Coates v. United States

JOSEPH COATES, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. 19-25190-CV-WILLIAMS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

November 2, 2020

ORDER SCREENING PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

THIS MATTER is before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Joseph Coates's second amended civil rights complaint ("Second Amended Complaint") filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [ECF No. 28]. Previously, Plaintiff was granted in forma pauperis ("IFP") status, and his amended civil rights complaint ("Amended Complaint") [ECF No. 12] screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) [ECF No. 26]. A Report was entered recommending that the Amended Complaint be dismissed with leave to file a final amended complaint to cure the deficiencies identified in the Report. [Id. at 13-14]. Regarding his claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1), the Report recommended dismissal for lack of jurisdiction against the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the U.S. Marshal Service ("USMS"), Agents John Doe #1 and #2, and the unknown Automobile Insurance Company, with leave to amend and identify the United States ("U.S.") as the proper party. [Id. at 5]. The Report recognized Plaintiff had not sued the United States and did not identify the individual he claims drove recklessly causing the vehicular accident which resulted in his injuries. [Id. at 12]. The Report also recommended dismissal of Plaintiff's medical negligence claim because he had not provided sufficient facts to support such a claim. [Id. at 12-13]. Further, the Report noted that if Plaintiff was attempting to raise a claim under Bivens,¹ the claim should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). [Id. at 12, n.6]. Finally, the Report recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 18] and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 21] be denied without prejudice as they were prematurely filed since the Amended Complaint had not been screened, and discovery had not yet commenced. [Id.].

Before the Court ruled upon the pending Report, but after the time for filing objections passed, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint attempting to cure the deficiencies identified above. [ECF No. 28]. For the reasons discussed below, all claims in the Second Amended Complaint are dismissed except for Plaintiff's claim of negligence regarding the operation of the prison transport van under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff alleges that his Second Amended Complaint "relates back to both the 'Complaint,' and the 'First Amended Complaint,'" [ECF No. 28 at 1]. Plaintiff asserts that on December 19, 2017, a U.S. Marshal drove him from Martin County, Florida to the federal courthouse in Miami-Dade County, Florida for a hearing, when the van was involved in a "single vehicle accident" resulting in physical injuries to Plaintiff. [Id. at 1]. He alleges that the U.S., acting through the USMS, drove the vehicle "willfully and wantonly" disregarding his safety and the safety of other passengers. [Id. at 2]. Because the van had no safety belts, and he was shackled and restrained with waist, leg, and ankle cuffs, he states that he was unable to steady himself and was violently thrashed about inside the van due to the driver's actions. [Id.]. Plaintiff claims he suffered "serious bodily injury," including headaches, neck pain, and lack of concentration since the accident. [Id.]. He alleges the U.S., through the USMS, breached its duty to use reasonable care by "jumping the curb, revving up the engine, slamming into a metal barrier and thrusting the vehicle and its passenger violently" about the van. [Id. at 3].

Next, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied medical treatment by the BOP and DOJ. [Id. at 2]. He maintains all information regarding this claim was attached to the Complaint and First Amended Complaint. [Id.]. He alleges he made "years of requests for medical care during his incarceration from 2017 to 2020 with the medical staff at [D. Ray James Correctional Facility ("DRJ")]," but treatment was "systematically postponed or denied by DRJ, and the BOP." [Id.at 3]. He maintains that the U.S. and BOP were "deliberately indifferent" to his serious injuries refusing to provide him much needed medical care following the vehicular accident, resulting in permanent headaches and neck andshoulder pain. [Id.]. He also alleges he suffered knee injuries which were untreated resulting in a crippling and debilitating injury that now requires the use of a cane or walker. [Id.]. He seeks compensatory damages for all of these injuries. [Id. at 4-5].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because "Bivens actions are analogous to § 1983 actions," the Eleventh Circuit has applied "§ 1983 law to Bivens cases." Glover v. Eighth Unknown D.E.A. Agents/Drug Task Force Agents from Birmingham, Ala. Task Force, 225 F. App'x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citing Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1065 (11th Cir. 1995)). Standing alone, § 1983 "does not create any substantive rights, 'but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Glover, 225 F. App'x at 784 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), when a plaintiff is proceeding IFP, a complaint must be dismissed if the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See Wright v. Miranda, 740 F. App'x 692, 694 (11th Cir. 2018). In reviewing the complaint under § 1915(e), the Court takes the allegations as true and construes them in the most favorable light. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003); Maps v. Miami Dade State Attorney, 693 F. App'x 784, 785 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). In order to "avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain factual allegations that, when accepted as true, allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct." Wright, 740 F. App'x at 694 (citing Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)). Although a pro se pleading is liberally construed, it must still "suggest that there is some factual support for a claim." Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a causeof action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "Therefore, to prevail in a § 1983 [or Bivens] action, the plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under the color of state [or federal] law." Glover, 225 F. App'x at 784 (citing Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), courts may dismiss as frivolous claims that are "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or "whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001). The claim must be "plausible on its face." Bell, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The Court may not, however, construct a litigant's legal arguments for him. See Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1285 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding a court "may look at all the evidence in the record," but it may not "act as plaintiff's lawyer and construct the party's theory of liability from facts never alleged, alluded to, or mentioned during the litigation.").

III. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")

1. Proper Party

"An FTCA claim against a federal agency or employee as opposed to the United States itself must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction." Echevarria-de-Pena, No. 12-22248-CIV, 2013 WL 616932, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2013). To the extent Plaintiff intends to sue the BOP, DOJ, the USMS, Agents John Doe #1 and John Doe #2, and the unknown Automobile Insurance Company, the claim must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. However, in the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff added the United States as a Defendant, therefore naming the proper party to the FTCA claim. [ECF No. 26 at 5]. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's FTCA claim against the United States should proceed as it states a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted.

2. FTCA Standard

"The FTCA 'was designed to provide redress for ordinary torts recognized by state law.'" See Daniel v. United States, 188 F. App'x 954, 959 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (quoting Stone v. United States, 373 F.3d 1129, 1130 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (quotations omitted)).

The FTCA imposes civil liability on the United States for "injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."

Duque v. United States, 216 F. App'x 830, 831 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). However, "the alleged tortfeasor must be an employee of the government." See Duque, 216 F. App'x at 831 (citing Patterson & Wilder Constr. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1269, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 2000)). Under the FTCA, an "'employee of the Government' includes 'officers or employees of any federal agency . . . and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States, whether with or without compensation.'" Duque, 216 F. App'x at 831-32 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2671) (omission in original).

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