Cocroft v. Pfister

DESHAWN COCROFT, Petitioner, v. RANDY PFISTER, Warden, Pontiac Correctional Center, Respondent.

No. 14 C 02445

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

March 9, 2016

Judge John J. Tharp, Jr.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner Deshawn Cocroft is currently in the custody of the respondent, Warden Randy Pfister, at the Pontiac Correctional Center in Pontiac, Illinois. Before the Court is Cocroft's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Also pending is Cocroft's motion for leave to make necessary discovery. For the following reasons, the Court denies Cocroft's habeas petition and the discovery motion, and declines to certify any issues for appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹

Cocroft was arrested and convicted for the sexual assault of an eleven-year-old girl ("SH") that took place on January 26, 2003. A grand jury charged Cocroft with four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault, three counts of criminal sexual abuse, and one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Answer to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 18, Ex. Aat 1. The government dismissed all but two counts alleging Cocroft committed predatory sexual assault by contacting S.H's vagina with his penis and penetrating her with his finger.

Although Cocroft was known to the victim and others in the house where the crime occurred, and was reported to the police immediately, he fled from the home and was not taken into custody until May 15, 2007. Id. At an October 2007 pretrial hearing, at which the state requested a continuance because there was outstanding DNA evidence that needed to be analyzed, Cocroft demanded a trial by jury "today." Id. at 1-2. The court instructed Cocroft that decision belonged to his attorney and that discovery was not yet completed. Id. Cocroft asked if he could demand a speedy trial if he dismissed his attorney and proceeded pro se. The court told him that he could represent himself but warned that:

"You have a lawyer. If you want to have another lawyer come in and file a substitution of lawyer...they can file the motion and I will consider it depending how far along we are in the case and whether or not I find at that point a dilatory tactic. But once you demand trial and represent yourself, we're going to trial. So you can't come in here, demand trial and then have a lawyer come in in a month and file an appearance and non-demand trial and then fire that lawyer and demand trial, okay?

Id. at 2.

Despite the court's admonishments, Cocroft fired his court-appointed counsel, elected to proceed pro se, and demanded an immediate jury trial. Id. The court set the case for status in two weeks. Id. At that status, a privately hired attorney entered an appearance on Cocroft's behalf. Id. The attorney withdrew Cocroft's request for a speedy trial and requested time to review discovery. Id. The trial court judge allowed Cocroft to withdraw his request to proceed pro se, but indicated he would not further allow him to hire and fire attorneys as a dilatory tactic. The court gave the following warning:

All right. Here's the deal. I spent like 10 minutes last week going over this with you, all right? [Counsel's] appearance has been allowed. I have allowed him to file his appearance today. You're withdrawing your demand for trial. [Counsel] is going to look at it, talk to you and come back. You're not going to play the game. You're not going to fire the lawyer and ask time to get another lawyer.

Id. Cocroft then asked his newly hired attorney to disclose to him the police reports produced by the government during discovery, but private counsel declined to do so. Cocroft's counsel made the court aware of Cocroft's request at a later hearing, and the trial court explained to Cocroft that Illinois law prevented his counsel from physically tendering the police reports produced by the state to Cocroft, but reiterated that he could review those reports with counsel.

Several months later, at an August 2008 hearing, Cocroft's privately hired counsel informed the trial court that Cocroft had contacted the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) seeking information about his professional reputation. Id. at 2-3. Cocroft then wrote a letter to the ARDC asking it to investigate counsel for numerous ethical violations. Id. Counsel stated that none of the allegations in the letter were true, but he had no problem continuing to represent the petitioner. Counsel went on to indicate that Cocroft no longer wished to stipulate to the government's DNA evidence and wanted to hire his own independent analyst. Id. at 3. The court said he was free to do so, but had to have the analysis complete by the set trial date as the case was nearly two years old and he would not allow further delay.

The next day the state confirmed that it was ready for trial. Cocroft then again moved to fire his counsel and again indicated he wanted to proceed pro se. The Court then told Cocroft the following:

THE COURT: Now, you have the right to have a lawyer. You had a lawyer, okay? He's been representing you, okay? At this pointwe've gone through this on other occasions. Now it's on the eve of trial, and you're saying you don't want your lawyer and I've told you that the case is not going to be continued anymore and you knew that, right?

COCROFT: Yep.

THE COURT: And so you know you're going to trial today?

COCROFT: Okay.

Id. Cocroft then requested time to review discovery materials. But the state then informed the court that, because the petitioner had refused to stipulate to DNA evidence, it had flown in two witnesses from out of state to testify that day at trial. The trial judge went on to note that he had told Cocroft the day before that if the witnesses were available, they were going to trial that day. After again warning Cocroft about the dangers of self-representation, the court granted his request to proceed pro se but declined his request for a continuance and stated the following:

I find this whole procedure today dilatory and I went over this yesterday and told you that if the witnesses were available, we were going to trial today. And this morning you're firing your lawyer and wanting a date to go over the discovery. So I just think that it is dilatory and I told you it was going to trial today...[w]e've been through this with you a couple times...and I think it's now just a stalling tactic. The case is set for trial and [counsel] has been dismissed. You're representing yourself.

Id. at 4.

When the case was called for trial, Cocroft stated that he was not prepared for trial because he had inadequate time to obtain discovery, and he again asked for a continuance. When that request was denied the trial court told defendant:

[Whenever] things didn't go your way you would say you were going to represent yourself, then you went back your lawyer. [Defense counsel] had put on the record . . . that he gone over discovery with you . . . I told you yesterday it was going to trial, so today your fired your lawyer and said you wanted a continuance. I think at this point you are following a path hoping to injecterror and hope that the [a]ppellate [c]ourt reverses the case. So I am making it clear for the record that over the course of this case we've had you examined for fitness, they found you fit . . . [and] that is my opinion, based on observing you and the history of the case, and the conversations with your attorney on the record that this is a calculated move by you to try and delay the case. And I'm not going to allow you to do it.

Id. The case then went to trial, but Cocroft refused to participate.

SH testified that on January 25, 2003 she was eleven-years old and lived at 4053 West Cermak Road with her older sister Christel Catchings, Michelle Silas, and Silas' seven-year old daughter, QM. People v. Cocroft, 2011 WL 9698901, at *5 (Ill. App. June 17, 2011). That night Cocroft arrived at SH's home with her cousin. After SH was introduced to Cocroft, he followed her into the bathroom and exposed his penis to her and then attempted to grab her, but SH was able to escape and proceeded to a bedroom in the home. Approximately one hour later, Cocroft entered the bedroom and lay down next to S.H. After Cocroft began rubbing her legs, SH left the room and proceeded into QM's bedroom and lay in QM's bed next to her. Cocroft followed SH into QM's bed and again lay next to her. When Cocroft began to sexually assault SH, QM attempted to leave the room to notify other adults in the home. But as QM was attempting to do so, Cocroft struck her in the lip. Crystal then called out to SH and told her and Cocroft to come out of the room. The two did so, and Crystal instructed SH to go back to bed. Id.

About an hour later, Cocroft went into the room SH was sleeping and raped her. Id. at *6. SH then went into the living room and told Christel what had happened. Id. The police were called, but Cocroft fled. SH was then transported to Mount Sinai hospital where she was examined by a physician; he testified at trial that his examination of SH found that there was a disruption of her hymen consistent with digital and/or penile penetration and that SH had told him that her assailant had vaginally penetrated her with both his penis and finger. Id. DNAevidence was collected from a bite mark on SH's neck. A DNA forensic analyst then testified that she had examined the sample collected at Mount Sinai with a sample provided by defendant and concluded that they came from the same DNA profile. Id. Cocroft refused to cross exam any witnesses and declined to put forth any defense, despite being afforded the opportunity to do so. The jury found Cocroft guilty on both counts of predatory sexual assault.

After the jury was discharged, Cocroft sought a lawyer for his sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing—after two further continuances—Cocroft informed the court that he had retained...