Coates v. Cluney

1

SCOTT COATES, Plaintiff, v. SHANNON CLUNEY, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 23-00122 JMS-WRP

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

August 29, 2023

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT, ECF NO. 13, WITH PARTIAL LEAVE GRANTED TO AMEND

J Michael Seabright, United States District Judge.

Before the court is pro se Plaintiff Scott Coates' (“Coates”) First Amended Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint (“FAC”) brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983. ECF No. 13. In the FAC, Coates alleges that he was denied adequate medical care while he was incarcerated at the Halawa Correctional Facility (“HCF”), a state prison.^[1] After conducting the required screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court DISMISSES the FAC with partial leave granted to amend. If Coates wants this action to proceed, he must file an amended pleading that cures the noted deficiencies in his claims on or before September 29, 2023.

In the alternative, Coates may inform the court in writing on or before September 29, 2023, that he would like to dismiss voluntarily this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1).

I. STATUTORY SCREENING

The court must screen any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, or in which a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(a); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007) (“Among other reforms, the [Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] mandates early judicial screening of prisoner complaints.”). During this screening, the court must dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune from suit. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Harris v. Harris, 935 F.3d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 2019) (describing screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(a)-(b)).

Screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a) involves the same standard of review as that used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Under this standard, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim is “plausible” when the facts alleged support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. See id.

In conducting this screening, the court liberally construes pro se litigants' pleadings and resolves all doubts in their favor. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The court must grant leave to amend if it appears the plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). When a claim cannot be saved by amendment, however, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. See Sylvia Landfield Tr. v. City of Los Angeles, 729 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013).

II. BACKGROUND^[2]

Sometime in 2021, Dr. Tresch, a primary care physician at the HCF, concluded that there was an “issue” with Coates' right eye.^[3] ECF No. 13 at PageID.75. Dr. Tresch referred Coates to an ophthalmologist at Straub Medical Center who examined Coates in March 2022. Id. Two other ophthalmologists- one at EyeSight Hawaii and another at the Oculoplastics Center-examined Coates in May 2022 and December 2022, respectively. Id. All three ophthalmologists diagnosed Coates with ocular cicatricial pemphigoid (“OCP”), a rare autoimmune disease.^[4] Id. at PageID.75-PageID.76. According to Coates, he should have been seen by a rheumatologist, but treatment was “withheld” for fourteen months. Id. at PageID.75.

In January 2023, Coates had an appointment at EyeSight Hawaii for “tear duct plugs.” Id. at PageID.76. Cummings, a registered nurse, cancelled this appointment. Id. Cummings also cancelled a second appointment for Coates with the ophthalmologist at the Oculoplastics Center. Id.

At some point, Glidewell, a nurse practitioner, ordered an injection of methotrexate for Coates, but he refused it.^[5] Id. Glidewell later told Coates that she would inform the Hawaii Paroling Authority that Coates was refusing treatment. Id. Glidewell told Coates that this could affect his chances of being granted parole. Id.

Coates commenced this suit by signing the original Complaint on February 27, 2023. ECF No. 1 at PageID.8. The court dismissed the Complaint on April 14, 2023. ECF No. 7. After the court granted two extension requests filed by Coates, see ECF Nos. 9, 12, the court received the FAC on August 14, 2023, ECF No. 13.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Eleventh Amendment

Coates names all five Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. ECF No. 13 at PageID.69-PageID.71.

“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-03 (1984). It does not bar official-capacity suits against state officials for prospective relief to enjoin alleged ongoing violations of federal law. See Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989). Nor does it bar suits for damages against state officials in their personal capacities. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003).

Coates only seeks damages in this action. See ECF No. 13 at PageID.77. Any such claims against Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and, therefore, DISMISSED with prejudice. See Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages against a state official acting in his or her official capacity.” (citation omitted)).

Thus, all claims against Defendants in their official capacities are DISMISSED with prejudice.

B. Legal Framework for Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against ‘[e]very person who, under color of' law deprives another of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.'” Cornel v. Hawaii, 37 F.4th 527, 531 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (alteration in original). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Park v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020).

Section 1983 requires a connection or link between a defendant's actions and the plaintiff's alleged deprivation. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980). “A person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).

C. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment governs the treatment of convicted prisoners and forbids “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see Sandoval v. Cnty. of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 667 (9th Cir. 2021). Although the Constitution “‘does not mandate comfortable prisons,'” it does not “permit inhumane ones[.]” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citations omitted). Prison officials, therefore, “must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and [they] must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates[.]'” Id. (citations omitted).

Coates alleges in Counts I, II, and III that he was denied adequate medical care while he was incarcerated at the HCF.^[6] See ECF No. 13 at PageID.74-PageID.76.

To establish a claim of inadequate medical care, a prisoner must show both a “serious medical need” and that an official's response to the need was “deliberately indifferent.” Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 785-86 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).

A serious medical need is present when, for example, the “‘failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. at 785 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Serious medical needs can relate to physical, dental and mental health.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“To show deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show that the course of treatment the [official] chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances and that the [official] chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the plaintiff's health.” Id. at 786 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original). This is a “high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “An inadvertent or negligent failure to provide adequate medical care is insufficient to establish a claim under the Eighth Amendment.” Edmo, 935 F.3d at 786 (citation omitted). “In other words, [m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional...