Coffield v. Robinson

857 S.E.2d 395

Karen COFFIELD, Defendant Below, Petitioner

v.Ronald Neil ROBINSON II, Plaintiff Below, Respondent

No. 20-0033

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: February 16, 2021

Filed: April 16, 2021

Paul J. Harris, Esq., Wheeling, West Virginia, Attorney for Petitioner.

Amy Pigg Shafer, Esq., Shafer Law Offices, Wheeling, West Virginia, Attorney for Respondent.

HUTCHISON, Justice:

Petitioner Karen Coffield appeals the December 17, 2019, order of the Circuit Court of Marshall County denying her motion for judgment as a matter of law and her alternative motion for a new trial in this civil action filed against her by the respondent, Ronald Neil Robinson II. Mr. Robinson filed his complaint against Ms. Coffield on September 27, 2013, alleging that she fraudulently and intentionally concealed, for more than ten years, the fact that he was the father of her child. Mr. Robinson asserted that Ms. Coffield's conduct precluded him from establishing a relationship with his child and constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. The case was tried before a jury in December 2019, and a verdict was returned in favor of Mr. Robinson. Thereafter, the circuit court awarded Mr. Robinson his attorney's fees.

In this appeal, Ms. Coffield primarily argues that the circuit court erred by not granting summary judgment in her favor prior to trial because Mr. Robinson's claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations, which she alleged as an affirmative defense in her answer to his complaint.¹ In denying Ms. Coffield's summary judgment motion, the circuit court concluded she had "slumbered on her rights" by engaging in the litigation for five years and, therefore, waived her statute of limitations defense. For the reasons set forth below, we find that the circuit court erred in that regard. We further find that Mr. Robinson's claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Therefore, we reverse the circuit court's final order and remand this case for entry of an order setting aside the jury's verdict and granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Ms. Coffield.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

The parties had a three-year relationship that ended in February 2000. A few months later, the parties spent one night together. Thereafter, Ms. Coffield told Mr. Robinson that she was pregnant, but did not disclose that he was the father of her child. Instead, she told him that she became pregnant by artificial insemination. Ms. Coffield gave birth to her child in March 2001. After the child was born, Mr. Robinson made a couple of inquiries about the child's paternity because people commented on the child's resemblance to him. Ms. Coffield maintained that her child had been conceived through artificial insemination.

After personally observing the child at the age of ten years old,² Mr. Robinson filed an action in the Family Court of Marshall County seeking a paternity determination. Thereafter, the family court ordered paternity testing, and on September 27, 2011, the test results confirming that Mr. Robinson was the child's father were filed in the family court case. Notably, however, Mr. Robinson posted the following on his Facebook page on September 11, 2011:

I just wanted everyone to know that I just found out that im [sic] the father of A [sic] ten year old little girl. Her name is [ ] Coffield and she is so beautiful. I lost ten years not knowing she was mine but I intend on making up for lost time. I am so happy.

The parties had agreed to conduct a private DNA test using a kit obtained at a drugstore. They learned the results of the private test before the results of the paternity test ordered by the family court were made available.

On September 27, 2013, Mr. Robinson initiated this civil action by filing his complaint in the circuit court. On October 24, 2013, Ms. Coffield filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that West Virginia does not recognize actions for "alienation of affections" and Mr. Robinson's claims were barred by res judicata because the issues were decided in the family court case. The motion to dismiss was denied. Ms. Coffield then answered the complaint and asserted, inter alia, the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.

On July 20, 2018, Ms. Coffield filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Robinson's complaint was barred because it was filed after the statute of limitations expired. ³

The circuit court denied the summary judgment motion by order entered on February 1, 2019, finding that Ms. Coffield had "slumbered on her rights to have the case dismissed pursuant to the statute of limitation[s]." The case proceeded to trial on December 9, 2019. At the end of the second day of trial, the jury returned a verdict for Mr. Robinson, finding in his favor only as to his claim of intentional misrepresentation/fraudulent concealment.⁴ The jury awarded Mr. Robinson $2,747.50 in compensable damages for "the reasonable costs and expenses ... in legal fees, in his attempt to establish paternity to his daughter and gain custody of her" and punitive damages in the amount of $12,252.50, resulting in a total verdict of $15,000.

Subsequently, Ms. Coffield filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or alternatively, a new trial, again asserting, inter alia, that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. Mr. Robinson sought a new trial on damages only, claiming that the jury's compensatory damages verdict was inadequate. The parties’ respective motions were denied.

Mr. Robinson also filed a motion for an award of attorney's fees. A hearing was held on the motion on January 16, 2020, and by order dated February 21, 2020, Mr. Robinson was granted attorney's fees in the amount of $6,000.00. In its order, the circuit court included the following finding as a factor in determining the amount of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded to Mr. Robinson:

The Court is mindful of the fact that the plaintiff's prevailing fraud claim could have easily been dismissed. The statute of limitations for claims of fraud is two (2) years. The statute in this case began to run on September 11, 2011, when the plaintiff discovered that he was the father of the defendant's child. The plaintiff did not file his complaint until September 27, 2013, over two weeks too late. However, the defendant failed to raise the statute of limitations for nearly five (5) years. By order dated February 1, 2019, the Court denied the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the statute of limitations issue due to the defendant slumbering on her right to raise the same. But for the defendant's neglect, the fraud claim may have been barred completely.

Following entry of the circuit court's orders on the post-trial motions, Ms. Coffield filed her petition for appeal with this Court. In his response brief, Mr. Robinson has asserted two cross-assignments of error,⁵ contending that the circuit court erred by denying his motion for a new trial as to damages only because of the inadequacy of the compensatory damages award and erred by failing to grant him a greater amount of attorney's fees.

II. Standard of Review

Ms. Coffield appeals the circuit court's order denying her post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, a new trial. It is well established that "[t]he appellate standard of review for an order granting or denying a renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law after trial pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure [1998] is de novo. " Syl. Pt. 1., Fredeking v. Tyler , 224 W. Va. 1, 680 S.E.2d 16 (2009). Upon review, we find the dispositive issue in this case is whether the affirmative defense that a complaint is barred by the applicable statute of limitations can be waived by a defendant's participation in the litigation. Thus, we are presented with a question of law to which we also apply a de novo standard of review. See Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L. , 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995) ("Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review."). With this standard in mind, we consider the parties’ arguments.

III. Discussion

In this case, the threshold question we must answer is whether the statute of limitations defense can be waived by participation in the litigation after it is asserted affirmatively in the answer to a complaint. Although we have not previously considered this exact issue, this Court has long held that "[t]he statute of limitations is a defense which should be set forth affirmatively pursuant to Rule 8(c), W.Va.R.C.P.⁶ or the pleader risks the court's denial to assert that defense in bar at trial." Syl. Pt. 2, Nellas v. Loucas , 156 W. Va. 77, 191 S.E.2d 160 (1972) (footnote added). Accordingly, Nellas provides a starting point for our analysis.

Nellas was an action brought by the heirs of a decedent against one of the attorneys who handled the administration of their decedent's estate and failed to timely file a federal estate tax return resulting in an assessment of penalties against the estate in addition to the tax that was due. Id. at 78-79, 191 S.E.2d at 161-62. The complaint was drafted in a vague manner such that it was unclear as to whether the cause of action sounded in tort or contract. The statute of limitations defense was not raised by the defendant in his answer to the complaint and did not become an issue until the middle of trial when defense counsel raised it for the first time at the close of the plaintiffs’ evidence. Id. The trial court took no action at that time with respect to defense counsel's assertion that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiffs’ claim, and at the end of trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. Thereafter, the defendant raised the statute of limitations defense by formal motion and moved to set aside the jury's...