Coffey v. N.H. Judicial Ret. Plan

957 F.3d 45

Patricia C. COFFEY, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.NEW HAMPSHIRE JUDICIAL RETIREMENT PLAN; Board of Trustees of the New Hampshire Judicial Retirement Plan, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 19-1908

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

April 21, 2020

Stephen D. Rosenberg, Caroline M. Fiore, The Wagner Law Group, Russell F. Hilliard, and Upton & Hatfield LLP were on brief for appellant.

Scott H. Harris, Benjamin B. Folsom, and McLane Middleton, P.A. were on brief for appellee.

Before Lynch, Kayatta, and Barron, Circuit Judges.

LYNCH, Circuit Judge.

The issue on appeal is whether the New Hampshire Judicial Retirement Plan ("the Plan") allows a former judge who resigned with sufficient years of creditable service, but before reaching the minimum retirement age, to receive a Service Retirement Allowance ("SRA") upon later reaching the retirement age. In agreement with the district court, we hold that it does not. We affirm summary judgment for the Plan.

I.

A. The Judicial Retirement Plan Statute

The General Court of New Hampshire ("legislature") enacted the Plan as "a defined benefit plan providing disability, death, and retirement protection to members and their families." N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100-C:2(I). The Plan defines a "member" as "any full-time supreme court, superior court, or circuit court judge." Id. § 100-C:1(IX). The Plan "is intended for all time to meet the requirements of a qualified pension trust within the meaning of section 401(a), and to qualify as a governmental plan within the meaning of section 414(d) of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended." Id. § 100-C:2(I).

The Plan states in the "Service Retirement Benefits" provision that

[a]ny member who has at least 15 years of creditable service and is at least 60 years of age ... may retire on a service retirement allowance or a reduced service retirement allowance, upon written application to the board setting forth on what date, not less than 30 days nor more than 90 days subsequent to the filing of the application, the member desires to be retired. During such period of notification, the member may have separated from service.

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100-C:5(I).¹ "Retirement" is defined as "withdrawal from active service with a retirement allowance granted under the provisions of this chapter." Id. § 100-C:1(XIV).

A member who retires with five years of creditable service but is not eligible for an SRA is entitled to the return of the member's accumulated contributions to the Plan and any interest accrued on those contributions. Id. § 100-C:5(VII).

The Plan also allows a member to retire if he or she becomes disabled. The "Disability Retirement Benefits" provision states that

[r]egardless of a member's length of service, any member who becomes permanently and totally disabled may apply to the board of trustees to retire on a disability retirement allowance .... Such application shall be granted provided that a physician ... certifies that the member is mentally or physically incapacitated for further performance of duty, that such incapacity is likely to be permanent, and that such person should be retired. A member's disability retirement allowance shall be equal to 70 percent of the member's final year's salary.

Id. § 100-C:6. Further, the Plan provides that,

[i]f a member ceases to be a judge for reasons other than retirement or death, the amount of such member's accumulated contributions shall be paid to such member within 3 months after such member's written request therefor, provided that the member may not file a written request for such payment until at least 30 days from the date the member ceases to be a judge.

Id. § 100-C:8(I).

B. Facts

On October 25, 1991, Coffey became a Superior Court justice for the state of New Hampshire. She served full-time as a justice until she resigned on April 21, 2008; that is, for sixteen-and-a-half years. She was fifty-four years old when she resigned.

On January 16, 2015, at the age of sixty-one, Coffey applied for an SRA.

On February 24, 2015, the Board of Trustees of the New Hampshire Judicial Retirement Plan ("Board") denied her application. It stated that it interpreted N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100-C:5(I) "as requiring a member be employed up to the point of retirement"; that is, to be in active service at the time he or she applies for an SRA. Coffey's attorney protested, arguing that both the plain language of the statute and compliance with the governmental plan provisions of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") supported Coffey's interpretation and SRA application. On June 12, 2015, after considering these arguments, the Board issued a final decision denying Coffey's application for an SRA and so notified her.

C. Procedural History

Almost three years later, Coffey filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire against the Plan and the Board. She sought a declaratory judgment that she was eligible for an SRA and brought claims for violations of Chapter 100-C, section 5 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes and of section 502(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). She also brought a similar claim for breach of contract under New Hampshire state law.

On November 26, 2018, the district court dismissed Coffey's ERISA claim for failure to state a claim.² On August 14, 2019, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Plan as to the remaining claims. Coffey v. N.H. Judicial Ret. Plan, No. 18-cv-503, 2019 WL 3816731, at *6 (D.N.H. Aug. 14, 2019). The court concluded that the plain language of the statute "requires a judge to be in active service when she elects to retire and claim a service retirement allowance" and that "textual evidence" from the entire statutory scheme supported that conclusion. Id. at *3-4. This appeal followed.

II.

A. Standard of Review

"We review a grant or denial of summary judgment, as well as pure issues of law, de novo." Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 943 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 138 (1st Cir. 2013) ).

B. Statutory Interpretation Under New Hampshire Law

The parties agree there are no disputes of material fact and the issue is one of law. The issue is one of statutory interpretation: that is, whether Coffey is eligible to receive an SRA on her application.

To interpret a statute, New Hampshire courts³ "first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning." In re Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 82 A.3d 917, 920 (2013). "[I]f the language is clear and unambiguous," the court need "not look beyond the language of the statute." In re Town of Seabrook, 163 N.H. 635, 44 A.3d 518, 525 (2012). New Hampshire courts "interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include." Carrier, 82 A.3d at 920.

"[W]henever possible, every word of a statute should be given effect." Garand v. Town of Exeter, 159 N.H. 136, 977 A.2d 540, 544 (2009) (quoting Town of Amherst v. Gilroy, 157 N.H. 275, 950 A.2d 193, 197 (2008) ). Importantly, "[w]hile the title of a statute is not conclusive of its interpretation, it provides significant indication of the legislature's intent in enacting the statute." Id. at 545 (quoting State v. Gubitosi, 157 N.H. 720, 958 A.2d 962, 966 (2008) ).

New Hampshire courts "construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. Moreover, [they] do not consider words and phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole." Carrier, 82 A.3d at 920 (citation omitted). Following this approach, we must also "presume that the legislature does not enact unnecessary and duplicative provisions." Garand, 977 A.2d at 544 (quoting State v. Gifford, 148 N.H. 215, 808 A.2d 1, 3 (2002) ).

C. Section 100-C:5 Requires a Member To Be in Active Service When He or She Applies for an SRA

The district court correctly concluded that "the only plausible way to read [ section] 100-C:5, I is that it requires a judge to be in active service when she elects to retire and claim a service retirement allowance." Inserting the definition in section 100-C:1(XIV) of "retirement" into section 100-C:5(I) reads as:

Any member who has at least 15 years of creditable service and is at least 60 years of age ... may ["withdraw[ ] from active service with a retirement allowance granted under the provisions of this chapter"] on a service retirement allowance or a reduced service retirement allowance, upon written application to the board setting forth on what date, not less than 30 days nor more than 90 days subsequent to the filing of the application, the member desires to be retired. During such period of notification, the member may have separated from service.

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 100-C:1(XIV), 100-C:5(I). Read with the definition of "retirement," the plain language of this section requires a retirement-age member with sufficient creditable service to "withdraw from active service" to receive an SRA.

Although this substitution does show a minor superfluity in the provision, this does not alter our interpretation. First, it does not create the significant redundancy and either inconsistency or absurd result that Coffey's interpretation would. See infra; see also Garand, 977 A.2d at 544 ("[W]henever possible, every word of a statute should be given effect." (emphasis added) (quoting Town of Amherst, 950 A.2d at 197 )). Although the district court adopted this interpretation and the Plan argues for it in its appellate brief, Coffey does not argue that this minor superfluity requires that we adopt her interpretation. Any such argument is waived. Pignons S.A. de Mecanique v. Polaroid Corp., ...