Colomb v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.

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MICHAEL COLOMB and JONI COLOMB, Plaintiffs v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION d/b/a AMTRAK, Defendant

No. 21 CV 3449

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

September 10, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JEREMY C. DANIEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Michael Colomb, an employee of CBRE, Inc. (“CBRE”) injured his hand while repairing an anti-terrorism barrier in the parking lot of Union Station in Chicago, Illinois. Colomb and his wife, Joni,^[1]filed this action against Defendant National Railroad Passenger Corporation d/b/a Amtrak (“Amtrak”) alleging that Amtrak's negligence as owner of Union Station caused his injuries. Amtrak now moves for summary judgment on Colomb's negligence and premises liability claims. (R 95.)^[2] For the reasons that follow, the Court denies the motion.

BACKGROUND^[3]

Amtrak is a national railroad company created and incorporated by Congress. (Def.'s SOF ¶ 1.)^[4] It owns the commuter rail terminal in Chicago's West Loop known as Union Station. (Id.) Opened in 1925 and designed by legendary architect, Daniel Burnham, Union Station is a central hub of Amtrak's long-distance train service, and a primary transit point for the Chicago Metra commuter rail service. (Id. ¶ 6; see also R. 97-4 at 32.) As of 2012, Union Station was the third-busiest rail terminal in the United States, serving approximately 130,000 commuters each weekday and 31.6 million passengers annually. (R. 97-4 at 32.)

In 2011, Amtrak purchased and installed a Delta 501 Phalanx security barrier to secure Union Station and prevent acts of terrorism. (Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 6.) The wedgeshaped barrier weighs over 5,000 pounds and can stop a 65,000-pound truck travelling at fifty miles per hour when raised. (Id. ¶ 2.) It is raised and lowered through interfacing hydraulic, mechanical, and electrical systems. (R. 64 ¶ 10.) The barrier is embedded into the roadway entrance to the Union Station parking lot through a concrete foundation and reinforced steel. (Pl.'s SOAF ¶¶ 3, 4.)

Although it owns Union Station, Amtrak delegates day-to-day maintenance and upkeep to independent contractors. In 2013 it hired U.S. Equities Asset Management, LLC to perform operation and maintenance services. (Def.'s SOF ¶ 7.) The agreement was memorialized in a services contract dated May 1, 2013 (the “Service Agreement”). (R 97-4.) CBRE, Plaintiff Michael Colomb's employer, later assumed the Services Agreement and became subject to its terms. (Def.'s SOF ¶¶ 2, 8.)

The Service Agreement provides that CBRE is an independent contractor and its workers are not employees of Amtrak. (R 97-4 at 9.) In broad strokes, the contract delegates responsibility to CBRE for “effective and efficient building operations and maintenance” at Union Station. (Id. at 35.) CBRE is required to plan, schedule, and perform all maintenance at Union Station (whether preventative or corrective) as well as perform repair services for Union Station's operating systems. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s SOF ¶¶ 7, 12-14.) Routine maintenance tasks include replacing light bulbs, plunging toilets, changing filters, fixing doors, and changing grease and oil. (Id. ¶ 11.) Although the Service Agreement does not address the Delta 501 security barrier specifically, prior to 2019, CBRE and its employees would also perform maintenance on the barrier, by changing its light bulbs and repairing the metal front plate, or “skirt.” (Id. ¶ 15 R. 97-4; R. 97-15 (“Robinson Dep.”) at 18:17, 19:20-20:2.)

This lawsuit arises from an accident involving the barrier that occurred on November 21, 2019. The morning preceding the accident, a CBRE employee named Deveon Bromby struck the barrier with her car as she was entering the Union Station parking lot, causing a bend on the barrier's front skirt. (Def.'s SOF ¶¶ 31, 33.)^[5]Mike Berry, CBRE's Chief Engineer, inspected the barrier and decided to take it out of service. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 34.) He informed the guards and Amtrak police that the barrier would not be operating. (Id. ¶ 35.) He then directed four CBRE engineers including Colomb, as well as Joe Constantino, Kevin Murphy, and Dan Riordan to repair the barrier. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 47.)

Colomb and his fellow CBRE employees planned to repair the security barrier by removing the front skirt plate and straightening it. (Id. ¶ 43.) Before they did so, the men installed safety legs, or braces, on the barrier. (Id.) After removing them from a storage location, they attached them to the bottom of the barrier plate and lowered the barrier onto the legs. (Id. ¶ 45.) When installing the legs, Berry and Constantino decided not to “bleed down” or release pressure from the barrier's hydraulic system. (Id. ¶ 47.)

The engineers successfully removed the skirt from the front of the barrier but could not straighten it. (See 97-10 (“Berry Dep.”) at 20:1-26:11.) They decided to install a new skirt instead. (See, e.g., id.) After the skirt was replaced, Colomb began removing the safety braces on the barrier. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s SOF ¶ 48.) He had difficulty and asked his coworker, Kevin Murphy, if the barrier had been raised up. (Id.) Murphy told Colomb mistakenly that the barrier was in the “up” position. (Id.; see also R. 97-12 (“Murphy Dep.”) at 81:3-14.) However, because the hydraulics had not been bled down, this was not the case. (See Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s SOF ¶ 49.) As a result, instead of coming down slowly when the braces were removed, the barrier fell on Colomb's hand, causing a severe and permanent injury and the amputation of his hand. (See id.; Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 1.)

Amtrak investigated the incident and concluded the barrier collapsed because the hydraulics were not bled off, and because CBRE was not trained or qualified to perform barrier work. (Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 66; R. 97-14 (“Wright Dep.”) at 67:4-6.) Following the accident, CBRE decided that its engineers would no longer perform any work on the security barriers at Union Station. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s SOF ¶ 52.) Colomb filed this suit against Amtrak, asserting claims for common law negligence and premises liability. (R. 62.) Amtrak now moves for summary judgment on both claims. (R. 95.) The Court now addresses the merits of that motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of the material facts and ‘the record permits only one resolution of the factual issue[s].'” Beckner v. Maxim Crane Works, L.P., 109 F.4th 968, 973 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 292 (1982)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court does not “weigh conflicting evidence, resolve swearing contests, determine credibility, or ponder which party's version of the facts is most likely to be true.” Stewart v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 14 F.4th 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2021). The non-moving party is given the benefit of conflicting evidence and any reasonable inferences. Runkel v. City of Springfield, 51 F.4th 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2022).

ANALYSIS

I. NEGLIGENCE

The Court begins with the plaintiffs' negligence claim, which is governed by Illinois law. “In a negligence action, the plaintiff must plead and prove the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and injury proximately resulting from the breach.” Bruns v. City of Centralia, 21 N.E.3d 684, 688-89 (Ill. 2014) (citation omitted). Here, the only issue is whether Amtrak owed a duty to the plaintiffs.^[6] This is a question of law for the court to decide. Id. (citing Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 864 N.E.2d 227 (Ill. 2007)). “In the absence of a showing from which the court [can] infer the existence of a duty, no recovery by the plaintiff is possible as a matter of law and summary judgment in favor of the defendant is proper.” Id. (quoting Vesey v. Chi. Housing Authority, 583 N.E.2d 538 (Ill. 1991)).

The duty inquiry focuses on “whether [the] defendant and plaintiff stood in such a relationship to one another that the law imposed upon [the] defendant an obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of [the] plaintiff.” Ward v. K mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223, 226 (Ill. 1990). Courts consider four factors in resolving this question: (1) the likelihood of injury, (2) the reasonable foreseeability of injury, (3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and (4) the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant. Frieden v. Bott, 146 N.E.3d 763, 768 (Ill.App.Ct. 2020) (citation omitted). Courts may also consider public policy. Id.

As an initial matter, it is undisputed that Colomb was not an Amtrak employee; he was an employee of CBRE, an entity that was classified, pursuant to the Services Agreement, as an independent contractor. (See R. 97-4 at 9.) CBRE's independent contractor status is confirmed by provisions in the Agreement showing that Amtrak generally lacked control over the means of CBRE's maintenance work. See, e.g., Brettman v. M & G Truck Brokerage, Inc., 127 N.E.3d 880, 888 (Ill.App.Ct. 2019) (holding that “[t]he court is to consider whether there is a right to control the manner of work performance” in determining whether an employee is an independent contractor). For example, the Services Agreement provides that CBRE “is responsible for selecting qualified personnel to perform the Services,” “supervi[sing] all of its employees, monitor[ing] the techniques used in the performance of work, and keep[ing] its employees informed of improvements, changes, and methods of operation.” (Id. at 12-13.)

The fact that CBRE is an independent...