Cody v. City of St. Louis ex rel. Medium Sec. Inst.

103 F.4th 523

James CODY, Plaintiff - AppelleeVincent Grover; John Doe; John Roe, PlaintiffsMichael Mosley; Diedre Wortham, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated;Callion Barnes; Eddie Williams; Jasmine Borden, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, FOR AND ON BEHALF OF MEDIUM SECURITY INSTITUTION, Defendant - Appellant

No. 22-2348

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

Submitted: January 10, 2024

Filed: June 3, 2024

Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant and appeared on the brief was Andrew D. Wheaton, of Saint Louis, MO.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellees and appeared on the brief was Derek C. Reinbold, of Washington, DC. The following attorney(s) also appeared on the appellee brief; David Charles Frederick, of Washington, DC, Jacki Janelle Langum, of Saint Louis, MO, Nathaniel R. Carroll, of Saint Louis, MO, Blake A. Strode, of Saint Louis, MO, Maureen Hanlon, of Saint Louis, MO, Matthew N. Drecun, of Washington, DC, William B. Rubenstein, of Cambridge, MA.

Before SMITH, Chief Judge,¹ GRUENDER and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

In this civil rights case, Plaintiffs seek damages for the allegedly inhumane conditions experienced at the City of St. Louis's Medium Security Institution (MSI). To that end, Plaintiffs sought certification of classes of pre-trial and post-conviction detainees at MSI. After the district court denied their first motion to certify, Plaintiffs returned with new proposed classes and renewed their motion. The district court granted the renewed motion, and the City now appeals, challenging both the decision to certify and several of its procedural aspects. We reverse the certification of the classes and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The named Plaintiffs² in this case are all former pre-trial or post-conviction detainees at MSI—a facility with a checkered past that closed in 2021 following action by St. Louis's political leaders. Plaintiffs allege that they were subjected to inhumane conditions at MSI, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. After suing the City for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they sought to represent classes of pre-trial and post-conviction detainees. Plaintiffs asserted that both categories of detainees were subjected to unconstitutionally poor physical conditions in the form of extreme temperatures, mold, faulty plumbing, and pest infestations, and unconstitutionally inadequate operations in the form of understaffing, inadequate recreation time, and the excessive use of force.

Plaintiffs first moved to certify four classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).³ Two were defined as all pre-trial and all post-conviction detainees "who were or will be released from MSI on or after November 13, 2012." And two were "heat" subclasses, defined as all members of the pre-trial and post-conviction detainee classes "who were assigned to a dorm, pod, or other area at MSI in which the internal temperature equaled or exceeded 88 degrees Fahrenheit."

While Plaintiffs' motion to certify was pending, the City and Plaintiffs both filed motions to exclude from evidence at trial the opinions, testimony, and reports of the other's experts concerning standards of care for prisons and the City's compliance therewith. As relevant here, Plaintiffs sought to present the opinions of James Balsamo, an environmental health and safety consultant with experience investigating correctional institutions, and Eldon Vail, a former correctional administrator. Balsamo used City records and National Weather Service data to calculate heat indexes for MSI, covering the hottest months of 2016 and 2017. He opined about the risks that excessively high temperatures created for inmates, and how those risks were exacerbated by inmates' underlying medical conditions or prescription medications. Vail opined about MSI's policies and practices relating to facility conditions and compared them to standards set by national bodies. The City argued that Balsamo's opinions should be excluded pursuant to Daubert⁴ because he relied on improper data in calculating the heat indexes and because he is not a medical doctor and is therefore not qualified to opine about medical risks posed by conditions at MSI. It also argued that Vail's opinions about facility temperatures were based on Balsamo's own unreliable opinions.

Before ruling on the parties' motions to exclude the expert testimony, the district court denied Plaintiffs' motion to certify the four classes. It reasoned that certification was inappropriate because of the open-ended class periods and because it was undisputed that the City improved the conditions at MSI over that time, for example, by installing air conditioning and substantially reducing the prison population. Moreover, the district court noted that the classes seemed to combine Plaintiffs' distinct complaints about the poor conditions and the use of excessive force: as the district court explained, different legal standards govern excessive force claims and conditions-of-confinement claims. Still, the district court "recognize[d] that a more focused claim, covering a more discrete time period, on behalf of a more uniform class, may well be appropriate for class certification."

Responding to the district court's concerns, Plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for class certification and proposed four new, more narrowly defined classes. The pre-trial and post-conviction classes were renamed as two "conditions" classes which, Plaintiffs argued, eliminated their excessive-force claims. The pre-trial and post-conviction heat subclasses were also narrowed to those detained in MSI's dormitories only, and "on days where the ambient air temperature in St. Louis, Missouri equaled or exceeded 88 degrees Fahrenheit." Plaintiffs argued this was an objective criterion for determining exposure to unconstitutionally hot conditions. Plaintiffs' narrowed class definitions also set end dates: July 1, 2018 for the pre-trial and post-conviction conditions classes, and July 24, 2017 for the heat subclasses.

The district court granted Plaintiffs' renewed motion and certified the four new classes pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). It reasoned, in relevant part, that the new conditions classes were appropriate for certification because Plaintiffs' renewed motion alleged that the conditions at MSI applied to them uniformly over a discrete period, meaning that class-wide proceedings would generate common answers to the members' claims. In doing so, the district court rejected the City's contention that variations in the conditions faced by each member and in the length of exposure to those conditions precluded certification. With respect to the heat subclasses, the district court held that certification was appropriate, in relevant part, because an Eighth Amendment violation may be proven by demonstrating exposure to excessive heat without adequate mitigation. Moreover, the district court explained that the proffered expert testimony from Balsamo concerning the dangers of high temperatures, and other common evidence of "sporadic and inconsistent" mitigation measures, would "help prove Plaintiffs' uniform allegation that the City's mitigation measures were, at best, haphazard and insufficient to reduce the danger posed by excessive heat." The district court rejected the City's argument that differences in the mitigation measures offered to class members—such as ice and cold showers—precluded certification.

After certifying the four new classes, the district court ruled on the City's and Plaintiffs' respective Daubert motions. As relevant here, the district court agreed with the City that Balsamo's heat indexes must be excluded because they were based on surface temperature data. However, the district court concluded that Balsamo was qualified to render an opinion regarding medical risks to inmates given his experience in public health. So too with his opinions regarding the excessive heat conditions at MSI, which were based on his observations of MSI's ventilation, heating and cooling systems, and his own ambient air temperature readings. The district court excluded Vail's opinions that relied on the surface temperature data but declined to exclude his remaining opinions, finding that the City's challenges to their factual bases were best addressed through cross-examination.

The City timely petitioned this Court for permission to appeal the district court's order certifying the classes, which we granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). The City now appeals, raising several points of error.

II.

"A district court has 'broad discretion' to determine whether certification is appropriate. The district court's rulings on questions of law are reviewed de novo and its application of the law is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The district court's factual findings are reversible only if clearly erroneous." Stuart v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 910 F.3d 371, 375 (8th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). "[T]he [district] court abuses its discretion if it commits an error of law." Luiken v. Domino's Pizza, LLC, 705 F.3d 370, 372 (8th Cir. 2013).

"To be certified as a class, plaintiffs must meet all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and must satisfy one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). Rule 23(a) requires showing that the class meets requirements of 'numerosity, commonality, typicality, and fair and adequate representation.' " Ahmad v. City of St. Louis, 995 F.3d 635, 643 (8th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) requires the court to find "that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the...