano for Mosquito and Vector Control Association of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Robert Thompson, Sacramento, and Kristin L. Rosi for Defendant and Respondent.

Rothner, Segall & Greenstone, Glenn Rothner, Emma Leheny and Jean Shin, Pasadena, for American Federation for State, County and Municipal Employees Union, AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Michael R. Clancy, Madalyn J. Frazzini and Sonja J. Woodward, San Jose, for Real Party in Interest and Respondent California School Employees Association.

No appearances for Real Parties in Interest and Respondents Ramon C. Gonzalez, Mike Martinez, Jeffrey Garcia and Virginia Sanchez.

KENNARD, J.

The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (Gov. Code, §§ 3500-3511; hereafter the MMBA) governs collective bargaining and employer-employee relations for most California local public entities, including cities, counties, and special districts. Before July 1, 2001, an employee association claiming a violation of the MMBA could bring an action in superior court. (See Santa Clara County Counsel Attys. Assn. v. Woodside (1994) 7 Cal.4th 525, 541-542, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 617, 869 P.2d 1142.) Effective July 1, 2001, however, the Legislature vested the California Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) with exclusive jurisdiction over alleged violations of the MMBA.¹ (Gov.Code, § 3509, added by Stats.2000, ch. 901, § 8.) In making this fundamental change, the Legislature did not specify a limitations period for making an MMBA unfair practice charge to the PERB. Under every other public employment law subject to the PERB's jurisdiction, however, the Legislature has expressly designated six months as the limitations period for making an unfair practice charge. (See Gov.Code, §§ 3514.5, subd. (a), 3541.5, subd. (a), 3563.2, subd. (a), 71639.1, subd. (c), 71825, subd. (c); Pub. Util.Code, § 99561.2, subd. (a).)

The main issue here is whether the limitations period for making an MMBA unfair practice charge to the PERB is three years, which the PERB insists was the generally accepted limitations period for an MMBA cause of action filed in superior court (see Giffin v. United Transportation Union (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1359, 1365, 236 Cal.Rptr. 6 [holding that three years is the statute of limitations for an alleged violation of state labor law, without mentioning the MMBA]), or six months, which is the limitations period for all other unfair practice charges subject to the PERB's jurisdiction. We conclude the limitations period is six months.

This case presents two additional issues. One issue, which we address first, is whether this action is barred by the doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. On this issue, we conclude that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is excused because this action challenges the PERB's jurisdiction and raises issues of law with broad public importance. The other issue concerns retroactive application of the shortened limitations period. On this issue, we conclude that the shortened limitations period applies retroactively, but also that when an unfair practice charge is based on conduct before the effective date of the shortened limitations period, the charge is timely if filed within three years of the alleged unfair practice or before January 1, 2002, whichever occurs sooner.

Because the Court of Appeal's judgment is consistent with these conclusions, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 6, 2001, the California School Employees Association (CSEA) filed an MMBA unfair practice charge with the PERB against the Coachella Valley Mosquito and Vector Control District (District), a special district (see Health & Saf. Code, § 2000 et seq. [formerly § 2200 et seq.]) subject to the MMBA. The CSEA amended the charge on August 29, 2001. In the amended charge, the CSEA, as the exclusive employee representative of a bargaining unit of the District's employees, alleged that the District had discriminated against several CSEA-represented employees for their participation in negotiations for a memorandum of understanding, interfered with the rights of additional unit members by threatening disciplinary action if they engaged in activity protected under the MMBA, and unilaterally changed the means by which employees' annual performance evaluations were prepared and administered. On October 23, 2001, the PERB issued a complaint against the District on these allegations, alleging that the District had committed specified unfair practices on various dates between December 1999 and July 2001.

On November 13, 2001, the District filed an answer to the complaint and a motion to dismiss it. In the motion, the District argued that the PERB lacked jurisdiction over alleged MMBA violations occurring before July 1, 2001, and that six months was the limitations period for an MMBA unfair practice charge. On December 5, 2001, the PERB's board agent denied the motion to dismiss.

The District objected to the board agent's ruling and requested a ruling by the PERB itself. Under a PERB regulation, however, the PERB does not review a board agent's interim ruling unless the agent joins in the party's request for review. (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32200.) On January 3, 2002, the board agent refused to join in the District's request.

On January 9, 2002, the District petitioned the superior court for writs of mandate and prohibition, naming the CSEA and certain District employees as real parties in interest and arguing that the PERB lacked jurisdiction to issue the complaint.² After the PERB filed preliminary opposition, the superior court issued an order to show cause. Both the CSEA and the PERB then filed formal opposition in which they argued, among other things, that the District's action was barred because the administrative proceedings had not concluded and therefore the District had not exhausted its administrative remedies. The superior court held a brief hearing, after which it denied the petition, concluding that the District was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies before challenging the PERB's jurisdiction, that the PERB had jurisdiction over alleged MMBA violations occurring before July 1, 2001, that the limitations period for alleging these violations was three years, and that the PERB therefore had jurisdiction over each unfair practice alleged in the complaint.

The District appealed from the superior court's judgment denying the petition. In May 2002, while the appeal was pending, the District and the CSEA executed a settlement agreement covering the merits of the unfair practices charge, the CSEA withdrew the charge, and the PERB complaint was dismissed. Although the settlement had rendered it moot, the appeal nonetheless proceeded, and all parties joined in urging the Court of Appeal to issue a decision on the merits. The court granted requests for judicial notice of various legislative history documents. On December 9, 2003, the court issued its decision.

The Court of Appeal held: (1) Because the appeal presented issues of broad public interest that were likely to recur, the court could properly resolve those issues even though the case had become moot;³ (2) the District's action was not barred by the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies because exhaustion would have been futile; (3) the PERB had jurisdiction to issue a complaint based on unfair practices occurring before July 1, 2001;⁴ (4) the limitations period for an MMBA unfair practice charge filed with the PERB is six months; and (5) to prevent unfair retroactive application of the shortened limitations period, charges based on unfair practices occurring before July 1, 2001, were timely if filed with the PERB within three years of their occurrence or before January 1, 2002, whichever occurred first. Applying these holdings to the facts, the Court of Appeal concluded that the CSEA's unfair practice charge was timely filed as to all of the alleged unfair practices, and therefore it affirmed the trial court's judgment.

This court granted the PERB's petition for review.

II. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

In general, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts. (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 292, 109 P.2d 942; see California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1148, 43 Cal. Rptr.2d 693, 899 P.2d 79.) Under this rule, an administrative remedy is exhausted only upon "termination of all available, nonduplicative administrative review procedures." (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd., supra, at p. 1151, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 693, 899 P.2d 79; see also Jonathan Neil & Assoc., Inc. v. Jones (2004) 33 Cal.4th 917, 933, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 94 P.3d 1055 [exhaustion requires agency decision of "`entire controversy'"]; People v. Beaumont Investment, Ltd. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 102, 124, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 429 [administrative process must "`"run its course"'"]; Bleeck v. State Board of Optometry (1971) 18 Cal. App.3d 415, 432, 95 Cal.Rptr. 860 [exhaustion...