Coates v. Disc. Tire Co. of Neb.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Brian C. Buescher, United States District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Damon Coates has sued Discount Tire Company of Nebraska, Inc., (“Discount Tire”) for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act (“NFEPA”), as well as for common-law retaliation. Before the Court is Discount Tire's Motion for Summary Judgment. Filing 49. For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants Discount Tire's motion.

II. BACKGROUND

Coates began working at Discount Tire in October of 2008. Filing 51-3 at 6. In February of 2015, Discount Tire promoted Coates to store manager at its Omaha, Nebraska, location. Filing 51-3 at 8-9. Coates held this position until Discount Tire changed his position to comanager in 2017.^[1] Filing 51-3 at 8-9.

On November 30, 2017, while Coates was working outside inspecting a vehicle, a car drove quickly towards the garage and turned directly at him. Filing 51-3 at 28. Coates dove out of the way and landed on his right hip and lower back, causing him injury. Filing 51-3 at 28. According to Coates, his injury causes him severe back pain while lifting items at home and at work. Filing 51-3 at 27. He is unable to sit or stand for long periods of time, and must refrain from repetitive bending, twisting, or stooping. Filing 51-3 at 27, 30-31. Coates notified the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court of his injury shortly after becoming injured. Filing 51-17 at 2.

In April of 2018, Discount Tire demoted Coates to senior assistant store manager. Filing 51-3 at 9-10. Discount Tire contends that it demoted Coates due to several performance issues. Filing 51-7 at 18; Filing 51-8 at 3-4. Coates claims his demotion stemmed from his inability to perform managerial functions, citing notes written by one of his superiors stating, “There's not a co-manager spot available for people who are not able to perform the functions of manager.” Filing 51-12 at 8, 11; Filing 52 at 9.

While continuing to work at Discount Tire, Coates refrained from lifting heavier items, installing tires, or performing other similar duties. Filing 51-3 at 31, 33, 36. On October 16, 2018, Coates tried changing trailer tires, but noticed a significant increased level of thoracic pain at the end of the day. Filing 51-3 at 39. Afterwards, his physician recommended that he take a functional capacity evaluation (“FCE”) to determine appropriate work restrictions going forward. Filing 51-3 at 39. On the pre-FCE questionnaire, Coates reported that he has close to a 100% limitation on lifting items and must stop and stretch periodically while performing activities. Filing 51-3 at 41. Coates also wrote that he cannot sit for more than one hour and is unable to stand for longer than a half hour. Filing 51-3 at 41. The FCE results stated that Coates had significant limitations on his ability to bend and stoop, twist, and carry items. Filing 51-3 at 43. The FCE report concluded,

“Based on [Coates's] job description, it does not appear that he can complete all the components of his job description as they are written.” Filing 51-3 at 42. Pursuant to the FCE report, Coates's physician cleared him to work with permanent restrictions as recommended by the FCE. Filing 51-3 at 45.

On January 18, 2019, Discount Tire terminated Coates's employment. Filing 51-3 at 46. Discount Tire claims it terminated Coates's employment because he could not perform his essential job functions after being permanently restricted pursuant to the FCE. Filing 51-7 at 17; Filing 51-35 at 7. Before terminating him, Discount Tire claims it looked at alternative positions for Coates but could not find one that he qualified for or could perform with his permanent restrictions. Filing 51-35 at 4-6. Discount Tire also contends that there were no reasonable accommodations available that would have allowed Coates to continue working as a senior assistant store manager. Filing 51-8 at 4; 51-9 at 3. Coates disputes this contention, arguing that he was able to work by performing the duties outlined in his Areas of Responsibilities^[2] instead of in the senior assistant store manager job description and refraining from lifting and performing other similar physical activity. Filing 51-3 at 50. He also believes Discount Tire could have purchased a mechanical device to assist him in lifting items. Filing 51-3 at 50. Finally, Coates claims that Discount Tire could have transferred him to a different position. Filing 51-3 at 53, 60.

Coates filed a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which sent a Right to Sue letter to him on March 2, 2020. Filing 51-41 at 10. Two days later, Coates sued Discount Tire in Nebraska state court. Filing 1 at 1. In his Complaint, Coates alleged that Discount Tire terminated his employment because of his disability in violation of the ADA

and the NFEPA. Filing 1-1 at 7-10. Coates also asserted a claim for common-law retaliation, arguing that Discount Tire retaliated against him for filing a workers' compensation claim by demoting him and then later terminating him. Filing 1-1 at 10-11. Discount Tire removed the action to this Court on April 10, 2020. Filing 1. On August 6, 2020, Discount Tire filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. Filing 49.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

“Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, presents no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Garrison v. ConAgra Foods Packaged Foods, LLC, 833 F.3d 881, 884 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). “[S]ummary judgment is not disfavored and is designed for every action.” Briscoe v. Cnty. of St. Louis, 690 F.3d 1004, 1011 n.2 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1043 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court will view “the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Whitney v. Guys, Inc., 826 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Hitt v. Harsco Corp., 356 F.3d 920, 923-24 (8th Cir. 2004)). Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, “Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves.” Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608, 618 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). The moving party need not produce evidence showing “an absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Johnson v. Wheeling Mach. Prods., 779 F.3d 514, 517 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Instead, “the burden

on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing' . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Lifecare Int'l, Inc., 250 F.3d 587, 596 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325).

In response to the moving party's showing, the nonmoving party's burden is to produce “specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial.” Haggenmiller v. ABM Parking Servs., Inc., 837 F.3d 879, 884 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Gibson v. Am. Greetings Corp., 670 F.3d 844, 853 (8th Cir. 2012)). The nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, and must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Wagner v. Gallup, Inc., 788 F.3d 877, 882 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042). “[T]here must be more than ‘the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute'” between the parties in order to overcome summary judgment. Dick v. Dickinson State Univ., 826 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Vacca v. Viacom Broad. of Mo., Inc., 875 F.2d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1989)).

B. Discrimination Under the ADA

Discount Tire argues that Coates cannot establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA. Filing 50 at 20. According to Discount Tire, Coates cannot show that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, nor can he demonstrate that he was qualified to perform the essential functions of his job. Filing 50 at 19. Coates responds by claiming that he is disabled under the ADA because his back pain substantially limits one or more of his major life activities, and that he was qualified to perform his job with a reasonable accommodation. Filing 52 at 26-33. The Court concludes that Coates is not a qualified individual under the ADA, and therefore summary judgment on his ADA claim is warranted.^[3]

The ADA prohibits discrimination against any “qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). “Discrimination” includes “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.” Id. at § 12112(b)(5)(A). To make a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff must show that he “(1) is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) is a qualified individual under the ADA, and (3) has suffered an adverse employment action because of [his] disability.” Hill v. Walker, 737 F.3d 1209, 1216 (8th Cir. 2013). A qualified individual is one who (1) possesses the “requisite skill, education, experience, and training for his position, ” and (2) is able to “perform the essential job functions, with or without reasonable accommodation.” Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 712 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Benson v. Nw....