Coley v. City of Hartford

312 Conn. 150

95 A.3d 480

Orville COLEY, Administrator (Estate of Lorna Coley)

v.CITY OF HARTFORD.

No. 19129.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 21, 2014.

Decided June 10, 2014.

Hugh D. Hughes, with whom, on the brief, was William F. Gallagher, New Haven, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Jonathan H. Beamon, senior assistant corporation counsel, for the appellee (defendant).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.

ROGERS, C.J.

This appeal requires us to determine the scope of governmental immunity that is afforded to a city that has been sued for allegedly negligent conduct in connection with its police department's response to a report of domestic violence. The plaintiff, Orville Coley, the administrator of the estate of Lorna Coley (decedent), appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, the city of Hartford. Coley v. Hartford, 140 Conn.App. 315, 327, 59 A.3d 811 (2013). The plaintiff brought this wrongful death action after the decedent was shot and killed after police responded to a report of domestic violence at the apartment where the decedent resided with her daughter, Jahmesha Williams. The plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that the police were negligent in failing to remain at the scene for a reasonable amount of time until the likelihood of imminent violence had been eliminated, in violation of the duty allegedly imposed pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–38b¹ and the Hartford Police Department Policy and Procedure entitled “Police Response to Cases of Family Violence” (police response procedures). See Hartford Police Dept. Policy and Procedure, No. 7–40 (October 1, 1986).² Although the plaintiff raises several issues on appeal, the dispositive issue is whether the Appellate Court properly determined that any duty to remain at the scene that was allegedly owed to the plaintiff's decedent was discretionary.³ We conclude that any such duty was discretionary and, therefore, that the defendant is entitled to immunity pursuant to General Statutes § 52–557n (a)(2)(B)⁴ Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following uncontested facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of this appeal.⁵ “On November 5, 2007, at approximately 8:39 p.m., Hartford police officers [Garrett] Fancher and [Zachary] Freeto were dispatched to respond to a complaint of domestic violence at 47 Bolton Street. The complaint had been made by [Williams], one of the residents of 47 Bolton Street, who had called the police because the father of her child, Gerard Chapdelaine, had come to her house and attempted to gain entry and, having failed, brandished a revolver and threatened her life.

“Williams lived at 47 Bolton Street with her son, a friend and Williams' mother, [the decedent]. On the evening in question, [the decedent] had arrived at the house in her car and observed Chapdelaine threatening Williams' life and brandishing a firearm in the front yard. [The decedent] told Chapdelaine that she would call the police if he did not leave. He responded, ‘call the cops,’ and [the decedent] drove away. By the time she returned, [O]fficers Fancher and Freeto had arrived at 47 Bolton Street in response to Williams' call, but Chapdelaine was no longer present. The officers spoke with neighbors and went to Chapdelaine's residence at 51 Bolton Street, but they were unable to find him. Williams informed the officers that Chapdelaine's car was illegally parked at 55 Bolton Street, and officers ticketed the vehicle and had it towed. The officers also learned that Williams had a protective order against Chapdelaine prohibiting him from threatening or harassing her, entering her dwelling or having any other contact with her. Hartford police ... previously had responded to incidents of domestic violence between Chapdelaine and Williams at 47 Bolton Street.

“Unable to locate Chapdelaine, and aware that he had allegedly committed a family violence crime by violating a protective order, Fancher and Freeto left ... to prepare an arrest warrant.” Coley v. Hartford, supra, 140 Conn.App. at 317–18, 59 A.3d 811. Prior to leaving the scene, Officers Fancher and Freeto contacted the Interval House, a local domestic violence shelter, and spoke with a representative on Williams' behalf. The officers also provided Williams with a victim services card containing additional resources regarding domestic violence.

“Approximately three hours later, at about 12:05 a.m., officers were again dispatched to 47 Bolton Street, this time in response to a report that a male was attempting to force entry into the residence. The police determined that the two reported incidents at 47 Bolton Street were related, and, upon arrival at the scene, heard screams coming from the second floor. After setting up a perimeter and entering the residence, police discovered that [the decedent] had been shot and killed.” ⁶Id., at 318, 59 A.3d 811.

The plaintiff brought this wrongful death action alleging that the defendant's police officers were negligent in responding to the domestic violence incident at 47 Bolton Street. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the police officers: “failed to arrest ... Chapdelaine as required by ... § 46b–38b (a)”; “failed to arrest ... Chapdelaine for violating a protective order as required by the police response procedures”; “left the scene before the likelihood of further imminent violence had been eliminated, in violation of ... § 46b–38b (d)”; and “left the scene before the likelihood of further imminent violence had been eliminated, in violation of the police response procedures.” The defendant asserted as a special defense that it is entitled to governmental immunity pursuant to § 52–557n and it subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on that ground. The trial court, Rittenband, J., rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the police officers' actions were discretionary, not ministerial, and that the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity for discretionary acts ⁷ does not apply in the present case. The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's decision to the Appellate Court.⁸

In the Appellate Court, the plaintiff argued that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in the defendant's favor because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether police officers had a ministerial duty, pursuant to § 46b–38b and the police response procedures, to remain at Williams' residence for “a reasonable time until, in the reasonable judgment of the officer, the likelihood of further imminent violence [had] been eliminated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coley v. Hartford, supra, 140 Conn.App. at 319–20, 59 A.3d 811. The Appellate Court disagreed for three reasons. First, the Appellate Court concluded that § 46b–38b (d) does not apply in the present case because that statute requires police officers to remain at the scene only when, unlike in the present case, there is no probable cause for arrest. Id., at 324, 59 A.3d 811. Second, the Appellate Court concluded that any duty arising under the police response procedures was owed to Williams, the victim of domestic violence, and not to the decedent. Id., at 326, 59 A.3d 811. Finally, the Appellate Court determined that, even if it were to assume that the defendant owed a duty to the decedent to remain at the scene under the police response procedures, the duty was discretionary and, therefore, the defendant is entitled to governmental immunity. Id., at 326 n. 10, 59 A.3d 811. For these reasons, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the defendant. This certified appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for the defendant. Although the plaintiff challenges each of the three grounds for the Appellate Court's decision, we focus our inquiry on the plaintiff's claim that the police response procedures gave rise to a ministerial duty to remain at the scene in the present case. With respect to this claim, the plaintiff argues that the police response procedures are broader than § 46b–38b (d) because the procedures require law enforcement personnel to remain at the scene for a reasonable time in the event an arrest is not made. See footnote 2 of this opinion. The plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the duty to remain at the scene under the police response procedures was discretionary rather than ministerial.

In response, the defendant argues that the Appellate Court properly affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the defendant. With respect to the plaintiff's claim regarding the police response procedures, the defendant argues that, even if we were to assume that there was a duty owed to the decedent under the police response procedures, it is apparent from the allegations in the complaint that the duty to remain at the scene was discretionary. The defendant contends, therefore, that it is immune from liability for its allegedly negligent discretionary acts under § 52–557n (a)(2)(B).

As a preliminary matter, we agree with the plaintiff that the obligation to remain at the scene in the event that an arrest is not made under the police response procedures, on its face, is broader than the obligation to remain at the scene under the statute, which gives rise to this obligation only when “no cause exists for an arrest....” General Statutes § 46b–38b (d); see footnotes 1 and 2 of this opinion. Because the police officers determined that there was probable cause to arrest Chapdelaine, and an arrest was not in fact made, we conclude that the police response procedures apply in the present case.⁹The dispositive issue in this appeal, therefore, is whether the duty to...