Cole v. Mont. Univ. Sys.

1

CATHERINE COLE, BARBARA KOOSTRA, MARY-ANN SONTAG BOWMAN, and RHONDIE VOORHEES, Plaintiffs, v. MONTANA UNIVERSITY SYSTEM, UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA-MISSOULA, and JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 1-50, Defendants.

No. CV-21-88-M-BMM

United States District Court, D. Montana, Missoula Division

May 4, 2023

ORDER

BRIAN MORRIS, CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Catherine Cole, Barbara Koostra, Mary-Ann Sontag Bowman Rhondie Voorhees, Courtney Babcock, Laura Berkhouse, Ruth Ann Burgad, Jennifer Cooper, Cindy Ferguson, Frieda Houser Sherrie Lindbo, Jennifer McNulty, Kathleen Reeves, Vida Wilkinson, and two Jane Does (“Plaintiffs”) filed this action alleging breach of contract claims and claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C § 1681, et seq. (“Title IX”) against the Montana University System (“MUS”) and the University of Montana (“UM”) (collectively “Defendants”). (Doc. 53.)

Plaintiffs and Defendants most recently filed competing motions, in support of class certification, and to deny class certification, respectively, in the fall of 2022. (Doc. 36); (Doc. 33.) The Court granted Defendants' Motion to Deny Class Certification and denied without prejudice Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification on October 3, 2022. (Doc. 58.)

Plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint on January 6, 2023, in which they seek to add Jackie Hedtke (“Hedtke”) and Laura John (“John”) as plaintiffs. (Doc. 65.) Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss the claims of Hedtke and John. (Doc. 66.) Defendants argue that Hedtke's and John's claims fall outside the statute of limitations. (Id.) Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Amend their Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 80) and a Motion to Continue Scheduling Order Dates. (Doc. 82.) The Court held hearings on these Motions on February 17, 2023 and April 10, 2023. (Doc. 77); (Doc. 100.) The Court will address by separate Order Plaintiffs' Motion to Continue Scheduling Order Dates.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are women suing Defendants for violation of Title IX and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing relating to their employment contracts. (Doc. 65.) Plaintiffs allege generally that Defendants discriminated against them on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants fostered a “good ol' boys club culture, favoring male athletes and employees, while excluding women from participation in activities and benefits regularly afforded to their male counterparts.” (Doc. 35 at 9.)

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained within each Plaintiff's employment contract with Defendants. Plaintiffs claim that “Defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by depriving Plaintiffs and the putative class the Title IX benefits to which they were lawfully entitled.” (Doc. 65 ¶ 447.)

Hedtke's claims involve her tenure as an Assistant Director for Operations at UM's Adams Center between her hiring in 2006 and UM's failure to renew her contract some time in 2013. (Id. ¶¶ 331-47.) John's claims involve her time as a Ph.D. candidate in UM's Clinical Psychology Program. (Id. ¶¶ 348-71.) John spent five years, from 2006 to 2011, in the Clinical Psychology Program and alleges that UM terminated her Ph.D. candidacy in 2011. John claims that UM would allow her only to pursue a lesser degree after 2011: “[a]fter 5-years in the Department, the Chair informed [] John that she was ‘not Ph.D material' and would not receive her Ph.D from UM. The Chair had decided for Ms. John that she could only pursue and receive a master's degree.” (Id. ¶¶ 348-71.) John alleges that her relationship with Defendants ended in 2015, but she does not detail the circumstances of this ultimate termination. (Doc. 70 at 5.)

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants' Motion for Partial Dismissal (Doc. 66)

Legal background

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal proves appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Mendiondo v. Centinela Hospital Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).

A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim for relief plausible on its face to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). A claim appears plausible on its face when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. The Court must accept all allegations of material fact contained in the complaint as true when evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Johnson v. Lucent Technologies Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court does not weigh the facts at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage but merely assesses the sufficiency of Plaintiff's allegations. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).

The Court should grant a motion to dismiss based on expiration of the statute of limitations “if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. U.S., 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir.1980)). The Court may grant this type of motion to dismiss when “the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Jablon, 614 F.2d at 682. The Court examines separately the statute of limitations for each type of claim at issue.

Hedtke and John have joined the preexisting Plaintiffs in asserting that Defendants violated Title IX (Doc. 65 ¶¶ 421-40) and breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Id. ¶¶ 441-48.) Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides that protected persons shall not “on the basis of sex [. . .] be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Montana's statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to Title IX claims. See Stanley v. Trustees of California State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006). Montana law has established a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-204(1); see Slice v. Schweitzer, 2008 WL 5435338, at *7 (D. Mont. June 5, 2008).

“‘[T]he covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] is a mutual promise implied in every contract that the parties will deal with each other in good faith, and not attempt to deprive the other party of the benefits of the contract through dishonesty or abuse of discretion in performance.'” Phelps v. Frampton, 170 P.3d 474, 482 (Mont. 2007) (quoting Beaverhead Bar Supply v. Harrington, 805 P.2d 560, 564 (Mont. 1991)). Claims for breach of the implied covenant claims may sound in tort or in contract. Some of these contract-based claims fall under an extended, eightyear statute of limitations. See, e.g., Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 776 (Mont. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Arrowhead Sch. Dist. No. 75 v. Klyap, 79 P.3d 250 (Mont. 2003); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-202(1).

This eight-year statute of limitations does not apply to claims based on certain public contracts with the State of Montana's public agencies. Disputes between a contractor and a public agency require a court action to commence within one year after “the cause of action arises” when the contracting agency provides no settlement procedure. Mont. Code Ann. § 18-1-402(2). Defendants here represent public contracting agencies for the purposes of this statutory time limitation. Mont. Code Ann. § 18-1-101(c)(i).

“A claim or cause of action accrues” under Montana law “when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action.” Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-102(a). A statute of limitations begins to run, in other words, “when all elements of a claim, including [injury and] damages, have occurred.” Estate of Watkins v. Hedman, Hileman & Lacosta, 91 P.3d 1264, 1269 (Mont. 2004).

The statutes of limitations applicable to Hedtke's and John's claims

Defendants' argument in support of dismissal proves simple. Defendants argue that Hedtke's and John's Title IX claims accrued at the latest in 2013 and 2011 or 2015, respectively, when UM failed to renew Hedtke's contract and John's time as a Ph.D candidate in the Clinical Psychology department ended. (Doc. 67 at 9-10); (Doc. 94 at 11.) Three years represents the statute of limitations for Title IX actions in Montana. See Stanley, 433 F.3d at 1136; Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-204(1). Defendants contend that Hedtke's and John's claims prove time-barred because they did not bring their respective Title IX claims within three years of the termination of their relationships with Defendants-within three years of 2013 for Hedtke and within three years of 2011, or 2015, for John. (Doc. 67 at 10-12.) Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Hedtke's and John's claims for this reason. (Doc. 67 at 12.)

Hedtke and John do not dispute that Title IX claims remain subject to a three-year statute of limitations. (Doc. 70 at 6.) The Court agrees. The alleged events related to Hedtke occurred between 2006 and 2013. The alleged events related to John occurred between 2006 and, at the latest, 2015. (Doc. 65 at ¶¶ 348-59); (Doc. 70 at 6.) These dates, as Defendants point out, required Hedtke to bring her Title IX claim by 2016 and John by 2018. Hedtke's and John's ...