Collington v. Clayton Cty.

897 S.E.2d 361

COLLINGTON

v.CLAYTON COUNTY, et al.

S22G1146

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: January 17, 2024

State Court, Clayton County, Margaret L. Spencer, Judge

John David Hadden, Darren Wade Penn, Penn Law, LLC, 4200 Northside Parkway, NW, Building One, Suite 100, Atlanta, Georgia 30327, Benjamin Frederick Windham, Ben F. Windham, P.C., 3838 Highway 42, Locust Grove, Georgia 30248, Robert Walker Garrett, Morgan & Morgan Atlanta, PLLC, 408 12th Street, Suite 200, Columbus, Georgia 31901, for Appellant.

Charles Madden Cork, III, Law Offices of Charles M. Cork, III, P.O. Box 2594, Decatur, Georgia 30031, for Amicus Appellant.

Jack R. Hancock, Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, 661 Forest Parkway, Suite E, Forest Park, Georgia 30297, Arash Ali Sabzevari, Wes C. Jackson, Jacob Edward Daly, Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, 100

Galleria Parkway, Suite 1600, Atlanta, Georgia 30339-5948, for Appellee.

Kellye C. Moore, Walker Hulbert Gray & Moore, LLP, P.O. Box 1770, Perry, Georgia 31069, for Amicus Appellee.

Daniel C. Prout, Jr., Waldon Adelman Castilla McNamara & Prout, 900 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1040, Atlanta, Georgia 30339, for Other Party.

LaGrua, Justice.

We granted certiorari in this case to decide two issues: first, whether official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the purported negligent use of a covered motor vehicle are "claims against counties" as that phrase is used in OCGA § 36-11-1;¹ and second, if OCGA § 36-11-1 applies to claims of this nature, whether presentment of such a claim to the county commission satisfies a claimant’s duty under this statute. The Court of Appeals concluded that OCGA § 36-11-1 does apply to such claims, but held that, to comply with the statute, a claimant must present her claim to the county sheriff, not the county commission. See Collington v. Clayton County, et al. (Case No. A22A0379), 364 Ga. App. XXV (June 2, 2022) (unpublished). While we agree with the Court of Appeals that OCGA § 36-11-1 applies to official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the purported negligent use of a covered motor vehicle, we overrule a line of Court of Appeals case law holding that, to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 36-11-1, a claimant is required to present her claim to the county sheriff, as opposed to the county governing authority. Instead, we hold that, because a claim against a county sheriff in his official capacity for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle is a claim against a county under OCGA § 36-11-1, presenting the claim to the county governing authority satisfies the statute’s presentment requirement. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

1. Pertinent Facts and Procedural History

The relevant facts, as drawn from the allegations in the complaint and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are as follows:

On August 30, 2018, Mary Collington was operating her vehicle on State Route 85 in Clayton County when she was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Jesse Curney, a deputy with the Clayton County Sheriff’s Department, who was operating a 2015 Dodge Charger owned by Clayton County. It is undisputed that Deputy Curney was acting in the scope of his official duties as a deputy sheriff at the time of the collision.

Based on the description of Deputy Curney’s vehicle in the accident report—i.e., "2015 Dodge Charger Police"—Collington was initially under the impression that Deputy Curney was a Clayton County police officer. Accordingly, on February 12, 2019, Collington’s attorney sent notice of her claims via certified mail to the Clayton County Chief of Police, the Clayton County Commissioners, and the District Attorney of Clayton County. Thereafter, on October 21, 2019, Collington filed a lawsuit against Clayton County, asserting that she suffered injuries in an automobile accident caused by the negligence of Deputy Curney, who was driving a county-owned vehicle and acting in the course and scope of his employment with Clayton County at the time of the accident. Clayton County moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the County did not employ Deputy Curney and was not liable for his actions. On December 1, 2020, Collington voluntarily dismissed the action.

On December 21, 2020, Collington filed a renewed complaint pursuant to OCGA § 9-2-61 (a)² against Deputy Curney, Clayton County, and Victor Hill, in his capacity as the Sheriff of Clayton County (the "Sheriff")³ (collectively the "Defendants") in the State Court of Clayton County. On February 12, 2021, the Defendants filed a consolidated motion to dismiss Collington’s complaint, arguing that: (1) Deputy Curney was an improper party pursuant to OCGA § 36-92-3 because this statute forecloses claims against a deputy in his individual capacity for torts allegedly committed while he was operating a covered motor vehicle in the performance of his official duties;⁴ (2) Clayton County was not a proper party under OCGA § 36-92-3 (b) because the County did not employ Deputy Curney and could not be liable for his actions; and (3) Collington’s claims against the Sheriff were barred by sovereign immunity because, while Collington timely presented notice of her claims to Clayton County and its Board of Commissioners, Collington failed to submit timely notice of her claims to the Sheriff pursuant to OCGA § 36-11-1.

In response to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Collington conceded that, because OCGA § 36-92-1, et seq. was amended after the subject collision occurred,⁵ her claims against Deputy Curney in his individual capacity were improper and should be dismissed. See OCGA § 36-92-3 (a). Collington further asserted that the amendments to OCGA § 36-92-1, et seq., as well as then-Presiding Justice Nahmias’s concurrence in Mendez v. Moats, 310 Ga. 114, 124 (3), 852 S.E.2d 816 (2020) (Nahmias, P.J., concurring), suggested that Clayton County may be a proper party to be sued. Finally, Collington asserted that, with respect to her claims against the Sheriff, if the trial court were to conclude that the Sheriff was the proper defendant, then presenting notice of her claims to Clayton County should be deemed sufficient under OCGA § 36-11-1. While Collington admitted that she did not present notice directly to the Sheriff, she argued that the Mendez concurrence called into question whether the presentment notice even applied to claims involving sheriff’s deputies, and if so, whether notice to the relevant county commission for claims against the sheriff satisfied that notice requirement. See id. Collington also argued that the Mendez concurrence seemed to conclude that there was no justification for holding that OCGA § 36-11-1 required "a plaintiff to present his official-capacity claims against a sheriff to the sheriff instead of the county governing authority," id. at 123 (3), 852 S.E.2d 816, and that presentment of the notice to the "county governing authority" should be sufficient to comply with the statute. Id. at 125 (3), 852 S.E.2d 816. Collington thus asserted that, even assuming the notice requirement applied in a case like this one, she provided notice to Clayton County, which was sufficient under the analysis in the Mendez concurrence. See id.

On June 9, 2021, the trial court issued an order granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that: (1) Collington’s claims against Deputy Curney should be dismissed under OCGA § 36-92-3 (a); (2) Collington’s claims against Clayton County should be dismissed because the conduct giving rise to Collington’s injury was committed by a deputy sheriff, not a county officer or employee; and (3) Collington’s claims against the Sheriff should be dismissed because Collington "failed to present a timely … notice to the Sheriff’s office pursuant to OCGA § 36-11-1." Collington filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals.⁶

On June 2, 2022, the Court of Appeals issued a decision⁷ affirming the trial court’s dismissal of Collington’s claims against the Sheriff, vacating the dismissal of Collington’s claims against the County, and remanding the case with direction. See Collington v. Clayton County, et al., supra. In affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the claims against the Sheriff, the Court of Appeals determined that Collington did not present notice of her claims to the Sheriff as required by OCGA § 36-11-1, and thus, she could not proceed with those claims. In vacating the trial court’s dismissal of Collington’s claims against Clayton County, the Court of Appeals noted that, in responding to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss in the trial court, Collington contended that Clayton County might be the proper party to be sued if the 2019 amendments to OCGA § 36-92-1, et seq., were applicable in the present case. The Court of Appeals determined that, because the trial court did not address or issue a definitive ruling on that question, the trial court’s dismissal of Collington’s claims against Clayton County should be vacated. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for the trial court to rule on whether Clayton County was a proper defendant in this case.⁸

Collington then filed her petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court.⁹ We granted certiorari to address whether OCGA § 36-11-1 applies to official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle, and if so, whether the proper presentment of such claims to the county commission satisfies the claimant’s duty under the statute.

2. Analysis

[1] (a) The answer to the first question is yes—OCGA § 36-11-1 applies to official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle because such a claim is a claim against the county itself. As explained below, this question is one of statutory construction, and critical to the question of construction here is the historical context of OCGA § 36-11-1, including the legal context against which the statutory language...