Coleman v. Chevron Phiilips Chem. Co.

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION

Lee H. Rosenthal United States District Judge

The plaintiff, Ronnie Coleman, alleges that his former employer, the defendant Chevron Phillips Chemical Company LP (“CPChem”), discriminated against him based on race (African American) and age (57 when hired). Summary judgment is appropriate because Coleman has failed to raise a genuine issue of fact material to determining whether CPChem discriminated against him.

I. Background

In 2019, CPChem hired Coleman to work as a process operator in its Pasadena plastics complex. In January 2021, Coleman successfully bid for an opening at the “Plant 6” unit in the Pasadena plastics complex. (Docket Entry No. 19-1 at 69). He was assigned to begin a training plan on the outside reactor that would run from January 2021 to July 2021. (Id.). Coleman had to complete training modules and written examinations before proceeding to an area walkthrough, a critical part of his training. (Id. at 69-70).

In April 2021, Coleman asked to take a break from reactor training in order to do loadout training. (Id.). His request was granted. (Id.). This made him eligible for overtime shifts in the loadout area. (Id.).

In May 2021, Coleman returned to reactor training and took his 60-day evaluation. (Id. at 85). He was rated as “Needs Improvement” in four out of five areas and was given specific suggestions to improve. (Id. at 85-86). Coleman contested his rating, blaming it on, among other things, the Texas February 2021 freeze for delaying his training, causing certain absences, and leading to harassment by his training supervisor, Wayne Kline. (Id.). HR investigated the harassment allegation, but no one had seen or heard Kline treat Coleman inappropriately or differently from other trainees. (Docket Entry No. 19-2 at 12).

In August 2021, Coleman finished the last training module, leaving the required walkthrough, which tested necessary knowledge of the training material. (Id. at 58). Kline and Marlon Jordan (an African American Chief Daylight Operator) did Coleman's walkthrough with him. (Id. at 28; Docket Entry No. 19-1 at 70). They both determined that Coleman did not pass. (Docket Entry No. 19-1 at 70).

Coleman met with Operations Manager Robert Ricker to complain about Kline, alleging that he was making racially inappropriate remarks and not giving proper training. Coleman asked for a shift change. (Id. at 23). Because of Coleman's complaints against him, Kline did not participate in the rest of Coleman's evaluation. (Id. at 70). Coleman also complained about a lack of assistance from the plant superintendent, Nicole Wright, in getting his training. (Docket Entry No. 19-1 at 27).

After Coleman failed his first walkthrough attempt, a second occurred in September 2021. (Docket Entry No. 19-1 at 70). Howard Williams, who is older than Coleman and also African

American, conducted the walkthrough with Coleman and concluded that Coleman had not passed. (Id.). It was then decided that Coleman would get a third attempt, set far enough ahead to allow Coleman extra shifts to prepare. (Id.). The third walkthrough fared no better. Coleman had trouble identifying equipment, giving correct process flows, and demonstrating an overall understanding of the reactor process. (Docket Entry No. 19-2 at 44-45). The next day, Coleman asked for a fourth walkthrough attempt, which occurred a month later. (Id. at 47). Williams found that Coleman had not passed, noting that he was not at the “expected knowledge level.” (Id. at 54). He was terminated shortly thereafter. (Id. at 56-58). This lawsuit followed.

Coleman's claims are that: (1) he was deprived of training, subjected to additional testing, and ultimately terminated based on his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; (2) he was deprived of training, subjected to additional testing, and ultimately terminated based on his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; and (3) he was terminated because the defendants wanted to avoid paying him medical benefits for his gout, in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.

CPChem has moved for summary judgment. (Docket Entry No. 19). Coleman has responded, CPChem has replied, and Coleman has sur-replied. (Docket Entry Nos. 22, 23, 25). CPChem has also moved to strike portions of the affidavits attached to Coleman's response brief. (Docket Entry No. 24). Based on the pleadings, the briefing, the record, and the applicable law, the court concludes that Coleman has identified no factual dispute material to determining whether CPChem discriminated against him or terminated him for the purpose of denying him ERISA

benefits. CPChem's motion to strike is granted in part and its motion for summary judgment is granted in full. The reasons are set out below.

II. The Legal Standards

A. Rule 56

“Summary judgment is appropriate where ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'” Springboards to Educ., Inc. v. Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Indep. Sch. Dist., 33 F.4th 747, 749 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(A)). “A FACT IS MATERIAL IF IT MIGHT AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF THE SUIT AND A FACTUAL DISPUTE IS GENUINE IF THE EVIDENCE IS SUCH THAT A REASONABLE JURY COULD RETURN A VERDICT FOR THE NONMOVING PARTY.” Thompson v. Microsoft Corp., 2 F.4th 460, 467 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting reference omitted). The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion[] and identifying” the record evidence “which it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

“When ‘the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial,' a party moving for summary judgment ‘may merely point to the absence of evidence and thereby shift to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating by competent summary judgment proof that there is [a dispute] of material fact warranting trial.” MDK S.R.L. v. Proplant Inc., 25 F.4th 360, 368 (5th Cir. 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting reference omitted). “However[,] the movant ‘need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case.'” Terral River Serv., Inc. v. SCF Marine Inc., 20 F.4th 1015, 1018 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam)). “If ‘reasonable minds could differ' on ‘the import of the evidence,' a court

must deny the motion.” Sanchez v. Young County, 956 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986)).

After the movant meets its Rule 56(c) burden, “the non-movant must come forward with ‘specific facts' showing a genuine factual issue for trial.” Houston v. Tex. Dep't of Agric., 17 F.4th 576, 581 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting references omitted). The nonmovant “must identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the ‘precise manner' in which the evidence” aids their case. Shah v. VHS San Antonio Partners, L.L.C., 985 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting reference omitted). Of course, all reasonable inferences are drawn in the nonmovant's favor. Loftin v. City of Prentiss, 33 F.4th 774, 779 (5th Cir. 2022). But a nonmovant “cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.” Jones v. Gulf Coast Rest. Grp., Inc., 8 F.4th 363, 369 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting reference omitted).

B. Summary Judgment Evidence and the Sham Affidavit Doctrine

“An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion [for summary judgment] must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(C)(4).

The sham affidavit doctrine prevents a party from defeating a motion for summary judgment “using an affidavit that impeaches, without explanation, sworn testimony.” Seigler v. Walmart, 30 F.4th 472, 477 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting reference omitted). “[A] nonmoving party may not manufacture a dispute of fact merely to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Id. “If a party who has been examined at length on deposition could raise an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony, this would greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact.” Id. “When a summary-judgment affidavit is subsequently executed after a prior sworn statement is made, and

there is a clear contradiction on a material point without explanation, the ‘sham affidavit' doctrine is applied and the contradictory statements in the affidavit should be disregarded.” Tafacory v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 2020 WL 7658070, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2020), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Tafacory v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. as Tr. for Registered Holders of Long Beach Mortgage Loan Tr. 2006-6, Asset-backed Certificates, Series 2006-6, 2021 WL 958544 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2021), aff'd, 2021 WL 6061556 (5th Cir. Dec. 17, 2021).

When a plaintiff fails to recall specific details at his deposition that he later includes in a summary judgment affidavit, the sham affidavit doctrine applies. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 380, 386 (5th Cir. 2000) (collecting authority); Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A] district court may find a declaration to be a sham when it contains facts that the affiant...