Colon v. Kenwall

ADAM COLON, Plaintiff v. APRIL KENWALL, et al., Defendants

Civil No. 1:18-CV-840

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

November 6, 2018

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Statement of Facts and of the Case

This case comes before us for consideration of a motion to dismiss some of the claims set forth in the plaintiff's amended complaint. (Doc. 23.) The well-pleaded facts set forth in that amended complaint describe a pattern of sexual exploitation of the plaintiff, a state inmate, by a correctional officer, and allege as follows:

The plaintiff, Adam Colon, was a mentally disabled, illiterate state inmate who only spoke broken English and Spanish. Colon was housed in the State Correctional Institution, Camp Hill where he was employed as inmate worker in the kitchen at SCI Camp Hill under the supervision of Correctional Officer April Kenwell. (Doc. 21, ¶ 8.) Over a one year period Kenwell sexually exploited Colon, forcing him to engage in unwanted sexual acts, including intercourse, on numerous occasions at various locations within the prison. (Id., ¶¶ 9-20.) Colon alleges that he brought this sexual abuse to the attention of supervisory officials, including Defendant Laurel Harry, the Superintendent at SCI Camp Hill, but these supervisors did nothing to prevent this sexual exploitation or protect Colon from abuse at the hands of Correctional Officer Kenwell. (Id., ¶¶ 9 and 13.) According to Colon, Kenwell was eventually investigated, prosecuted and convicted for her role in this sexual exploitation of the inmates entrusted to her care. (Id., ¶¶ 20-32.)

Set against the backdrop of these well-pleaded facts, Colon's amended complaint names April Kenwell, Superintendent Laurel Harry, an unnamed prison supervisor, and the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections as defendants. (Id.) The amended complaint then sets forth seven causes of action against these defendants including: (1) a claim of assault and battery against Kenwell, (Id., Count I); (2) claims under the federal and state constitutions, and the Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 30301, et seq., against all defendants arising out of these alleged sexual assaults, (Id., Count II); (3) failure to intervene claims against Defendant Harry and the Department of Corrections arising under the federal and state constitutions, and the Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 30301, et seq., (Id., Count III); (4) a claim of deliberate indifference in violation of thefederal and state constitutions, and the Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 30301, et seq., leveled against Defendant Kenwell, (Id., Count IV); (5) a state common law negligence claim lodged against all defendants, (Id., Count V); (6) a state common law tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, (Id., Count VI); and (7) federal statutory claims against all defendants brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). (Id., Count VII.)

The defendants have now moved to dismiss some, but not all, of these claims. (Doc. 23.) Specifically in their motion to dismiss, the defendants assert that claims for damages against the Department of Corrections are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. The defendants further contend that the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes claims against state employees for negligence or intentional infliction of emotional distress. In addition, the defendants contend that any claims brought by Colon premised upon the Prison Rape Elimination Act also fail as a matter of law because this act does not provide for a private right of action. Further, according to the defendants, Colon's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims fail as a matter of law with respect to both the individual and institutional defendants. Finally, in their motion to dismiss the defendants argue that Colon's amended complaint fails to state a constitutionaltort claim against the sole supervisory defendant named in the complaint, Defendant Harry.

This motion is fully briefed by the parties and is, therefore, ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss will be granted, in part: (1) with respect to the plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims; (2) with respect to the plaintiff's claims for damages from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections; (3) with respect to the plaintiff's state law negligence and intentional tort claims; and (4) with respect to the plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to the Prison Rape Elimination Act 42 U.S.C. § 30301, et seq. In all other respects, the motion to dismiss is denied.

II. Discussion

A. Rule 12(b)(6) - The Legal Standard

The defendants have moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that the plaintiff has continued to fail to allege facts that state a claim upon which relief may be granted. With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)]and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal -U.S.-, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally a court need not "assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the ... plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of theelements of a cause of actions will not do." Id. at 555. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.

In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. According to the Supreme Court, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:

[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id. at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyondthe level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a 'plausible claim for relief.' In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis: "First, the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675. Second, the court should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Id. at 679. Finally, 'where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.' Id." Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).

In undertaking this task, the court generally relies only on the...