Coleman v. United States

1

QUBID M. COLEMAN, Petitioner-Defendant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent-Plaintiff.

Nos. 12-cr-40031-6, 21-cv-4149

United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Rock Island Division

April 10, 2023

ORDER AND OPINION

Sara Darrow Chief United States District Judge

Now before the Court is Petitioner Qubid M. Coleman's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C § 2255 (d/e 485). Coleman argues that his sentencing enhancements are invalid in light of the sealing and possible expungement of his predicate state convictions. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Petitioner's § 2255 motion (d/e 485), and DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Plea Agreement and Change of Plea Hearing

In August 2012, a grand jury charged Coleman in a superseding indictment with Conspiracy to Distribute Crack Cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. See Superseding Indictment (d/e 65). On July 11, 2013, after delays due to competency proceedings (at which the Court found Coleman competent), Coleman pled guilty to the superseding indictment pursuant to a plea agreement. See Plea Agreement (d/e 203). Notably, Coleman pled guilty after having the benefit of knowing the outcome of his co-defendants' severed trial, in which his co-defendants were found guilty. In the plea agreement, Coleman acknowledged that he understood the elements of the counts to which he was pleading. Id. (d/e 203) at ¶¶4-6. Importantly, the parties agreed and acknowledged that he faced a mandatory minimum term of life imprisonment due to the quantity of controlled substances involved and because he agreed that he had two or more prior felony drug convictions. Id. at ¶7. Coleman also agreed to waive notice of his prior felony drug conviction pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, and to waive his right to appeal and to file a collateral attack. Id. at ¶¶10-12. Specifically, with regard to his right to collaterally attack his sentence, the plea agreement stated:

12. The defendant also understands that the defendant has a right to attack the conviction and/or sentence collaterally on the grounds that it was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; that the defendant received ineffective assistance from the defendant's attorney; that the Court was without proper jurisdiction; or that the conviction and/or sentence were otherwise subject to collateral attack. The defendant understands such an attack is usually brought through a motion pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255. The defendant and the defendant's attorney have reviewed Section 2255, and the defendant understands the defendant's rights under the statute. Understanding those rights, and having thoroughly discussed those rights with the defendant's attorney, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the defendant's right to collaterally attack the conviction and/or sentence. The defendant's attorney has fully discussed and explained the defendant's right to attack the conviction and/or sentence collaterally with the defendant. The defendant specifically acknowledges that the decision to waive the right to challenge any later claim of the ineffectiveness of the defendant's counsel was made by the defendant alone notwithstanding any advice the defendant may or may not have received from the defendant's attorney regarding this right. Regardless of any advice the defendant's attorney may have given the defendant, in exchange for the concessions made by the United States in this plea agreement, the defendant hereby knowingly and voluntarily waives the defendant's right to collaterally attack the conviction and/or sentence. The rights waived by the defendant include the defendant's right to challenge the amount of any fine or restitution, in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, excepting only those claims which relate directly to the negotiation of this waiver itself.

Id. at ¶11-12.

In return, the government agreed to allow Coleman the opportunity to provide substantial assistance to the government in the investigation and prosecution of others. Coleman agreed that only upon a determination by the United States, in its sole discretion, would he be able to request the Court consider his cooperation to the United States. See Plea Agreement (d/e 203) at ¶17-19.

At the change of plea hearing, Coleman was put under oath and affirmed that his attorney had read the plea agreement to him word-for-word, and that Coleman understood what his attorney had read to him. P.Tr. (d/e 310) at 4. Coleman affirmed that he understood the charges against him in the superseding indictment, that he had sufficient opportunity to discuss the charges with his counsel, and that he was fully satisfied with his representation. Id. at 5-8. Coleman further affirmed that he understood that the plea agreement contained the parties' full agreement, that no one had made any promises to him not in the plea agreement, and that no one had threatened him to plead guilty. Id. at 9.

The Court went over the rights Coleman would be giving up by pleading guilty, including the right to a jury trial. Coleman affirmed that he had gone over the waivers in the plea agreement with his attorney and that he understood that he was waiving almost all of his rights to appeal any sentence that the Court might impose in the case. Id. at 12. Next, the Court went over the essential elements of the offense the government would need to prove at trial. Id. at 14-15. Coleman stated in his own words the factual basis for his plea, and then the government went over the factual basis of the evidence they would present if the case proceeded to trial. Id. at 15-18. Finally, the Court addressed the cooperation agreement in Coleman's plea agreement and the terms of the agreement. Id. at 19-20. Coleman then pled guilty and the Court accepted the plea. Id. at 22-23.

B. Sentencing Hearing

The United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). The PSR calculated a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI, resulting in a sentencing guideline imprisonment range of 262 months to 327 months. PSR at ¶124. However, because the statutory minimum sentence was life imprisonment, his guideline range became life. Id. On May 29, 2014, at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel confirmed that the defense had no objection to the calculations in the PSR. S.Tr. (d/e 388) at 9. Coleman's counsel informed the Court that he went through the PSR line by line with Coleman, and that Coleman was fully advised on the contents of the PSR. Id. at 4. Coleman's only objection to the PSR was that it said he was involved in a street gang, and after discussion with probation, the Court ordered the paragraphs showing a gang affiliation stricken from the PSR. Id. at 5, 8. The Court then adopted the findings of the PSR. Id. at 8-9.

Next, the government presented an in camera motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), and recommended a twenty percent reduction in Coleman's sentence. Id. at 11, 15. The Court granted the motion and agreed to reduce Coleman's sentence by twenty percent. The Court determined that the starting point for the sentence was life, based in part on Coleman's “really, really disturbing” criminal history. The Court found the first ten percent reduced Coleman's sentence from life to 360 months and the second ten percent resulted in a sentence of 324 months' imprisonment. Id. at 19. The Court also sentenced him to 10 years of supervised release. The judgment was entered on June 2, 2014. See Judgment (d/e 296).

C. Direct Appeal and Resentencing

After sentencing, Coleman appealed to the Seventh Circuit. See United States v. Coleman, 806 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2015). He claimed: (1) that the Court did not adequately inform him of the collateral-attack waiver, and (2) that several conditions of his supervised release were unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 944. While the Court covered Coleman's appellate waiver in his plea colloquy, the Court did not explicitly refer to the collateral-attack waiver. Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit found that Coleman failed to prove that his substantial rights were affected by the Court's error and, therefore, upheld his conviction. See id. at 944-46. The Seventh Circuit, however, did find that the collateral-attack waiver was too narrow because it did not allow Coleman to allege ineffective assistance of counsel “with regard to the plea agreement as a whole.” Id. at 945. The government “promise[d] that it [would] not attempt to enforce the collateral-attack waiver against ineffective assistance of counsel claims,” id. at 945, and also conceded the error related to supervised release conditions, id. at 946. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case to this Court for resentencing to adjust the conditions of supervised release. Id.

On June 9, 2016, the Court resentenced Coleman to the same periods of imprisonment and supervised release, but with different conditions of supervised release. See Amended Judgment (d/e 382). Coleman again appealed, but his counsel filed a motion pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967). The Seventh Circuit granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. United States v. Coleman, 676 Fed.Appx. 596, 597 (7th Cir. 2017).

D. Coleman's First § 2255 Motion

On February 8, 2017, notwithstanding the waiver in his Plea Agreement, and after having received a substantial sentence reduction based on the government's compliance with the terms of that agreement, Coleman filed his first Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See ...