Coleman v. City of S. Fulton

1

MARCUS COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SOUTH FULTON et al., Defendants.

Civil Action FILE No. 1:22-CV-814-TWT

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division

May 10, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS W. THRASH, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a civil rights action. It is before the Court on the Defendant City of South Fulton (“South Fulton”)'s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 26] and the Defendant Solomon Muhammad's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 28]. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant South Fulton's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 26] is DENIED, and the Defendant Muhammad's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 28] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. Background^[1]

This case arises from the allegedly unlawful detention of the Plaintiff Marcus Coleman by the Defendant Solomon Muhammad at the scene of a traffic accident. (Def. Muhammad's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 1-2). Muhammad is a police officer for the Defendant City of South Fulton. (Id. ¶ 2). On January 29, 2021, Muhammad reported to the scene of a multicar traffic accident and began collecting information from the individuals involved to prepare his accident report. (Id. ¶ 2; Def South Fulton's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 4). While Muhammad was in his patrol car preparing the report, Coleman approached his car on the passenger side and asked, while filming the encounter on his phone, why there wasn't an officer directing traffic around the accident. (Def. Muhammad's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 6-7). After Muhammad instructed Coleman to “stand by,” Coleman proceeded to walk toward the scene of the accident and stated to the emergency personnel and individuals involved in the accident that the officer would be of more assistance directing traffic. (Id. ¶¶ 8-11). Muhammad then exited his patrol car and asked Coleman to go back to his vehicle because he was working a crime scene. (Id. ¶¶ 14-18). Coleman responded that he did not have to get back into his car and continued walking toward the accident scene. (Id. ¶¶ 19-21). After a brief exchange about the South Fulton police chief, Muhammad and Coleman engaged in a struggle that ultimately resulted in Muhammad placing Coleman in handcuffs by threatening the use of his taser in response to Coleman's noncompliance with his instructions. (Id. ¶¶ 23-33). After Muhammad placed Coleman in the back of his patrol car, Muhammad requested that a supervisor come to the scene; he also readjusted Coleman's right handcuff after Coleman complained of it being too tight and secured Coleman's vehicle at his request. (Id. ¶¶ 33-37). When Muhammad's supervisor arrived approximately 20 minutes later, he spoke with Muhammad and then spoke to Coleman and informed him that Muhammad was detaining and investigating him for obstruction. (Id. ¶¶ 3942). The supervisor then released Coleman without issuing him a citation. (Id. ¶¶ 43-46).

On January 26, 2022, Coleman brought suit against the Defendants in Fulton County Superior Court, asserting fourteen counts in total. Against both Muhammad and South Fulton, he brings claims of negligence, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent-intentional and negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference with economic advantage, assault, and battery. Against Muhammad, Coleman brings claims of libel per se, civil rights liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and false arrest and imprisonment. And against South Fulton, he brings claims of unfair business practices, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and respondeat superior. Muhammad and South Fulton both now move for summary judgment as to all of Coleman's claims.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits submitted by the parties show that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c). The court should view the evidence and draw any inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970). The party seeking summary judgment must first identify grounds that show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).

III. Discussion

South Fulton and Muhammad move for summary judgment, arguing that no genuine dispute of material fact exists as to any of Coleman's claims and therefore that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of his claims. (Br. in Supp. of Def. South Fulton's Mot. for Summ. J., at 7; Br. in Supp. of Def. Muhammad's Mot. for Summ. J.,^[2] at 1). In response, Coleman contends that genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment. (Pl.'s Resp. Br. in Opp'n to Def. South Fulton's Mot. for Summ. J., at 2; Pl.'s Resp. Br. in Opp'n to Def. Muhammad's Mot. for Summ. J., at 2). The Court begins by addressing the § 1983 claim against Muhammad.

Muhammad argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Coleman's § 1983 claim because he did not violate Coleman's rights either by detaining him on suspicion of obstruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) or using excessive force in detaining him and because he is entitled to qualified immunity. (Br. in Supp. of Def. Muhammad's Mot. for Summ. J., at 8-19). Coleman argues, in response, that his detention was unlawful because he did not obstruct Muhammad in the lawful discharge of his duties, that Muhammad used excessive force in detaining him, and that Muhammad is not entitled to qualified immunity. (Pl.'s Resp. Br. in Opp'n to Def. Muhammad's Mot. for Summ. J., at 8-17). The Court addresses the issues of unlawful detention, excessive force, and qualified immunity in turn.

A. Unlawful Detention

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by government actors. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Not all interactions between law enforcement and citizens, however, implicate the scrutiny of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 2011). “Only when the officer, by means of physical force or [a] show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may [a court] conclude that a ‘seizure' has occurred.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). The Eleventh Circuit has “categorized encounters between police and citizens into three types, with varying levels of Fourth Amendment scrutiny: ‘(1) police-citizen exchanges involving no coercion or detention; (2) brief seizures or investigatory detentions; and (3) full-scale arrests.'” Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1185 (quoting United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 777 (11th Cir. 2006)).

At issue in the present case is the second category.

[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner from approaching a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. That is, law enforcement officers may seize a suspect for a brief, investigatory Terry stop where (1) the officers have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was involved in, or is about to be involved in, criminal activity, and (2) the stop was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. While reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. Again, we look to the totality of the circumstances to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion.

Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186 (quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted). Finally, the Eleventh Circuit applies four factors in determining whether an encounter constituted a Terry stop or an arrest: “[1] the law enforcement purposes served by the detention, [2] the diligence with which the police pursue the investigation, [3] the scope and intrusiveness of the detention, and [4] the duration of the detention.” United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1146 (11th Cir. 2004).

Muhammad contends here that he had reasonable suspicion to detain Coleman for committing the crime of misdemeanor obstruction in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a). (Br. in Supp. of Def. Muhammad's Mot. for Summ. J., at 9). The Georgia statute provides that “a person who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer . . . in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a). “The obstruction statute is sufficiently broad to cover actions which might not be otherwise unlawful, but which obstructed or hindered law enforcement officers in carrying out their duties.” Patrick v. Andrews, 356 Ga.App. 801, 804 (2020). In addition, “argument and stubborn obstinance are all examples of conduct that may satisfy the obstruction element” of the statute. Tisdale v. State, 354 Ga.App. 735, 738 (2020) (citation omitted).

The Court concludes that Muhammad has carried his burden to establish reasonable suspicion in detaining Coleman for obstruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) as a matter of law. The video evidence capturing the encounter between Muhammad and Coleman shows, at the very least, a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop considering Muhammad's instruction to “assist [him] by getting back in [his] car” and...