Coleman v. State

300 So.3d 1044

Terry Lee COLEMAN, Appellant

v.STATE of Mississippi, Appellee

NO. 2019-CP-01110-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

May 12, 2020

Rehearing Denied August 25, 2020

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: TERRY LEE COLEMAN (PRO SE)

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BILLY L. GORE, Jackson

BEFORE J. WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND McDONALD, JJ.

McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. A Marion County grand jury indicted Terry Lee Coleman for murder in 2008. He pleaded guilty in 2009 and was sentenced to life imprisonment in the custody of Mississippi Department of Corrections. On May 28, 2019, Coleman filed a motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR), requesting to withdraw his guilty plea. Finding Coleman's motion procedurally time-barred and that Coleman failed to prove an exception to the bar, the circuit court entered an order denying Coleman's PCR motion. Coleman now appeals from the circuit court's denial of his PCR motion and claims he is entitled to relief due to the lack of a factual basis for his guilty plea, that he was not informed of his right against self-incrimination, and that his counsel's assistance was ineffective. Finding no error in the trial court's ruling, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On August 11, 2009, in the Circuit Court of Marion County, Terry Lee Coleman pleaded guilty to murdering Edward Charles Martin Jr. The following facts were presented and agreed to by Coleman during the plea hearing.

¶3. On June 21, 2008, Coleman, along with others, was playing dice on his father's property, which bordered Coleman's own property. Martin Jr.’s son was one of the participants in the dice game. An argument between Coleman and Martin Jr.’s son arose, and gunshots were exchanged before Martin Jr.’s son left the property.

¶4. After hearing about what had happened, Martin Jr. drove to Coleman's house. As Martin Jr. pulled into Coleman's driveway, Coleman came walking from his father's property carrying an AK-47. Coleman stopped Martin Jr. at the end of his driveway. Witnesses who were in a vehicle behind Martin Jr.’s would testify that Martin Jr. took no threatening action, that he did not say anything, and that Martin Jr. did not get out of his truck. Nonetheless, Coleman said he believed that Martin Jr. had come to shoot him. Coleman told Martin Jr. to get off his property and proceeded to beat on the truck's hood. Upon seeing Martin Jr. reach down, Coleman shot Martin Jr. one time through the truck's windshield. During the plea hearing, when asked if Martin Jr. had a gun, Coleman responded, "I didn't see a gun, but he raised his right hand down and I was at home protecting my family." No gun was found in Martin Jr.’s truck, and Martin Jr.’s hand was found on the gear shift.

¶5. Coleman, who was represented by counsel, signed and filed a "Petition to Enter the Plea of Guilty" on the charge of murder. At a group plea hearing, the circuit court accepted Coleman's guilty plea along with pleas from two others charged with different crimes. The court asked each defendant how he would plead, and the court informed each of them of their rights individually.

¶6. During the plea hearing, the State explained the proof against Coleman. This included testimony from Coleman's father who tried to restrain Coleman from going back home because Coleman was upset. Witnesses in the vehicle that had pulled up behind Martin Jr.’s truck would testify that Martin Jr. did not get out of the truck and exhibited no threatening behavior. The State also said it had proof that Coleman knew Martin Jr.’s truck had a gear shift. It explained that if there were a trial, testimony would be offered that the community is small, that Martin Jr. and Coleman grew up together, that Martin Jr. lived around the corner from Coleman, and that Coleman had been around the truck with Martin Jr. on prior occasions.

¶7. The Court then addressed Coleman's attorney and Coleman directly:

THE COURT: All right. So, Faye, with what the State proffered and assuming the jury believed their witnesses, professionally do you believe that there would be enough proof to where the jury would be able to find murder unanimously in this case?

MS. PETERSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And, Terry, do you agree with that?

TERRY COLEMAN: Yes, sir.

¶8. At the hearing, the circuit judge asked Coleman whether he was satisfied with his attorney's representation: "And has she in your opinion done everything as your attorney she should have done to properly represent you?" Again, Coleman responded affirmatively. After confirming that Coleman was aware that a life sentence accompanied a murder conviction in Mississippi, the circuit court accepted Coleman's plea of guilty to murder.

¶9. Almost ten years after Coleman pleaded guilty at his sentencing hearing, in May 2019, Coleman filed a PCR motion in the Marion County Circuit Court, requesting to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming (1) there was no factual basis for his conviction because the evidence did not prove every element of the offense for which he was charged, including deliberate design, (2) that he was not advised as to his right against self-incrimination, and (3) his counsel's assistance was ineffective because she failed to file an appeal when he asked and because she did not inform him of the possibility of filing a PCR motion. The circuit court denied Coleman's PCR motion, stating it was procedurally barred because it was not filed within three years of the date that Coleman pleaded guilty, as required by Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015), and that Coleman failed to prove an exception to the procedural bar. Coleman now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10. "When reviewing a trial court's denial or dismissal of a PCR motion, we will only disturb the trial court's decision if the trial court abused its discretion and the decision is clearly erroneous; however, we review the trial court's legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review." Green v. State , 242 So. 3d 176, 178 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).

DISCUSSION

¶11. Coleman asserts that the circuit court erred in its decision to deny Coleman's PCR motion. He argues that (1) no factual basis was established that he had a "deliberate design to effect death," making his guilty plea not knowingly made; (2) that at the sentencing hearing he was not informed of his right against self-incrimination, and (3) that he had ineffective assistance of counsel. We find the circuit court did not err in denying Coleman's PCR motion.

¶12. The Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA), Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-31-1 to -29 (Rev. 2015), applies to any person sentenced by a court of record of the State of Mississippi, including a person currently incarcerated, and provides "an exclusive and uniform procedure for the collateral review of convictions and sentences." Id . § 99-39-3(1). In the case of a guilty plea, such as Coleman's, a motion for relief must be made within three years after the entry of the judgment of conviction unless a statutory exception applies. Id . § 99-39-5(2). The exceptions include (1) an intervening decision of either the Supreme Court of the United States or the State of Mississippi "which would have adversely affected the outcome of his conviction or sentence," or (2) new evidence that was not reasonably discoverable at the time of trial, or (3) the sentence has expired or a parole, probation, or conditional release has been unlawfully revoked. Id . § 99-39-5(2)(a)-(b). The defendant bears the burden of showing he has met a statutory exception. Wooten v. State , 275 So. 3d 96, 99 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) ; Blount v. State , 126 So. 3d 927, 931 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

¶13. Additionally, errors affecting certain fundamental constitutional rights are also excepted from the procedural bars of a PCR motion. Brown v. State , 83 So. 3d 459, 461 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). Ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute a violation of the defendant's fundamental constitutional rights. Chapman v. State , 167 So. 3d 1170, 1173 (¶10) (Miss. 2015). In a PCR motion, the "movant has the burden of showing he is entitled to relief by preponderance of the evidence." Kidd v. State , 221 So. 3d 1041, 1043 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). But merely asserting a fundamental-right violation is not enough to meet that burden. Scott v. State , 187 So. 3d 679, 681 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). There must appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim. White v. State , 59 So. 3d 633, 636 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).

¶14. Coleman pleaded guilty on August 11, 2009. Any PCR motion must be filed within three years of the time of a conviction, unless a statutory exception applies. To meet the three-year deadline in this case, Coleman needed to file his motion by August 11, 2012, which he failed to do. Although Coleman claimed a valid exception to the time-bar, the circuit court ruled that Coleman failed to establish such an exception and that his motion was therefore time-barred. We agree.

I. Whether there was a factual basis for Coleman's guilty plea.

¶15. Coleman asserts the factual basis provided at the plea hearing does not prove the elements of murder, making his guilty plea unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary. He argues this denial of the fundamental right to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily plead guilty is not subject to the procedural time-bar, and therefore the circuit court's decision should be reversed. We disagree.

¶16. A claim of an involuntary guilty plea, albeit involving a constitutional right, is still subject to the procedural bar. Hughes v. State , 106 So. 3d 836, 839-40 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) ; see also Porter v. State , 281 So. 3d 935, 937 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). More similar to the current case, this Court in Green v. State held that a claim of an involuntary plea due to the trial court's failure to establish a factual basis, did "not implicate a fundamental constitutional...