Cogdell v. Murphy

Leland L. Cogdell, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Emily W. Murphy, Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 19-2462 (RC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

November 20, 2020

Re Document Nos.: 8, 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR, ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Leland Cogdell, Jr., used to be an employee at the General Services Administration ("GSA"). He now brings an official-capacity suit against GSA Administrator Emily Murphy alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794f.¹ The GSA filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, a motion for summary judgment. See Def.'s Mot. Dismiss or, Alternatively, Mot. Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mot."), ECF No. 8. For the reasons below, the Court denies the GSA summary judgment on Cogdell's failure-to-accommodate claim; grants in part and denies in part the motion to dismiss Cogdell's intentional discrimination claim; and grants in part and denies in part the motion to dismiss Cogdell's retaliation claim. The Court also denies the GSA's motion to dismiss insofar as it seeks to limit Cogdell's potential recovery to benefits he earned before his resignation. Three of Cogdell's claims survive: hisclaim that the GSA failed to accommodate his disability when it denied him a job coach as well as his claims that the GSA discriminated and retaliated against him when it rejected his request for advanced sick leave.

II. BACKGROUND²

The Court summarizes the relevant facts as alleged in Cogdell's amended complaint because, when considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court "assumes the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations . . . and construes reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff's favor." Sissel v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 760 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

Cogdell worked at the GSA for almost fifteen years. Am. Compl. ¶ 15, ECF No. 13-2. During his tenure there, he suffered from a variety of mental health problems, including autism spectrum disorder, a learning disability, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and mixed personality disorder. Id. ¶ 11. Among the consequences of these disorders was that Cogdell had difficulty concentrating. Id. ¶ 12.

A few years after beginning work for the GSA, Cogdell complained that the GSA did not reasonably accommodate his disabilities. See id. ¶ 21. An administrative judge with the EqualEmployment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") agreed and found that the GSA had retaliated against Cogdell too. Id. In accordance with the EEOC judge's order, the GSA started allowing Cogdell to work from home four days per week. Id. ¶ 22.

At the beginning of April 2014, the GSA assigned Cogdell to be an Internal Communications Specialist. Id. ¶ 81. Cogdell says the job, which "require[d] almost-daily deadlines," "was outside [his] skill set[] due to his developmental disabilities." Id. ¶¶ 81-82. So from April 15 to June 3, 2014, Cogdell took seven weeks of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). Id. ¶ 27. That act "entitles eligible employees . . . to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year for medical and other specified reasons." Doe v. U.S. Postal Serv., 317 F.3d 339, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

While Cogdell was out on leave in May, the GSA published a job vacancy. Am. Compl. ¶ 28. According to Cogdell, GSA policies required his supervisor, David Wycinski, to inform him of the vacancy while he was on leave "in an alternative manner[] other than sending [it] to his work email address." Id. ¶¶ 29-32. Wycinski did not do so. See id. ¶ 31.

Cogdell returned from his FMLA leave and, shortly thereafter, made an accommodation request through his cognitive therapist, Dr. Catherine Lee. Id. ¶ 36-37. He asked that the GSA provide him with (1) a quiet room when he came into the office to minimize distractions; (2) noise-cancelling headphones; (3) extra time to complete assignments; (4) regular feedback on work product; and (5) a job coach for at least ninety days to help him "re-acclimate" to work after his FMLA leave. Id. ¶ 38.

Octavia Richardson, a human resource specialist and reasonable accommodation coordinator, arranged a conference call with Cogdell and Wycinsky that took place about five weeks after Cogdell submitted his request. Id. ¶ 49. During the meeting, when Cogdell askedwhat was taking so long to respond to his request, Richardson "raised her voice" and exclaimed, "I have 100 Ted Cogdells!" Id. ¶¶ 50-51.

Six weeks later, the GSA granted all of Cogdell's accommodation requests except for the job coach. See id. ¶¶ 46, 52. Instead of giving Cogdell a job coach, the GSA provided him with a link to online training videos. Id. ¶ 57. He says that the link did not work and that nobody fixed the issue after he told GSA management. Id. ¶ 58. In addition, Cogdell filed two appeals of the GSA's accommodation decision, but the GSA never responded. Id. ¶¶ 64-65.

While the GSA was processing his accommodation request, Cogdell also asked for counseling as an employee with a targeted disability. Id. ¶ 39. An executive order charges federal agencies with identifying a senior official who shall, among other things, "coordinat[e] employment counseling to help match the career aspirations of individuals with disabilities to the needs of the agency." Exec. Order No. 13,548, 75 Fed. Reg. 45,039, 45,040 (July 26, 2010). Cogdell says that the relevant agency official at the GSA initially ignored his request for counseling, then transferred it to human resources, and ultimately hung up on Cogdell when he called for an update. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 42-45.

Cogdell's health deteriorated following the denials of his requests, so he made another accommodation request: that he be able to work from home full-time. Id. ¶¶ 66-67. The GSA granted the request just over a week later. Id. ¶ 76. But in the meantime, someone at the GSA became worried that Cogdell was suicidal and called the police to check on him. Id. ¶ 68. When the police arrived at Cogdell's home, he was not there. Id. at ¶ 69. Accordingly, the GSA asked him to provide medical certification for his absence. Id. ¶ 70. It also put him on leave and ordered him to stay away from his GSA workplace for a day. Id. ¶¶ 71-73.

Cogdell teleworked full-time for a month but continued to struggle in his role as an Internal Communications Specialist. Id. ¶ 76-77. In December 2014, he went on leave for three weeks. Id. ¶¶ 87-88. Dr. Lee submitted a request on his behalf for FMLA leave, administrative leave, or advanced sick leave. Id. ¶ 86. The GSA denied the request for advanced sick leave, "even though he met the [relevant] qualifications." Id. ¶ 93. It explained that it did not expect Cogdell would return to work (a requirement for advanced sick leave), despite the fact that Dr. Lee's request said he intended to return. Id. ¶ 94. In addition, Cogdell claims that the GSA did not tell him about a voluntary leave transfer program that could have benefited him. Id. ¶¶ 89-91. He ended up using 107 hours of leave without pay, id. ¶ 92, and his net pay fell to "about $203 per month." Id. ¶ 96.

After going off and on leave without pay a couple times in January, Cogdell worked full-time from home until July 14, 2015. Id. ¶¶ 97-102. During that time period, he was unable to do his job because, according to him, he was not properly accommodated, the job was one he was not trained for, and his supervisor gave "sparing assistance." Id. ¶ 103. He stopped working in July and eventually left the agency in February 2016. Id. ¶¶ 102, 104, 108.

Cogdell raised informal and formal complaints internally within the GSA to no avail. He then brought this suit, alleging three claims under the Rehabilitation Act: (1) that the GSA failed to reasonably accommodate him by denying him a job coach; (2) that the GSA discriminated against him on the basis of his disabilities; and (3) that the GSA retaliated against him for requesting reasonable accommodations. Compl. ¶¶ 101-27, ECF No. 1; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 109-40.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The GSA moves to dismiss Cogdell's complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. See Def.'s Mot. at 1. A plaintiff defeats a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6) if his complaint pleads "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In turn, a claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint's factual assertions need not be "detailed," but mere "'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In assessing plausibility, the court "assumes the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and construes reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff's favor but is not required to accept the plaintiff's legal conclusions as correct." Sissel, 760 F.3d at 4 (citation omitted).

A court ruling on a motion to dismiss confines its review to factual allegations in the complaint, documents attached or incorporated into the complaint, and matters of which it can take judicial notice. EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). But even when the complaint does not expressly incorporate a document, the court may consider "documents upon which the plaintiff's complaint necessarily relies," including those "produced not by the plaintiff in the complaint but by the defendant in a motion to dismiss." Page v. Mancuso, 999 F. Supp. 2d 269, 275 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Ward v. D.C. Dep't of Youth Rehab. Servs., 768 F. Supp. 2d 117, 119 (D.D.C. 2011)). If the...