Com. v. Hilliar

943 A.2d 984

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Blaine Allen HILLIAR, Appellant.

No. 218 MDA 2007.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued January 9, 2008.

Filed February 21, 2008.

John G. Bergdoll, IV, York, for appellant.

Seth F. Bortner, York, for appellee.

BEFORE: STEVENS, ORIE MELVIN and BENDER, JJ.

OPINION BY BENDER, J.

¶ 1 Blaine Allen Hilliar (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following his conviction for Driving Under the Influence. Appellant raises several allegations of error, all of which we conclude lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm.

¶ 2 The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this case as follows:

The arresting police officer's attention was called to the defendant's vehicle as he proceeded east on Market Street in West York Borough. The police officer ran the defendant's license plate, and determined that the owner of the vehicle's license was under suspension. The officer also discovered the owner's age and that he was a male. From his observation of the driver the officer believed that the defendant was male, and was about the same age as the owner. Based on the officer's conclusion that it was likely that the person operating the vehicle was the owner because he was a male of the same age as the owner and had possession of the owner's vehicle, the police officer decided to stop the vehicle for suspicion of driving on a suspended license. The police officer made the decision to stop the defendant while the defendant was still within the West York Borough limits. However, by this time the defendant was approaching the Borough line. It was the officer's conclusion that it would be safer to permit the defendant to cross the Borough line, proceed through an upcoming traffic light, and then be able to make the stop with less interference to traffic and with more safety for both the officer and the defendant. Therefore the stop actually occurred after defendant's vehicle had crossed the line into the next jurisdiction. Through sheer happenstance another officer from the same jurisdiction was traveling an opposite direction, and had a view of the defendant's vehicle from the front. Therefore the arresting officer contacted the officer while waiting for the light to change, and received confirmation from that officer that he also believed the driver matched the age provided by PennDOT of the owner prior to the stop.

After the defendant proceeded through the light, the officer turned on lights and sirens to pull the defendant over. The defendant failed to pull over immediately, and proceeded slowly for several more blocks before he pulled into a parking lot. When the officer talked to the defendant after the stop, the defendant exhibited the classic signs of intoxication, such as odor of alcohol, slurred speech, etc.

Trial Court Opinion, (T.C.O.), 3/8/07, at 1-2. Based on the foregoing, the officer took Appellant into custody and transported him to York Hospital for a blood test. Appellant submitted to the blood test which revealed a blood alcohol content of .256%. Consequently, Appellant was arrested and charged with DUI and Driving While Operating Privilege is Suspended. See 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1543, 3802(c). Appellant filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court denied. After a bench trial, Appellant was convicted of both offenses. This was Appellant's seventh DUI, and his third offense for the purpose of sentencing. The court sentenced Appellant to fifteen months' imprisonment on the DUI offense to be served concurrently with a ninety day sentence for the driving under suspension conviction. Appellant then filed this appeal raising four questions for our review:

I. Whether because the stop was not conducted within the primary jurisdiction of the Officer and the Officer lacked probable cause to be in fresh pursuit of the vehicle the Officer had neither authority nor jurisdiction to stop Mr. Hilliar and the stop was in Violation of the Statewide Municipal Jurisdiction Act, the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Constitution of the United States and the illegal stop warrants suppression of all evidence gained as a result.

II. Whether chemical testing as conducted in this case was not competent, credible, reliable and accurate to the extent required under the laws and regulations of Pennsylvania and therefore the Commonwealth has failed to meet the requirements under § 1547 of the Motor Vehicle Code and failed to provide or preserve relevant evidence and thus violated the laws and statutes of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Constitution of the United States.

III. Whether the Officer lacked Probable Cause to arrest Mr. Hilliar for DUI due to minimal observations of intoxication.

IV. Whether the 2004 DAI Per Se Laws, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3801 et seq. and § 1547 and attendant Statutes violate the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the United States Constitution as to (A) separation of powers, (B) procedural due process of law, right to counsel and Constitutional or Statutory warnings and confrontation of witnesses, rights as to self incrimination, and search and seizure, (C) the police power of government, (D) equal protection of law, (E) prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment, and (F) freedom of expression, freedom of travel, freedom to assemble, freedom of association and rights to participate as a citizen.

Brief for Appellant at 4.

¶ 3 In the first three questions presented for our review, Appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Our standard for reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress is as follows:

We are limited to determining whether the lower court's factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are correct. We may consider the evidence of the witnesses offered by the Commonwealth, as verdict winner, and only so much of the evidence presented by defense that is not contradicted when examined in the context of the record as a whole. We are bound by facts supported by the record and may reverse only if the legal conclusions reached by the court were erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Hughes, 908 A.2d 924, 927 (Pa.Super.2006).

¶ 4 In the first question presented for our review, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to suppress because the officer violated the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act (MPJA). See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. As a general rule, the MPJA provides:

Any duly employed municipal police officer who is within this Commonwealth, but beyond the territorial limits of his primary jurisdiction, shall have the power and authority to enforce the laws of this Commonwealth or otherwise perform the functions of that office as if enforcing those laws or performing those functions within the territorial limits of his primary jurisdiction in the following cases:

. . .

(2) Where the officer is in hot pursuit of any person for any offense which was committed, or which he has probable cause to believe was committed, within his primary jurisdiction and for which offense the officer continues in fresh pursuit of the person after the commission of the offense.

42 Pa.C.S. § 8953(a)(2). Under subsection two, if a police officer possesses probable cause that an offense has been committed in his or her primary jurisdiction, and is in hot and fresh pursuit of the perpetrator of the offense, the officer is vested with the same powers of law enforcement when the officer crosses out of his or her primary jurisdiction.

¶ 5 While in his primary jurisdiction, the officer in this case observed Appellant driving a vehicle whose owner had a suspended license. As we now know, Appellant was the owner and driver, but the officer did not know this for a fact. However, the officer did observe that the driver i.e. Appellant, was a middle aged man, which matched the description of the owner of the vehicle. Based on this information, the officer decided to initiate a traffic stop.

¶ 6 Pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b), a police officer may stop a vehicle anytime the officer possesses reasonable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation.

In order to determine whether the police officer had reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. In making this determination, we must give due weight ... to the specific reasonable inferences [the police officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Also, the totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather, even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 917 A.2d 848, 852 n. 4 (Pa.Super.2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). We conclude that under the facts of this case, the officer's suspicion that the driver of the vehicle was also the owner was a reasonable one because the driver matched the description of the owner as a middle aged man.¹ Consequently, had the officer initiated a traffic stop while in his primary jurisdiction it would have been entirely legal. However, due to traffic considerations, the officer waited just a few moments to execute the stop and by this time he was outside his primary jurisdiction.

¶ 7 Nonetheless, the MPJA requires probable cause that a violation has occurred within the officer's primary jurisdiction in order for the officer to carry out his or her law enforcement duties outside the primary jurisdiction. In this case, the officer did not possess probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed in his primary jurisdiction and consequently, there was a plain violation of the MPJA. But see Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 455 Pa.Super. 76, 686 A.2d 1353, 1354 (1996) (stating, "We hold that when an officer activates his emergency...