Cole v. Oceaneering Int'l, Inc.

670 F.Supp.3d 367

Darryl COLE v. OCEANEERING INTERNATIONAL, INC.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-1348

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

Signed April 26, 2023

Cayce Peterson, Grant Wood, James Edward Courtenay, Jeffrey Green, JJC Law LLC Sangisetty Law Firm, New Orleans, LA, Michael A. Mahone, Jr., The Mahone Firm LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Darryl Cole.

Michael A. McGlone, Richard C. Kean, Rachael Ferrante Gaudet, Kean Miller LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Oceaneering International, Inc.

SECTION: D (5)

ORDER AND REASONS

WENDY B. VITTER, United States District Judge

Before the Court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed by defendant, Oceaneering International, Inc. ("Oceaneering").¹ Plaintiff, Daryl Cole, opposes the Motion,² and Oceaneering has filed a Reply.³

After careful consideration of the parties' memoranda and the applicable law, the Motion is GRANTED and Cole's Jones Act claims asserted against Oceaneering are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND⁴

In this maritime personal injury case, the issue before the Court is whether Cole is a Jones Act seaman. Pertinent to the instant Motion, Daryl Cole alleges that while working as a crane operator aboard the M/V OCEAN PATRIOT, which was owned and operated by Oceaneering, he suffered a stroke that was misdiagnosed by the onboard medic.⁵ Cole filed this suit against Oceaneering, asserting claims for Jones Act negligence, general maritime law negligence and unseaworthiness, general maritime law maintenance and cure, and negligence under Louisiana law.⁶

In the instant Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Oceaneering seeks the dismissal of Cole's Jones Act claim alleging that Cole does not qualify as a Jones Act seaman because he lacked the requisite connection to a vessel, or an identifiable group of vessels, at the time of his alleged injuries.⁷ Oceaneering claims that to prove seaman status, a plaintiff must show: (1) his duties contributed to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission; and (2) he has a connection to a vessel in navigation, or to an identifiable group of such vessels, that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.⁸ Oceaneering contends that courts have routinely held that an appropriate rule of thumb is that a worker who spends less than about 30% of his time in the service of a vessel in navigation should not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act.⁹ Relying upon that rule, Oceaneering asserts that Cole cannot satisfy the "substantial connection" requirement because the undisputed facts show that he spent less than 10% of his employment with Huisman North American Services ("Huisman") working aboard Oceaneering's vessel.¹⁰

Oceaneering claims that Cole was employed by Huisman as a crane operator from approximately November 1, 2017 until February 21, 2021, or for about 1209 days, and that Huisman assigned Cole to work aboard Oceaneering vessels on only two occasions for a total of 48 days.¹¹ Oceaneering notes that Cole spent 462 days working aboard vessels owned and operated by a non-party to this suit during his three years of employment with Huisman.¹² Oceaneering asserts that Cole was not a member of any Oceaneering crew and that his assignments to vessels were temporary and sporadic based upon the specific needs of Huisman's clients at any given time.¹³ Alternatively, Oceaneering asserts that Cole cannot satisfy the first prong of the seaman status test because he cannot show that his work as a crane operator contributed to the function of the M/V OCEAN PATRIOT.¹⁴

Cole asserts that the Motion should be denied because he was a member of the crew of the M/V OCEAN PATRIOT "to which he was to be assigned for four straight hitches and on which he spent 100% of his working time onboard the vessel performing the duties of a crane operator which were essential to the mission and purpose of the vessel."¹⁵ Cole concedes that he has been a direct employee of Huisman since November 2017, but claims that he "was assigned to a Hornbeck Offshore Services LLC ('Hornbeck') vessel for his first 19 hitches while working for Huisman and then to the Oceaneering [M/V] OCEAN PATRIOT for his next four hitches after that, with the possibility that he could be assigned to the OCEAN PATRIOT beyond those four hitches."¹⁶ Cole asserts that during each hitch, he spent "100% of his working time on vessels, most of that time at sea."¹⁷ Cole argues that he is a Jones Act seaman because his work as a crane operator was essential to the purpose of the vessel, which was a diving support vessel, and because he meets the "substantial connection" test as a crew member of the M/V OCEAN PATRIOT who spent all of his working time aboard the vessel.¹⁸

In response, Oceaneering asserts that there is no evidence before the Court to indicate that Cole would be assigned to the M/V OCEAN PATRIOT for any additional hitches beyond the hitch at issue in this case.¹⁹ Turning to the "substantial connection" requirement of the Jones Act seaman test, Oceaneering asserts that the relevant consideration is not the amount of time that Cole spent aboard vessels, generally, but the amount of time he spent aboard vessels under Oceaneering's common ownership or control.²⁰ Oceaneering points out that Cole's Opposition brief ignores the Fifth Circuit's most recent case on this issue, Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Texas, LLC, cited in Oceaneering's Motion, wherein the Fifth Circuit reiterated that a plaintiff must show that 30% of his work was spent aboard vessels under the common ownership or control of his employer.²¹ Oceaneering maintains that Cole cannot meet this 30% threshold, as he spent less than 10% of his time aboard Oceaneering vessels while employed with Huisman.²² Oceaneering then distinguishes the two unreported cases cited by Cole in his Opposition brief, and further asserts that the evidence before the Court shows that Cole was never permanently assigned to an Oceaneering vessel.²³ Oceaneering asserts that, at best, the evidence shows that Cole's connection to the vessels he worked aboard while employed by Huisman was transitory and sporadic.²⁴ Oceaneering also asserts that Cole's self-serving affidavit is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.²⁵

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine disputed issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.²⁶ A party moving for summary judgment must inform the Court of the basis for the motion and identify those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, that show that there is no such genuine issue of material fact.²⁷ If the moving party carries its burden of proof under Rule 56, the opposing party must direct the Court's attention to specific evidence in the record which demonstrates that the non-moving party can satisfy a reasonable jury that it is entitled to a verdict in its favor.²⁸ This burden is not satisfied by some metaphysical doubt as to alleged material facts, by unsworn and unsubstantiated assertions, by conclusory allegations, or by a mere scintilla of evidence.²⁹ Rather, Rule 56 mandates that summary judgment be entered against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.³⁰ In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the Court must review the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and the Court may not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes.³¹

III. ANALYSIS

The Jones Act grants a "seaman" injured in the course of employment a cause of action against his employer in negligence.³² "A plaintiff claiming the benefits of the Jones Act bears the burden of establishing seaman status."³³ To prove seaman status, a plaintiff must show that: (1) his duties contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission; and (2) he has a connection to a vessel in navigation, or to an identifiable group of such vessels, that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.³⁴ "In deciding whether there is an identifiable group of vessels of relevance for a Jones Act seaman-status determination, the question is whether the vessels are subject to common ownership or control."³⁵ According to the Supreme Court, the first factor "is very broad: 'All who work at sea in the service of a ship' are eligible for seaman status."³⁶ In contrast, the purpose of the "substantial connection" requirement is to "separate the sea-based maritime employees who are entitled to Jones Act protection from those land-based workers who have only a transitory or sporadic connection to a vessel in navigation, and therefore whose employment does not regularly expose them to the perils of the sea."³⁷ Stated another way, "The duration of a worker's connection to a vessel and the nature of the worker's activities, taken together, determine whether a maritime employee is a seaman because the ultimate inquiry is whether the worker in question is a member of the vessel's crew or simply a land-based employee who happens to be working on a vessel at a given time."³⁸

A. Cole's Duties as a Crane Operator Contributed to the Function of the M/V OCEAN PATRIOT and to the Accomplishment of its Mission.

There is no dispute that the M/V OCEAN PATRIOT was a vessel in navigation. As to the "threshold requirement" of the Jones Act seaman status test,³⁹ Oceaneering asserts that the Fifth Circuit held in Adams v. All Coast, LLC that a crane operator, like Cole, is not qualified as a seaman because his duties do not aid the vessel as a means of transportation.⁴⁰ The Court, however, agrees with Cole that Oceaneering's reliance upon Adams is misplaced, as the issue before the Fifth Circuit was whether the plaintiffs were correctly...