Com. v. Huff

833 A.2d 227

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Sean Alan HUFF, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted June 2, 2003.

Filed September 22, 2003.

H. Anthony Adams, Public Defender, Carlisle, for appellant.

Jaime M. Keating, Asst. Dist. Atty., Carlisle, for Com., appellee.

BEFORE: JOYCE, KELLY and POPOVICH, JJ.

OPINION BY POPOVICH, J.:

¶ 1 Appellant Sean Alan Huff appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in Court of Common Pleas, Cumberland County, following his convictions of unlawful possession of a small amount of marijuana and of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellant challenges the suppression court's refusal to suppress all evidence. Upon review, we reverse.

¶ 2 On December 16, 2001, Corporal Jeffrey Shubert of the Shippensburg Police Department was on patrol in an unmarked police vehicle. At approximately 2:20 a.m., Corporal Shubert was parked in the parking lot of a Sheetz convenience store at the intersection of Queen and King Streets in Shippensburg. At 2:28 a.m., he observed a vehicle traveling south on Queen Street stop at the traffic signal at the intersection of Queen and King Streets. The vehicle was approximately fifteen to twenty feet from Corporal Shubert's vehicle. Corporal Shubert observed the female passenger in the vehicle attempt to light a small pipe, which he suspected was a marijuana pipe. He then stopped the vehicle. Appellant, who was driving the vehicle, attempted to exit the vehicle to approach Corporal Shubert. However, the corporal instructed Appellant to remain in the vehicle. Corporal Shubert approached Appellant's vehicle and conveyed his suspicion to Appellant and the female passenger. Appellant then handed to Corporal Shubert the small pipe and admitted to the corporal that he owned the pipe. Corporal Shubert examined the pipe, suspected that it had been used for marijuana and placed Appellant under arrest. The corporal also noticed the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from Appellant's vehicle. Corporal Shubert informed Appellant of his Miranda warnings and placed him in protective custody in the rear of the police vehicle. Appellant gave Corporal Shubert permission to search his vehicle and indicated that a film canister containing marijuana was underneath the driver's seat. During the search, Corporal Shubert recovered a film canister containing suspected marijuana. However, Corporal Shubert located the canister in the center console along with a second pipe. Appellant stated that nothing in the vehicle belonged to the female passenger and that he owned the contraband found. The female passenger corroborated Appellant's statements.

¶ 3 The Pennsylvania State Police performed an analysis of the contents of the canister and concluded that it was marijuana weighing .40 grams. The Commonwealth charged Appellant with one count of unlawful possession of a small amount of marijuana for personal use and one count of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia.

¶ 4 The trial court appointed counsel to represent Appellant. Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress all evidence discovered during Corporal Shubert's stop and investigation. He argued that Corporal Shubert did not possess probable cause when he stopped Appellant's vehicle. The court denied the motion to suppress. On July 29, 2002, the trial court conducted a bench trial. The court convicted Appellant on both charges and, on July 30, 2002, sentenced him to pay costs of prosecution and a fine of $50.00 for each offense. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court ordered Appellant to file a Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of matters complained of on appeal; he complied. The court authored a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.

¶ 5 Appellant presents the following question for our review:

Did the court err when it refused to suppress evidence from a stop made when an officer observed a passenger in a car lighting something, possibly a small pipe, in close proximity to her face?

Appellant's Brief, at 5.

¶ 6 In considering the denial of a suppression motion, our standard of review is well settled. We must "determine whether the record supports the suppression court's factual findings and the legitimacy of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from these findings." Commonwealth v. Ayala, 791 A.2d 1202, 1207 (Pa.Super.2002). In doing so, we "may consider only the prosecution's [evidence]" and the defendant's evidence to the extent it is not contradictory. Id.,791 A.2d at 1207. If the evidence presented at the suppression hearing supports these findings of fact, we may not reverse the suppression court unless its accompanying legal conclusions are in error. See Commonwealth v. Lohr, 715 A.2d 459, 461 (Pa.Super.1998).

¶ 7 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby ensuring the "right of each individual to be let alone." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Commonwealth v. Blair, 394 Pa.Super. 207, 575 A.2d 593, 596 (1990). To secure this right, courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with citizens as those interactions become more intrusive. See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 541 Pa. 285, 662 A.2d 1043, 1047 (1995) (citations omitted). The first of these interactions is a "mere encounter," or request for information, that needs not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. See id., 662 A.2d at 1047 (citations omitted). The second, an "investigative detention," or Terry stop, must be supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity afoot; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. See id, 662 A.2d at 1047 (citations omitted). Finally, an arrest, or "custodial detention," must be supported by probable cause. See id., 662 A.2d at 1047-48 (citations omitted).

An investigative detention occurs when a police officer temporarily detains an individual by means of physical force or a show of authority for investigative purposes. Commonwealth v. Lopez, 415 Pa.Super. 252, 258, 609 A.2d 177, 180, appeal denied, 533 Pa. 598, 617 A.2d 1273 (1992). See also Commonwealth v. Lewis, 535 Pa. 501, 636 A.2d 619 (1994). Such a detention constitutes a seizure of a person and thus activates the protections of the Fourth Amendment and the requirements of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Lopez, 415 Pa.Super. at 258-59, 609 A.2d at 180; Lewis, 535 Pa. at 507-08, 636 A.2d at 622-23. In order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure/detention, "a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter." Lewis, 535 Pa. at 509, 636 A.2d at 623 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991)).

Commonwealth v. Sierra, 555 Pa. 170, 723 A.2d 644, 646 (1999).

¶ 8 To determine whether the interaction rises to the level of an investigatory detention, we must discern whether, as a matter of law, the police conducted a seizure of the person involved. See Commonwealth v. Mendenhall, 552 Pa. 484, 715 A.2d 1117, 1119-20 (1998). To decide whether a seizure occurred, we must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the demeanor and conduct of the police would have communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to decline the officer's request or otherwise terminate the encounter. See Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1202 (Pa.Super.2002) (en banc).

¶ 9 In the present case, Corporal Shubert's interaction with Appellant was clearly an investigative detention when he initiated a stop of Appellant's vehicle to investigate whether criminal activity was afoot.¹ Accordingly, we conclude that the corporal effectively seized Appellant at the moment he initiated the stop of Appellant's vehicle.

Our Supreme Court has mandated that law enforcement officers, prior to subjecting a citizen to an investigatory detention, must harbor at least a reasonable suspicion that the person seized is then engaged in unlawful activity. See Commonwealth v. Polo, 563 Pa. 218, 759 A.2d 372, 375 (Pa.2000). The question of whether reasonable suspicion existed at the time of an investigatory detention must be answered by examining the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the officer who initiated the stop had a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting the individual stopped. Commonwealth v. Ayala, 2002 PA Super 30, 791 A.2d 1202, 1209 (Pa.Super.2002) (quoting In the Interest of D.M., 566 Pa. 445, 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa.2001)). Thus, to establish grounds for reasonable suspicion, the officer must articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in that activity. See Commonwealth v. Cook, 558 Pa. 50, 735 A.2d 673, 677 (Pa.1999).

Although a police officer's knowledge and length of experience weigh heavily in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed, our Courts remain mindful that the officer's judgment is necessarily colored by his or her primary involvement in "the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." In re D.E.M., 1999 PA Super 59, 727 A.2d 570, 578 n. 19 (Pa.Super.1999) (quoting Terry 392 U.S. at 11-12, 88 S.Ct. 1868). Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing court must

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