Collins v. State

Sherman Collins v. State of Alabama

CR-14-0753

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021

March 12, 2021

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

Appeal from Sumter Circuit Court

(CC-12-109)

On Application for Rehearing

PER CURIAM.

Sherman Collins was convicted of capital murder for the intentional killing of Detrick Bell for pecuniary gain, a violation of § 13A-5-40(a)(7), Ala. Code 1975, and conspiracy to commit murder, a violation of § 13A-4-3, Ala. Code 1975. The jury recommended, by a vote of 10 to 2, that Collins be sentenced to death for his capital-murder conviction. The trial court followed that recommendation. The trial court also sentenced Collins to 120 months' imprisonment for his conspiracy conviction.

In our opinion on original submission, this Court affirmed Collins's convictions and his 120-month sentence. But this Court remanded Collins's case to the trial court for that court "to correct its sentencing order to make specific findings of facts as required by § 13A-5-47(d), Ala. Code 1975," as to Collins's death sentence. Collins v. State, [Ms. CR-14-0753, Oct. 3, 2017] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2017) ("Collins I"). Ultimately, the trial court complied with our instructions, and we affirmed Collins's death sentence. Collins v. State, [Ms. CR-14-0753, Oct. 25, 2019] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2019) (opinion on return to second remand). Collins has now filed an application for rehearing with this Court, asking "this Court to reconsider its decision in this case and reverse his convictions and death sentence." (Collins's application, p. 89.)

Although none of Collins's arguments in his application warrant granting him relief, Collins correctly points out that this Court did not address his argument about the trial court's denial of his motion to strike for cause potential juror R.C. (Collins's application, p. 63.) Specifically, Collins argues in his application for rehearing that, although this Court addressed his arguments as to veniremembers T.T., Ke.S., Ka.S., T.D., and N.J., this Court "overlooked the erroneous denial of defense counsel's challenge for cause of R.C." (Collins's application, p. 67.) Thus, we address his argument as to potential juror R.C.

In his brief on original submission, Collins argued that, because "[p]otential juror R.C. sua sponte offered during voir dire that he had retained [Nathan] Watkins [an assistant district attorney] for legal services," the trial court should have granted his motion to strike R.C. for cause.

As we explained in our opinion on original submission,

" 'To justify a challenge for cause, there must be a proper statutory ground or " 'some matter which imports absolute bias or favor, and leaves nothing to the discretion of the trial court.' " Clark v. State, 621 So. 2d 309, 321 (Ala. Cr. App. 1992)(quoting Nettles v. State, 435 So. 2d 146, 149 (Ala. Cr. App. 1983)). This court has held that "once a juror indicates initially that he or she is biased or prejudiced or has deep seated impressions" about a case, the juror should be removed for cause. Knop v. McCain, 561 So. 2d 229, 234 (Ala. 1989). The test to be applied in determining whether a juror should be removed for cause is whether the juror can eliminate the influence of his previous feelings and render a verdict according to the evidence and the law. Ex parte Taylor, 666 So. 2d 73, 82 (Ala. 1995). A juror "need not be excused merely because [the juror] knows something of the case to be tried or because [the juror] has formed some opinions regarding it." Kinder v. State, 515 So. 2d 55, 61 (Ala. Cr. App. 1986).'

"Ex parte Davis, 718 So. 2d 1166, 1171-72 (Ala. 1998).

" 'The test for determining whether a strike rises to the level of a challenge for cause is "whether a juror can set aside their opinions and try the case fairly and impartially, according to the law and the evidence." Marshall v. State, 598 So. 2d 14, 16 (Ala. Cr. App. 1991). "Broad discretion is vested with the trial court in determining whether or not to sustain challenges for cause." Ex parte Nettles, 435 So. 2d 151, 153 (Ala. 1983). "The decision of the trial court 'on such questions is entitled to great weight and will not be interfered with unless clearly erroneous, equivalent to an abuse of discretion.' " Nettles, 435 So. 2d at 153.'

"Dunning v. State, 659 So. 2d 995, 997 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994).

" 'A trial judge is in a decidedly better position than an appellate court to assess the credibility of the jurors during voir dire questioning. SeeFord v. State, 628 So. 2d 1068 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). For that reason, we give great deference to a trial judge's ruling on challenges for cause. Baker v. State, 906 So. 2d 210 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001).'

"Turner v. State, 924 So. 2d 737, 754 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002).

"Moreover, most of [the] challenged jurors were removed by the use of peremptory strikes. '[T]he Alabama Supreme Court has held that the failure to remove a juror for cause is harmless when that juror is removed by the use of a peremptory strike. Bethea v. Springhill Mem'l Hosp., 833 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 2002).' Pace v. State, 904 So. 2d 331, 341 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003). Cf.Ex parte Colby, 41 So. 3d 1 (Ala. 2009) (may not be harmless when multiple challenges for cause are involved)."

Collins I, ___ So. 3d at ___.

During voir dire, Collins's counsel asked whether any veniremembers had "any business dealings with anyone in the District Attorney's Office." In response, R.C. said, "I have a question. Is this Mr. Watkins the same one that was with Pruitt, Pruitt and Watkins? I dealt with Mr. Watkins." (R. 146.) Later, Collins moved to strike R.C. for cause, arguing that R.C. "indicated a relationship with Mr. Watkins." (R. 225.) Watkins responded, "[R.C.] said when I was with Pruitt, Pruitt andWatkins that I had done some legal work for him. I really don't have any recollection of it. That was prior to 2002." (R. 225.) The trial court denied Collins's motion.

As we held on original submission concerning Watkins's prior legal work for potential jurors T.T., Ke.S. and Ka.S., " '[i]n the absence of a statute so providing, a venireperson is not absolutely disqualified because he has been a client of an attorney for one of the parties.' " Collins I, ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting State v. Douglas, 132 S.W. 3d 251, 258 (Mo. App. 2004)). When that business relationship is not ongoing and when the record does not suggest bias in favor of the attorney who represented the veniremember, the trial court does not err in denying a motion to strike that veniremember for cause. Collins I, ___ So. 3d at ___.

Here, although it appears that Watkins had done legal work for R.C., Watkins explained that he had no recollection of the work and that the business relationship had terminated about 12 years before Collins's trial. Nothing in the record reflects that the assistant district attorney (Watkins) was currently doing any legal work for R.C., and nothingsuggests that R.C. was biased in favor of the State. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Collins's motion to remove R.C. for cause.

For these reasons, Collins's application for rehearing is overruled.

APPLICATION FOR REHEARING OVERRULED.

Kellum, J., concurs. Windom, P.J., concurs specially, with opinion, which McCool, J., joins. Minor, J., concurs in the result. Cole, J., dissents, with opinion.WINDOM, Presiding Judge, concurring specially.

Both parties, as well as this Court, agree that the admission of a statement given by Kelvin Wrenn, a nontestifying codefendant, violated Sherman Collins's Sixth Amendment right of cross-examination. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Constitutional violations such as this may be held harmless only "if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Delaware v. Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).

Judge Joiner's dissent on original submission summarized his view of the evidence against Collins: "In the case before us, the State's evidence against Collins included Collins's written confession, witness statements identifying a black male in an orange shirt at the scene of [Detrick] Bell's murder as a person of interest, and Wrenn's statement to law-enforcement officers implicating Collins in Bell's murder." Collins v. State, [Ms. CR-14-0753, Oct. 13, 2017] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2017) (Joiner, J., dissenting). Judge Cole's dissent today on application for rehearing appears to adopt Judge Joiner's view of the evidence and statesthat this Court's "main opinion [on original submission] ostensibly agreed with Judge Joiner's assessment of the dearth of other evidence pointing to Collins's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." ___ So. 3d at ___ (Cole, J., dissenting).

I do not agree with Judge Cole's perspective on the main opinion. I do agree with both Judge Joiner's and Judge Cole's dissenting opinions, though, that the harmless-error analysis in this Court's main opinion on original submission was wanting. The main opinion held that the error was harmless because Collins's confession "contained more detail than the statements that were attributed to Wrenn, and it was corroborated by other testimony." Collins, ___ So. 3d at ___. I do not believe that the main opinion adequately set forth the strength of the State's evidence, and I believe this failing is shared by the dissents.

As the main opinion recognized, Collin's confession was compelling evidence of his guilt.¹ Collins admitted to shooting Bell in exchange forWrenn's promise to pay him $2,000. In other words, Collins admitted to committing a...