Coates v. Cluney

1

SCOTT COATES, #A1068673, Plaintiff, v. SHANNON CLUNEY, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 23-00122 JMS-WRP

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

April 14, 2023

ORDER DISMISSING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT, ECF NO. 1, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

J Michael Seabright, United States District Judge

Before the court is pro se Plaintiff Scott Coates' (“Coates”) Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint (“Complaint”) brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983.^[1] ECF No. 1. In the Complaint, Coates alleges that he was denied adequate medical care (Counts I and II) and that his safety was threatened (Count III) at the Halawa Correctional Facility (“HCF”), a state prison.^[2] After conducting the required screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a) the court DISMISSES the Complaint with leave granted to amend. If Coates wants this action to proceed, he must file an amended pleading that cures the noted deficiencies in his claims on or before May 15, 2023. In the alternative, Coates may inform the court in writing on or before May 15, 2023, that he would like to dismiss voluntarily this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), and such a dismissal will not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

I. STATUTORY SCREENING

The court is required to screen all in forma pauperis prisoner complaints filed against government officials, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a). See Byrd v. Phx. Police Dep't, 885 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 2018). Claims or complaints that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek damages from defendants who are immune from suit must be dismissed. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010).

Screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a) involves the same standard of review as that used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Under this standard, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim is “plausible” when the facts alleged support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. See id.

In conducting this screening, the court liberally construes pro se litigants' pleadings and resolves all doubts in their favor. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The court must grant leave to amend if it appears the plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. When a claim cannot be saved by amendment, however, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. See Sylvia Landfield Tr. v. City of Los Angeles, 729 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013).

II. BACKGROUND^[3]

On December 3, 2018, Coates informed medical staff at the HCF that he was previously diagnosed with pterygium on his right eye.^[4] ECF No. 1 at PageID.5. Coates was then given “artificial tears” to treat the condition. Id.

According to Coates, more than three years passed before he saw an ophthalmologist. Id. During this time, the pterygium developed into ocular cicatricial pemphigoid (“OCP”).^[5] Id. Dr. Treshe (who is not named as a defendant) diagnosed the OCP and referred Coates to a doctor at Straub Medical Center. Id. The doctor at Straub referred Coates to EyeSight Hawaii, which then referred Coates to a rheumatologist in May 2022. Id.

In January 2023, Coates was scheduled for a follow-up appointment at EyeSight Hawaii. Id. at PageID.6. According to Coates, Moani and Glidewell (who are not named as defendants) cancelled his appointment. Id. At some point, Glidewell ordered an injection of methotrexate for Coates but he “rejected it.”^[6] Id. at PageID.9. A week later, Coates refused an oral dose of the same drug.^[7] Id. Glidewell then told Coates that she would inform the Hawaii Paroling Authority that Coates was refusing treatment. Id. Coates denies that he was refusing treatment. Id.

At various times while he was incarcerated at the HCF, Coates alleges that prison officials threatened his safety by housing him with inmates infected with COVID-19. Id. at PageID.7. Coates further alleges that prison officials refused to provide him with a mask in November 2022. Id. Soon thereafter, Coates contracted COVID-19. Id. This was the third time that he had contracted the virus at the HCF. Id.

Coates signed the Complaint on February 27, 2023. Id. at PageID.8. On April 7, 2023, the court granted Coates' Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis by a Prisoner. ECF Nos. 4, 5. In the Complaint, Coates seeks injunctive relief and unspecified damages. ECF No. 1 at PageID.8.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Framework for Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against ‘[e]very person who, under color of' law deprives another of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.'” Cornel v. Hawaii, 37 F.4th 527, 531 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (alteration in original). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Park v. City & County of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020).

There are two situations in which a state official might be liable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “First, plaintiffs may seek damages against a state official in his personal capacity.” Cornel, 37 F.4th at 531 (citing Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016)). “Second, state officials are ‘persons' under § 1983 when sued for prospective injunctive relief.” Id. (citation omitted). This second situation applies “where a plaintiff alleges an ongoing violation of federal law, and where the relief sought is prospective rather than retrospective.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. Causation

Section 1983 requires a connection or link between a defendant's actions and the plaintiff's alleged deprivation. See Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury.” (citation omitted)). “To meet this causation requirement, the plaintiff must establish both causation-in-fact and proximate causation.” Id. (citation omitted).

“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.'” Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)).

Here, although Coates names six individuals in the Complaint's caption, he fails to link any of them to an alleged constitutional violation. Indeed, Coates does not refer to any Defendant in any of the Complaint's three Counts. See ECF No. 1 at PageID.5-PageID. 11. Because Coates has not plausibly alleged that any Defendant caused a constitutional violation, the Complaint will be DISMISSED with leave granted to amend. See Rodriguez v. Foss, 2019 WL 6341567, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2019) (“The complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend because plaintiff has failed to link any of the defendants to the constitutional violation.”).

If Coates decides to file an amended pleading, he should name, for each instance of an alleged constitutional violation, each person who violated his constitutional rights, describe what each person did to violate his rights, and state where and when the violation occurred. Coates must be careful to allege facts showing the basis for liability for each individual defendant. In other words, Coates “should identify each involved defendant by name and link each of them to his claim by explaining what each defendant did or failed to do that caused a violation of his constitutional rights.” Id. To assist Coates in preparing any amended pleading, the court provides the following procedural and legal standards.

C. Improper Joinder

A party asserting a claim may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 18. “To name different defendants in the same lawsuit, however, a plaintiff must satisfy Rule 20, governing joinder of parties.” Weeks v. Espinda, 2010 WL 2218631, at *3 (D. Haw. June 2, 2010). Rule 20(a)(2) allows joinder of defendants only if the following two requirements are met: (1) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (2) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2)(A)-(B); Stribling v. Tobias, 690 Fed.Appx. 972, 973 (9th Cir. 2017). Unrelated claims involving different defendants belong in different suits. See What v. Honolulu Police Dep't, 2014 WL 176610, at *4 (D. Haw. Jan. 13, 2014).

Here in Count III, Coates alleges that his safety was threatened when he was housed with...