Comben v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-20-929241

Amourgis & Associates, L.L.C., and Benjamin P. Pfouts, for appellee.

Kreiner & Peters, Co., L.PA., Shaun D. Byroads, and Daran Kiefer, for appellant.

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

FRANK D.CELEBREZZE, JR, PRESIDING JUDGE

{¶ 1} Appellant The Boyd Group (U.S.) Inc. ("Boyd") challenges the trial court's judgment denying its motion to intervene in the underlying personal injury

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action. Boyd had sought intervention in order to protect and preserve its claimed subrogation rights against the alleged tortfeasor and the insurance carrier for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. After a careful review of the record and law, we dismiss this appeal for lack of a final, appealable order.

I. Factual and Procedural History

{¶ 2} In 2017, plaintiff-appellee Allison Comben ("Comben") sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by Jacob K. Kastl ("Kastl"). At the time of the incident, Comben's vehicle was insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"). Comben was further insured under a health benefit plan that was offered through and sponsored by her husband's employer, Boyd. Boyd is the employer, fiduciary, and plan sponsor for The Boyd Group Health Benefit Plan ("The Plan"). UMR, Inc. ("UMR"), a subsidiary of UnitedHealthcare Company, provided administrative services for The Plan.

{¶ 3} Following the subject collision, Comben was contacted by UMR, who claimed that it had paid medical expenses that had been caused by the subject collision totaling $11, 628.08 from The Plan fund and that UMR (on behalf of Boyd) was entitled to be reimbursed for those expenses pursuant to its contractual rights of subrogation and reimbursement.

{¶ 4} Shortly before the expiration of the statute of limitations, Comben filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-19-923410, asserting claims against Kastl as tortfeasor and State Farm for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. The complaint further alleged a claim

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for declaratory judgment against Boyd, as the plan sponsor and a fiduciary of beneficiaries/insureds of The Plan, requesting that the court interpret the contract to determine Boyd's claimed subrogation and reimbursement rights.

{¶ 5} Boyd failed to file an answer or otherwise respond to the complaint, and Comben filed a motion for default judgment. While Comben's motion for default judgment was pending, Boyd filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Comben's declaratory judgment claim was preempted by 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3) of ERISA and arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Comben's declaratory judgment claim because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3).

{¶ 6} Boyd did not assert any of its own claims at that time regarding its alleged subrogation and reimbursement rights, nor did Boyd bring a separate action against Comben, Kastl, or State Farm.

{¶ 7} Before the trial court ruled on either motion, Comben filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice against all parties pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a).

{¶ 8} Comben subsequently refiled her action, which included the same claims against Kastl and State Farm, but did not refile the declaratory judgment claim against Boyd. Shortly after the suit was refiled, Boyd filed a motion to intervene. Boyd's intervening complaint sought to assert portions of two tort claims against Kastl and State Farm that it claimed had been assigned/subrogated to it by Comben through contract. Boyd's intervening complaint did not contain any claims

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for declaratory judgment or otherwise against Comben regarding its claimed contractual subrogation and reimbursement rights.

{¶ 9} The trial court denied Boyd's motion to intervene, and Boyd filed the instant appeal, asserting two assignments of error for our review:

1. The trial court erred by denying The Boyd Group (U.S.) Inc.'s motion to intervene/join as a party plaintiff preventing protection and preservation of subrogation rights against defendants

2. The trial court erred by failing to allow a subrogor to join the action as a necessary party needed for full and just adjudication

{¶ 10} A motion to dismiss appeal was filed by Comben. The motion was referred to the panel addressing the merits of this appeal.

II. Law and Analysis

{¶ 11} Preliminarily, we must address Comben's motion to dismiss this appeal. Comben argues that this court lacks jurisdiction over the instant appeal because the trial court's order fails to satisfy R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) and Civ.R. 54(B).

{¶ 12} Under Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, courts of appeals have jurisdiction only to "affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district." As a result, "'[i]t is well-established that an order must be final before it can be reviewed by an appellate court. If an order is not final, then an appellate court has no jurisdiction.'" Gehm v. Timberline Post & Frame, 112 Ohio St.3d 514, 2007-Ohio-607, 861 N.E.2d 519, ¶ 14, quoting Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 20, 540 N.E.2d 266 (1989). "An order of a court is a final appealable order

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only if the requirements of both R.C. 2505.02 and, if applicable, Civ.R. 54(B), are met."' Gehm at ¶ 15, quoting State ex rel Scruggs v. Sadler, 97 Ohio St.3d 78, 2002-Ohio-5315, 776 N.E.2d 101.

{¶ 13} Boyd argues that...