Collins v. Noble Drilling (U.S.) LLC

ANDREW COLLINS, Plaintiff, v. NOBLE DRILLING (U.S.) LLC, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-16-2293

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

December 19, 2018

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending in this case that has now been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 17). Having considered that motion, the response in opposition, Defendant's reply, the summary judgment evidence, and the applicable law, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS, for the reasons set forth below, that Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment (Document No. 17) be GRANTED.

I. Background and Procedural History

This is an employment discrimination case brought by Plaintiff Andrew Collins ("Collins") against his former employer, Noble Drilling (U.S.), LLC. ("Noble"). Collins alleges in the Original Complaint he filed that he was discriminated against on the basis of his race (African American), was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment, and was retaliated against when he voiced complaints of discrimination and retaliation. He has alleged claims of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, sex discrimination under Title VII, and retaliation under Title VII.

According to the allegations in Collins' Complaint, while he was working for Noble as a warehouseman in 2012, another employee "displayed a hangman's noose" to him. Collins alleges that he "immediately reported" the incident, but little was done. Collins also alleges that after he began working as a roustabout on the Noble Globetrotter I in 2014, he began to experience sexual harassment by fellow roustabouts Tyler Eaves and Jase Hardee, and crane operator Matt Housley, which consisted of those employees "grabbing and poking of his buttocks, grabbing of his scrotum, and simulating sexual acts towards him." Complaint (Document No. 1) at 4. According to Collins, despite his "numerous protests and reports, the conduct continued and no substantial action was implemented by [Noble] to deter the sexual[lly] harassing conduct." Id. Collins also alleges that "[f]ollowing his reports to human resources and management, [he] was issued unwarranted disciplinary actions and was repeatedly threatened by management with write-ups and impending disciplinary action. [Noble] further retaliated against [him] by transferring him to the Noble Bob Douglas, a less-desired offshore facility," and ultimately terminated his employment. Id.

In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Noble seeks summary judgment on all of Collins' claims. Noble argues that summary judgment is warranted on Collins' § 1981 claim because the summary judgment evidence shows that Collins was not subjected to a racially hostile work environment, that Noble took prompt remedial action upon learning of the "hangman's noose," and that Collins' termination was based on Collins' failure to return to work upon the expiration of his 180 day approved short term disability leave. Noble also argues that summary judgment is warranted on Collins' sex discrimination and retaliation claims because the summary judgment evidence shows that it took prompt remedial action once Collins raised his complaints of harassment with Human Resources, and that Collins' one "write-up" and his transfer to another offshore facility are not "adverse employment actions" that will support a retaliation claim.

In response to Noble's Motion for Summary Judgment, Collins maintains that there aregenuine issues of material fact on whether Noble knew or should have known of the harassment and whether it took prompt remedial action, and whether there is a causal connection between his complaints of harassment and both the written reprimand he received and his transfer to another offshore facility. Collins did not respond, at all, to that part of Noble's Motion for Summary Judgment which seeks summary judgment on his § 1981 race discrimination claim(s).

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56(a) provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The moving party must initially "demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant, "who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists" and that summary judgment should not be granted. Norwegian Bulk Transport A/S v. International Marine Terminals Partnership, 520 F.3d 409, 412 (5^th Cir. 2008); see also Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998).¹ A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in a pleading, and unsubstantiated assertions that a fact issue exists will not suffice. Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2548. Instead, "the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a 'genuine' issue concerning every essentialcomponent of its case." Morris, 144 F.3d at 380.

In considering a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences to be drawn from both the evidence and undisputed facts are be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986). "If the record, viewed in this light, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find" for the nonmovant, then summary judgment is proper. Kelley v. Price- Macemon, Inc., 992 F.2d 1408, 1413 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. at 1351). On the other hand, if "the factfinder could reasonably find in [the nonmovant's] favor, then summary judgment is improper." Id. Even if the standards of Rule 56 are met, a court has discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment if it believes that "the better course would be to proceed to a full trial." Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2513.

III. Discussion

A. § 1981 Race Discrimination Claims

Noble devoted much of its Motion for Summary Judgment to Collins' § 1981 claim, arguing that Collins cannot make out a prima facie case of a racially hostile work environment, and cannot make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment race discrimination. Collins, in his response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, did not mention his § 1981 claim or submit any summary judgment evidence in support of it. Collins has, as a result, abandoned that claim, see Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2002) (a claim or issue raised in a pleading but ignored on summary judgment may be considered waived and/or abandoned), Black v. N. Panola Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 584, 588 n.1 (5th Cir. 2006) ("failure to pursue [a] claim beyond her complaint constituted abandonment"), and Noble, for the reasons set forth in its Motion for Summary Judgment and basedon the uncontroverted summary judgment evidence it has submitted, is entitled to summary judgment on Collins' § 1981 race discrimination claim(s). See e.g,, Holmes v. N. Texas Health Care Laundry Coop. Ass'n, 304 F. Supp. 3d 525, 540-41 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (where plaintiff failed to pursue her Title VII retaliation claim and her state law claims when responding to defendant's motion for summary judgment, those claims considered abandoned or waived and summary judgment for defendant on those claims was warranted).

B. Sex Discrimination/Hostile Work Environment Claim under Title VII

Collins' sex discrimination claim is based on unwanted sexual contact and harassment he claims to have suffered at the hands of Matt Housley, Jase Hardee and Tyler Eaves, while he worked as a roustabout on the Globetrotter I, from February 2014 to July 2014. Noble, in its Motion for Summary Judgment, does not dispute that Collins was subjected to unwanted contact and harassment, but instead maintains that it is entitled to summary judgment on Collins' sex discrimination/hostile work environment claim because the summary judgment evidence shows that the harassment was by Collins' co-workers and because there is no summary judgment evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact on the fifth element of Collins' prima facie case - that Noble knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.

Title VII prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against any individual because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Actionable employment discrimination under Title VII can be based on disparate treatment, disparate impact, and/or a hostile work environment. Barnes v. McHugh, Civil Action No. 12-2491, 2013 WL 3561679 *11 (E.D. Tex. July 11, 2013) ("Courts have recognized several types of Title VII and ADEA claims. A plaintiff can assert "status-based" Title VII claims under 42U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) and (k), "retaliation" claims under 42 U.S.C .A. § 2000e-3, and "hostile work environment" claims, both for status-based discrimination and retaliation. Title VII status-based discrimination claims are divided into two categories: "disparate treatment" claims pursuant to § 2000e-2(a)(1), and "disparate impact" claims pursuant to 2000e-2(k)"). At issue in this case is hostile work environment discrimination.

For hostile work environment claims under Title VII, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case. When the alleged hostile work environment is based on conduct by a supervisor, as that term has been defined and limited by the Supreme Court in Vance v. Ball State University, 133 S.Ct. 2434 (2013), a prima facie case consists of evidence of: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) unwelcome harassment; (3) harassment based on the plaintiff's membership in a protected class; and (4) harassment that affects a term, condition, or privilege of...