Coker v. Warren

Befaithful Coker, Lake City, FL, Pro Se.

Lucas Jordan Taylor, Sellers, Taylor & Morrison, PA, Live Oak, FL, for Defendants Slyvester Warren, III, Justice and Equality Coalition, Incorporated, Stephen Douglas, Glennel Bowden, Vanessa George, Nathan Gambles, III.

Susan S. Erdelyi, Marks Gray, PA, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendants City Council of Lake City Florida, Jake Hill, Eugene Jefferson, Stephen Witt, Audrey Sikes, Fred Koberlein, Jr.

Gwendolyn Palmer Adkins, William Breen Armistead, Coppins Monroe Adkins & Dincman, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, Susan S. Erdelyi, Marks Gray, PA, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant Christopher Todd Sampson.

Stephanie Roman Caban, McConnaughhay, Coonrod, Pope, et al., Tallahassee, FL, for Defendants Tomi Brown, Joel Foreman, Columbia County Board of County Commissioners, Ronald Williams.

Robert Bruce George, The Liles Firm, PA, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendants Lake City, Columbia County Chamber of Commerce, Steve Smith.

Brooks C. Rathet, Bromagen, Rathet and Klee, PA, Jacksonville Beach, FL, for Defendants Northeast Florida Newspaper, LLC, Todd Wilson.

Jennifer Catherine Biewend, Kris Bradshaw Robinson, Robinson, Kennon & Kendron, PA, Lake City, FL, for Defendant Kris Bradshaw Robinson.

Christopher Claudio Torres, Florida Attorney General's Office Civil Torts Section, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant David Fina.

Ashley E. Davis, Florida Department of State, Tallahassee, FL, Christopher Claudio Torres, Florida Attorney General's Office Civil Torts Section, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant Florida Secretary of State.

Stephen Douglas, Lake City, FL, Pro Se.

ORDER

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD, United States District Judge

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on numerous motions to dismiss the Third Amended and Restated Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (Doc. 10; TAC) filed by Plaintiff Befaithful Coker in this action. Coker filed a response in opposition to each of the motions. The motions and responses are as follows:

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All moving Defendants seek dismissal of the claims against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)) for failure to state a claim. In addition, as specified in more detail below, certain Defendants move to dismiss for lack of standing pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).⁴ Upon review of the Motions, Responses, and operative complaint, the Court finds that dismissal of this case in its entirety is warranted.

I. Standards of Review

A motion to dismiss asserting a lack of standing is a challenge to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction properly considered under Rule 12(b)(1). Townsend v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. 2:05-cv-439-FtM-99DNF, 2007 WL 177857, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2007); Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 974 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that standing "implicates [the Court's] subject matter jurisdiction"). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction " 'empowered to hear only those cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article III of the Constitution,' and which have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant authorized by Congress." See Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994)). Article III of the Constitution, by its plain language, limits the jurisdiction of federal courts (the "judicial power" of the courts) to the consideration of Cases and Controversies. Kelly v. Harris, 331 F.3d 817, 819 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Ala. Power Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 307 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th Cir. 2002)). The doctrine of standing "stems directly from Article III's 'case or controversy' requirement," Bochese 405 F.3d at 974, and ensures that "federal courts do not exceed their authority," Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016). Indeed, standing "is 'perhaps the most important' jurisdictional doctrine." Bochese, 405 F.3d at 974 (quoting Bischoff v. Osceola Cnty., Fla., 222 F.3d 874, 877-78 (11th Cir. 2000)) (additional citations omitted). In the absence of standing, a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and is "powerless to hear a case." Id.; see also Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 410 ("Simply put, once a federal court determines that it is without subject matter jurisdiction, the court is powerless to continue.").

In this action, Coker, "as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing" that she has standing to pursue the claims she alleges in the Third Amended Complaint. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. To do so, she must establish each element of standing " 'in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of litigation.' " See Bischoff, 222 F.3d at 878 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). As such, "when standing becomes an issue on a motion to dismiss, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may be sufficient to show standing." Id.; Kawa Orthodontics, LLP v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 773 F.3d 243, 245 (11th Cir. 2014) ("[W]e presume the plaintiff's 'general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.' ") (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130).

The Eleventh Circuit has unequivocally instructed that "[u]nder settled precedent, the 'irreducible constitutional minimum' of standing consists of three elements: the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, the defendant must have caused that injury, and a favorable decision must be likely to redress it." See Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 996 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130). Among these elements, the "foremost" requirement of standing is the existence of an injury in fact. Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 103, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998)). "An injury in fact consists of 'an invasion of a legally protected interest' that is both 'concrete and particularized' and 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.' " Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130). To qualify as "concrete," the injury must be "real, and not abstract." Id. (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548). To be sufficiently "particularized," the injury "must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Id. (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548). To satisfy the injury element of standing, a plaintiff must establish "[e]ach subsidiary element of injury—a legally protected interest, concreteness, particularization, and imminence . . ." Id. (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545, and Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n.1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); see also Lotierzo v. Woman's World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while "[s]pecific facts are not necessary," the complaint should " 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.' " Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127...