Com. v. Rogers

849 A.2d 1185

578 Pa. 127

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Edward S. ROGERS, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted March 6, 2001.

Decided May 27, 2004.

Andrea Konow, Bruce A. Carsia, for Edward Stanley Rogers.

Patricia Jo McLean, Butler, Timothy Jon Barker, York, Timothy F. McCune, Butler, for Com.

Before CAPPY, C.J., CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice CAPPY.¹

The issues with which we are presented question whether the police legally detained Edward Rogers ("Appellant") and executed a canine search of Appellant's vehicle. For the following reasons, we now affirm.

On January 9, 1998, Trooper Michael Banovsky of the Pennsylvania State Police observed Appellant's vehicle traveling southbound on Interstate 79, passing other traffic.² The trooper positioned his vehicle behind Appellant's, and followed him for 4/10ths of a mile, clocking his speed at 73 mph in a 55 mph zone. Trooper Banovsky also noticed that the vehicle had an expired Tennessee temporary registration plate. Based on his observations, Trooper Banovsky initiated a traffic stop.³

Upon approaching Appellant's vehicle, Trooper Banovsky observed that Appellant was extremely nervous. In fact, Appellant was trembling so badly he had difficulty retrieving relevant documents for the trooper's examination. Appellant stated that he had just purchased the vehicle in Tennessee and was on his way to return it to the seller. Appellant also volunteered that he had structured the purchase of the vehicle in such a fashion that if anything was "shaky", he could return the vehicle.

The documents Appellant produced were incomplete or plainly false in many respects. For example, the Tennessee Certificate of Title extension form lacked the name of the transferee and the odometer reading. Also, the Tennessee Department of Revenue form was signed by "Edward Stanley" and listed an incorrect Pennsylvania address. Appellant stated that he knew that the Pennsylvania address listed on the form was false, but said that he placed it on the form at the behest of the seller of the vehicle.

Trooper Banovsky inquired about Appellant's travel plans, specifically asking about his origin and destination. Appellant stated that he had just left a friend's house in Butler, Pennsylvania, but was unable to recall the address of that friend. During the conversation with Appellant, Trooper Banovsky noticed that in the backseat of Appellant's vehicle there was an open box of "Tide" powdered laundry detergent, an open box of "Bounce" fabric softener dryer sheets, and a used roll of "Scotch" packaging tape.

At this juncture, Trooper Banovsky requested that Appellant get out of his automobile. Trooper Banovksy asked if he could search Appellant's vehicle. Appellant refused, stating that he himself had not yet searched the vehicle; Appellant volunteered that he had not yet had the opportunity to determine whether there was anything in the door panels or air vents of the vehicle. Trooper Banovsky then radioed a request for a criminal history check of Appellant. The check revealed that Appellant had a prior drug conviction. Trooper Banovsky proceeded to detain Appellant and requested that a canine unit be deployed to the scene.⁴

Allegheny County Police Officer Kent Maier and a canine named Rosie responded to the scene. Rosie checked the exterior of the vehicle and signaled a positive alert at the driver's door. Rosie then jumped, without prompting, inside the open driver's window and alerted the officers to the possible presence of drugs in the right rear of the vehicle. Based upon the positive results of the canine search, the police secured Appellant's vehicle and towed it to the police barracks. At the barracks, a second dog sniff was conducted by another canine; this search also yielded positive results. Subsequently, Trooper Banovsky obtained a search warrant. A search of the vehicle uncovered fifty-two pounds of marijuana.

Appellant was arrested and charged with Possession with the Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance,⁵ Possession of a Controlled Substance,⁶ and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.⁷ Appellant was also charged with violating the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code by driving with an expired registration plate and speeding at a rate of 73 mph in a 55 mph zone.⁸

Appellant filed a motion to suppress all statements and physical evidence the police obtained incident to his detention and arrest. He asserted that the police illegally detained him for investigative purposes and that his vehicle was illegally searched in violation of his constitutional rights. At the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated to the testimony that would have been presented by submitting to the court relevant portions of the police reports and other documents.

The suppression court concluded that Trooper Banovsky's investigative detention of Appellant was illegal because it was not supported by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The court also found that the warrantless canine search of the vehicle was illegal because there was no reasonable suspicion that Appellant was involved in drug trafficking.

The Superior Court reversed. Commonwealth v. Rogers, 741 A.2d 813 (Pa.Super.Ct.1999). The Superior Court concluded that there was reasonable suspicion that Appellant was committing a criminal act to support the detention and the search. Id. at 817-18. In arriving at this conclusion, the court focused on the fact that there were opened laundry supplies and packaging tape in the back seat of Appellant's car, items that Trooper Banovsky knew from his experience as a narcotics officer were used in the packaging of certain illegal drugs. The court also noted that Appellant was extraordinarily nervous at being stopped by Trooper Banovsky, and that the paperwork on his vehicle was incomplete and fraudulent. The Superior Court concluded that the totality of the circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion, and that the detention was therefore legal. Id. Utilizing the same set of facts, the Superior Court also determined that the dog sniff of Appellant's vehicle was valid. Id. 818-20.

Appellant then filed a petition for allowance of appeal with this court, which we granted.

On appeal, Appellant complains that his federal and state constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures have been violated. He raises two separate issues. The first is whether Trooper Banovsky had reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant beyond the initial traffic stop. He contends that after Trooper Banovsky issued the traffic citations, the detention should have ceased as the trooper had no reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Appellant concludes that as he was detained without reasonable suspicion, then he was seized in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.⁹

A police officer may detain an individual in order to conduct an investigation if that officer reasonably suspects that the individual is engaging in criminal conduct. Commonwealth v. Cook, 558 Pa. 50, 735 A.2d 673, 676 (1999). "This standard, less stringent than probable cause, is commonly known as reasonable suspicion." Id. In order to determine whether the police officer had reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. In re D.M., 566 Pa. 445, 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (2001). In making this determination, we must give "due weight ... to the specific reasonable inferences [the police officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience." Cook, 735 A.2d at 676 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Also, the totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather, "[e]ven a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer." Cook, 735 A.2d at 676.

In the matter sub judice, Trooper Banovsky stated that when he approached the vehicle, Appellant was extremely nervous. In fact, Appellant was trembling so badly he had difficulty retrieving his license from his wallet. Also, the paperwork for Appellant's car was conflicting, incomplete and in some instances plainly fraudulent. Furthermore, while Appellant claimed that he had just departed a friend's house in Butler, he could not recall the address. Additionally, Trooper Banovsky noted open boxes of laundry supplies as well as packaging tape in the back seat of the car; Trooper Banovsky knew from his experience investigating drug offenses that these items were commonly used in the packaging and distribution of controlled substances.¹⁰

Of course, one can conceive of innocent explanations for each one of these facts. Yet, as noted supra, reasonable suspicion does not require that the activity in question must be unquestionably criminal before an officer may investigate further. See Cook, supra. Rather, the test is what it purports to be—it requires a suspicion of criminal conduct that is reasonable based upon the facts of the matter. The facts of the matter sub judice give rise to just such a suspicion. Appellant was unusually agitated; the paperwork for his vehicle was out of order in several key respects; his answers regarding the location he had just departed were vague; and, most importantly, the back seat of his car contained products that Trooper Banovsky knew, via his extensive professional experience, are commonly used in the packaging of illegal narcotics. These facts, taken in their totality, lead to a conclusion that Trooper Banovsky had reasonable suspicion to suspect that criminal activity was afoot. Thus, Appellant's first claim for relief fails.

Appellant next contends that even if the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, the canine search of his vehicle was illegal...