Collik v. Pohlabel

LANCE COLLIK, Plaintiff, v. KYLE E. POHLABEL and JASON A. BARHORST, Defendants.

Case No. 3:20-cv-307

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

December 3, 2020

Judge Thomas M. Rose

ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANT POHLABEL AND MOTION TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANT BARHORST (DOC. 5)

Pending before the Court is the Partial Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Pohlabel and Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Barhorst (Doc. 5) (the "Motion"), filed by Defendants Kyle E. Pohlabel ("Trooper Pohlabel") and Jason A. Barhorst ("Trooper Barhorst") (collectively, the "Defendants"), pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff Lance Collik ("Mr. Collik") filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion. (Doc. 7.) Defendants filed a Reply in support of the Motion. (Doc. 8.) The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. (Docs. 5, 7, and 8.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Collik brings this action against two Ohio State Highway Patrol Troopers, stemming from a traffic stop and vehicle search in November of 2019. The Complaint alleges violations of Mr. Collik's constitutional rights (under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"). (Doc. 1.) It contains a single cause of action against both Defendants: Deprivation of Civil Rights under Section 1983. (Id. at PAGEID # 7-10.)

According to the Complaint, on November 13, 2019, Trooper Pohlabel conducted a traffic stop of Mr. Collik's motor vehicle (the "Vehicle"). The Complaint asserts that Trooper Pohlabel lacked "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting" Mr. Collik of criminal activity or a violation of a traffic law, so therefore the stop violated Mr. Collik's constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Complaint also asserts that Trooper Pohlabel unreasonably extended and delayed the detention of Mr. Collik beyond the time needed to handle the matter for which the traffic stop was made, thus again violating Mr. Collik's constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The Complaint then contains the following allegations most relevant to the Motion:

21. ... [Trooper Pohlabel] ultimately requested the presence of a canine unit at the scene of the traffic stop in order to have a dog sniff of the vehicle ....

...

25. Ultimately [Trooper Barhorst] arrived at the scene of the traffic stop and conducted a dog sniff of the vehicle owned and operated by [Mr. Collik].

26. Upon conclusion of the dog sniff of the vehicle, [Trooper Barhorst] then began conducting a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle.

27. As [Trooper Barhorst] was conducting the warrantless search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, [Trooper Pohlabel] declared to [Mr. Collik] ... that the drug-sniffing dog 'appeared to alert on the driver's side' of the vehicle.

28. The alert by the drug-sniffing dog, to the extent the dog actually alerted (as the cruiser camera in the patrol car did not indicate any such alert whatsoever) was towards the passenger compartment of the vehicle on the driver's side and not towards the trunk of the vehicle.

...

31. ... [F]ollowing the conclusion of the warrantless search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, [Trooper Barhorst] then proceeded to open the trunk of the vehicle and proceeded to conduct a warrantless search of the trunk even though the drug-sniffing dog had not alerted to the trunk area of the vehicle.

32. [Trooper Pohlabel] then joined [Trooper Barhorst] and both of them continued to conduct a warrantless search of the trunk of the vehicle even though the drug-sniffing dog had not alerted or allegedly alerted to the trunk area of the vehicle....

34. Even though the drug-sniffing dog had not alerted or allegedly alerted to the trunk area of the vehicle, [Trooper Pohlabel] and [Trooper Barhorst] proceeded to conduct a warrantless search of the trunk of the vehicle, as well as closed containers within the trunk of the vehicle.

(Doc. 1 at PAGEID # 4-6, 9-10.) The Complaint asserts that "the search of the trunk of the vehicle and the contents therein by [Trooper Pohlabel] and [Trooper Barhorst] exceeded the scope of any probable cause they had to search and, accordingly violated the constitutional rights of [Mr. Collik] under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." (Id. at ¶ 51.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." While this rule "does not require 'detailed factual allegations' . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A claim is facially plausible when it includes "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. This standard is not the same as a probability standard, but "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id.(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, if a plaintiff has "not nudged [its] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-55. However, the Court is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Id. at 555-56. "In evaluating a motion to dismiss [a court] may consider the complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to the defendant's motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the complaint and are central to the claims contained therein." Luis v. Zang, 833 F.3d 619, 626 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Section 1983 "provides a cause of action for deprivation, under color of state law, of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Horn v. Madison Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 22 F.3d 653, 656 (6th Cir. 1994).¹ "To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must set forth facts that, when construed favorably, establish (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting under the color of state law." Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)); Feucht v. Triad Loc. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 425 F. Supp. 3d 914, 923 (S.D. Ohio 2019).

"The Fourth Amendment protects 'the right of the people to be secure in their persons,houses, papers, and effects,' including vehicles, 'against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" United States v. Snoddy, 976 F.3d 630, 633 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). "The general rule is that warrantless searches of vehicles are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). One such exception is the automobile exception, which "permits officers to search a vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime." Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 334 (6th Cir. 2019). And, "[a]n alert to the presence of drugs by a properly trained narcotics detection dog is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a vehicle." United States v. Sharp, 689 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 393-94 (6th Cir. 1994) ("before the dog alerted on the car, probable cause for a search did not exist," but "[a] positive indication by a properly-trained dog is sufficient to establish probable cause for the presence of a controlled substance").

The Motion is limited to a relatively narrow argument. Defendants only argue that the portion of the claim concerning the search of the Vehicle should be dismissed, and that it should be dismissed because "it is undisputed that the police dog alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle," which provided "probable cause to search the entire vehicle," thus resulting in a "constitutionally permissible" search of the Vehicle.² (Doc. 5 at PAGEID # 20.) Therefore, according to Defendants, "[w]hile the other claims against Trooper Pohlabel may go forward, the unconstitutional search claim ... should be dismissed" because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Id.)

However, the Court disagrees with the argument because it is entirely based on a faultypremise: that Mr. Collik "concedes that the police dog alerted to the presence of drugs when it sniffed his car." (Doc. 5 at PAGEID # 19 (citing Doc. 1 at ¶ 28).) Looking at the Complaint, it alleges that the Defendants searched Mr. Collik's vehicle without a warrant. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 26, 31, 32, 34.) Allegations also indicate (or at least allow the reasonable inference) that there was no applicable exception to the general rule that warrantless searches of vehicles are per se unreasonable. (See generally Doc. 1.) This includes that the Complaint pleads a set of...