Combs v. Fla. Dep't of Corr.

461 F.Supp.3d 1203

Stephen COMBS, Plaintiff,

v.FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 5:18-cv-266-TKW/MJF

United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Panama City Division.

Signed May 20, 2020

Johana Elaine Nieves, John M. Vernaglia, Ryan Joshua Andrews, Law Offices of Steven R. Andrews PA, Tallahassee, FL, for Plaintiff.

Anthony Dean Johnson, Office of the Attorney General, Christopher Claudio Torres, Office of the Attorney General Civil Torts Section, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant Florida Department of Corrections.

Brian Alexander Wahl, Bradley Arant Boult etc., Birmingham, AL, Eliot Bradford Peace, Robert Craig Mayfield, Bradley Arant Boult etc. LLP, Tampa, FL, for Defendant Centurion of Florida LLC.

ORDER

Michael J. Frank, United States Magistrate Judge

This matter is before this court on Plaintiff's "Motion to Transfer Venue to the Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division." For the reasons set forth below, this motion will be denied.

I. Background

Plaintiff, while proceeding pro se , commenced this section 1983 action in the Panama City Division of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference by denying him treatment for Hepatitis C ("HCV"). On July 18, 2019, counsel made an appearance for Plaintiff. On September 16, 2019, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging that the Defendants' conduct violated: (1) the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. ; (2) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. ; and (3) Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to appropriate medical care while imprisoned.

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that during his initial health screening, he was diagnosed with chronic HCV. He avers that despite regularly inquiring about obtaining medication for his HCV, Defendants denied him necessary treatment. From October 2016 through November 2018, Defendants purportedly denied Plaintiff essential medication and failed to monitor his medical condition. Defendants allegedly informed Plaintiff that he did not qualify for HCV treatment, his liver was fine, and that treatment was not "clinically indicated." Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' denial of treatment and medication was motivated by a desire to minimize expenses and was not based on sound medical judgment.

II. Discussion

A. Intra-District Transfer Under Section 1404(b)

28 U.S.C. § 1404(b) authorizes district courts to transfer a civil action from one division in the district to another such division. PT United Can Co. Ltd. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. , 138 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1998). Section 1404(b) states in relevant part: "Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties , any action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature or any motion or hearing thereof, may be transferred, in the discretion of the court, from the division in which pending to any other division in the same district." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b) (emphasis added). " Section 1404(b) applies only when all parties agree to the transfer." 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT , ET AL. , FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3842, at 13 (4th ed. 2013) ; see In re Gibson , 423 F. App'x 385, 390 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that section 1404(b) "authorizes intra-district transfers of proceedings only when all of the parties consent or agree"); Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin. , 610 F.2d 70, 79 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting the limitation in section 1404(b) ). "If any party objects to a change of division, the general transfer standards of Section 1404(a) must be met." 15 WRIGHT , ET AL. , FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3842, at 14. Here, Defendants oppose Plaintiff's motion to transfer venue to the Tallahassee Division. Therefore, this court must consider whether a transfer is warranted under Section 1404(a).

B. Transfer Under Section 1404(a)

When addressing opposed motions for an intra-district transfer, courts analyze such motion using the applicable factors relevant to inter-district transfers pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Zanghi v. FreightCar Am., Inc. , 38 F. Supp. 3d 631, 643 (W.D. Penn. 2014) ; Hanning v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 710 F. Supp. 213, 214-15 (S.D. Ohio 1989) ; see generally Steshenko v. McKay , 735 F. App'x 298, 301 (9th Cir. 2018). Section 1404(a), provides that "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

" Section 1404(a) is merely a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens for the subset of cases in which the transferee forum is within the federal court system; in such cases, Congress has replaced the traditional remedy of outright dismissal with transfer." Atlantic Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W.D. of Tex. , 571 U.S. 49, 60, 134 S. Ct. 568, 580, 187 L.Ed.2d 487 (2013) ; Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp. , 549 U.S. 422, 430, 127 S. Ct. 1184, 1190-91, 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007) ("For the federal court system, Congress has codified the doctrine and has provided for transfer, rather than dismissal, when a sister federal court is the more convenient place for trial of the action."). Because an intra-district transfer generally has milder ramifications than transfer to another district, courts are less rigorous in applying the section 1404(a) analysis. K.B. by T.B. v. Mich. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. , 367 F. Supp. 3d 647, 654 (E.D. Mich. 2019). " Section 1404(a) ... exists to make venue convenient" for parties, witnesses, and the courts. Ferens v. John Deere Co. , 494 U.S. 516, 528, 110 S. Ct. 1274, 1282, 108 L.Ed.2d 443 (1990). It "reflects an increased desire to have federal civil suits tried in the federal system at the place called for in the particular case by considerations of convenience and justice." Van Dusen v. Barrack , 376 U.S. 612, 616, 84 S. Ct. 805, 809, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964). Section 1404(a) is designed to minimize the cost—in "time, energy and money"—that may result from litigating an action in an inconvenient forum. Cont'l Grain Co. v. The FBL-585 , 364 U.S. 19, 26, 80 S. Ct. 1470, 1474, 4 L.Ed.2d 1540 (1960).

District courts have substantial discretion to adjudicate motions to transfer consistent with an "individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness." Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp. , 487 U.S. 22, 29, 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2244, 101 L.Ed.2d 22 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen , 376 U.S. at 622, 84 S. Ct. at 812 ). The movant bears the burden of establishing that transferring venue to another division clearly would be more convenient for the parties and/or witnesses, or would best serve the interest of justice. In re Ricoh , 870 F.2d 570, 573 (11th Cir. 1989) ; Coady v. Ashcraft & Gerel , 223 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2000) ; Time, Inc. v. Manning , 366 F.2d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 1966).

Merely demonstrating that litigating the case in another division or district would be equally convenient will not suffice. Van Dusen , 376 U.S. at 645-46, 84 S. Ct. at 824. To justify transferring a case, a court must conclude that "some other forum is a better location to hear the dispute." 15 WRIGHT , ET AL. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3841, at 4 (emphasis added). Courts called upon to address a motion to transfer should be mindful that § 1404 is not designed to transfer the inconvenience from one party to another. S.E.C. v. Lauer , 478 F. App'x 550, 554 (11th Cir. 2012) ; Smithfield Packing Co., Inc. v. V. Suarez & Co., Inc. , 857 F. Supp. 2d 581, 588-89 (E.D. Va. 2012). "[M]erely shifting inconvenience from one party to another is not a sufficient basis for transfer." Research Automation, Inc. v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int'l, Inc. , 626 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 2010).

"In ruling on § 1404(a) motions, courts have not limited their consideration to the three enumerated factors in § 1404(a) (convenience of parties, convenience of witnesses, or interests of justice) ...." Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co. , 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995). As the Supreme Court has stated, a "district court considering a § 1404(a) motion ... must evaluate both the convenience of the parties and various public-interest considerations." Atlantic Marine Constr. Co., Inc. , 571 U.S. at 62, 134 S. Ct. at 581 ; Stewart Org. , 487 U.S. at 29, 108 S. Ct. at 2244 ("A motion to transfer under § 1404(a) thus calls on the district court to weigh in the balance a number of case-specific factors."); In re Apple, Inc. , 602 F.3d 909, 912 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating that "district courts should weigh ‘any case-specific factors’ relevant to convenience and fairness to determine whether transfer is warranted"). "The three statutory factors—convenience of parties, convenience of witnesses, and the interest of justice—are broad generalities that take on a variety of meanings in the context of specific cases." 15 WRIGHT , ET AL. , FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3847, at 129.

To the extent they are relevant to a particular case, courts typically consider at least the following public and private factors:

(1) the convenience of the witnesses;

(2) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof;

(3) the convenience of the parties;

(4) the locus of operative facts;

(5) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses;

(6) the relative means of the parties;

(7) a forum's familiarity with the governing law;

(8) the weight accorded a plaintiff's choice of forum; and

(9) trial efficiency and the interest of justice, based on the totality of the circumstances.

Atlantic Marine Constr. Co., Inc. , 571 U.S. at 62 n.6, 134 S. Ct. at 581 n.6 ; Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno , 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6, 102 S. Ct. 252, 258 n.6, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981) ; Manuel v. Convergys Corp. , 430 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); see generally Gulf...