Comm'r of Transp. v. Lagosz

189 Conn.App. 828

209 A.3d 709

COMMISSIONER OF TRANSPORTATION

v.Teresa B. LAGOSZ et al.

AC 40885

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 7, 2019

Officially released May 14, 2019

Teresa B. Lagosz, self-represented, the appellant (named defendant).

Raul A. Rodriguez, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, former attorney general, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Lavine, Moll and Bear, Js.

BEAR, J.

The defendant Teresa B. Lagosz¹ appeals from the judgment of the trial court reassessing damages in the sum of $ 600,000 for the taking of her property by the plaintiff, the Commissioner of Transportation, on May 4, 2015, in connection with the improvement of the New Haven-Hartford-Springfield rail corridor. The defendant's primary claim on appeal is that the court improperly found and summarily enforced, after conducting a hearing pursuant to Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc. , 225 Conn. 804, 626 A.2d 729 (1993) ( Audubon ), an oral settlement agreement in the amount of $ 600,000 as just compensation for the taking by eminent domain of the defendant's real property. Specifically, the defendant claims that (1) the settlement agreement was not inclusive of all the essential terms of the parties' agreement and (2) the court's finding that an enforceable agreement existed was clearly erroneous because it was based on unclear and ambiguous testimony elicited at the Audubon hearing.² Conversely, the plaintiff claims that the court, after the Audubon hearing, correctly concluded that there was a settlement agreement in the amount of $ 600,000 that was just compensation for the taking of the defendant's real property. We agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are undisputed or uncontested. On May 4, 2015, pursuant to General Statutes § 13b-36³ and General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 13a-73,⁴ the plaintiff took by eminent domain real property owned by the defendant located at 468 Norton Lane in Berlin. The real property consisted of approximately 11.64 acres, including all buildings, improvements and appurtenances thereon. The defendant's husband, Joseph Lagosz, also operated a business in one of the buildings on the real property. On the date of the taking, the plaintiff deposited with the court $ 420,000 in compensation for the taking.

On September 28, 2015, the defendant appealed to the court from the plaintiff's assessment of damages.

See General Statutes § 13a-76.⁵ In that appeal, she stated that she was "aggrieved by [the $ 420,000] assessment of damages because the same is inadequate." No other claims were set forth in her appeal.

On November 3, 2015, the plaintiff filed his answer denying that the assessment was inadequate. On November 6, 2015, a certificate of closed pleadings and a claim to the trial list were filed. The defendant subsequently was ordered to provide an appraisal of the real property to the plaintiff on or before April 1, 2016. The parties met on three occasions in June, 2016, in an attempt to mediate a settlement on the amount of the compensation to be paid to the defendant for the taking.

The plaintiff asserts that, during the third of those mediation sessions, the parties entered into an oral agreement in which the defendant would receive a total of $ 600,000, less the $ 420,000 already paid by the plaintiff, as compensation for the taking of her real property and, in turn, the defendant and her husband would vacate the property by August 15, 2016, without having to pay any postcondemnation use and occupancy charges.⁶ The plaintiff further states that the court, during the third mediation session, spoke to the defendant and her husband to ensure that they understood and accepted the terms of that agreement. The court then informed the plaintiff that the defendant had agreed to those terms. After the reported settlement, the plaintiff and the defendant's counsel prepared drafts of a written settlement agreement memorializing the agreement reached through the mediation, but the defendant refused to sign the final version of the agreement, and the case was scheduled for trial.⁷ The defendant subsequently discharged her counsel and elected to represent herself at the trial. Her former counsel filed a motion to withdraw and requested a status conference.

On July 21, 2017, the court, after the status conference, ordered, sua sponte, that an Audubon hearing take place to determine if the parties had reached an enforceable settlement agreement, and the court postponed any trial until after it made its determination. On August 14, 2017, the court commenced the Audubon hearing. The defendant, her husband, and the defendant's former attorneys were present at the hearing. During the hearing, the following colloquy between the court and Richard P. Healey, one of the defendant's former attorneys, occurred:

"The Court: Is it your position that there was no settlement agreement?

"[Attorney Healey]: No.

"The Court: Okay.

"[Attorney Healey]: No, not at all."

Attorney Healey's cocounsel, John Bradley, and the court had the following colloquy:

"[Attorney Bradley]: I definitely agree, Your Honor ... that the settlement was for—they were going to pay an additional $ 180,000 over what they—

"The Court: In addition to the [$ 420,000] that was already on deposit.

"[Attorney Bradley]: Right.... So the essential terms, in my view, was the additional [$ 180,000], waiver of the use and occupancy [which occurred]."

Attorney Healey told the court that the only obligation of the defendant and her husband under the settlement agreement "was to vacate the [real] property at a date that was acceptable to the state; they have done that."

The court also stated the following:

"The Court: My memories have come flying back and comport with everyone's here; is that we did reach an agreement as to the money. The other stuff was a little—a little more amorphous, but the other stuff is off the table now.

"[Attorney Healey]: Right.

"The Court: I mean, that has been completed. The agreement was $ 600,000 .... I don't think I can reopen negotiations. The only thing I'm allowed to determine is whether there was a deal. And I'm being told there was a deal. I remember there was a deal."

The defendant's husband testified in the defendant's presence and on her behalf at the Audubon hearing. In response to a question by the court, he stated that the $ 600,000 in total payment for the real property was agreed to by the parties.

On August 14, 2017, after the Audubon hearing concluded, the court rendered judgment finding that a settlement agreement was reached in the amount of $ 600,000: "The court finds that a settlement was reached in this matter in the amount of $ 600,000. Any settlement funds as yet unpaid to the defendant are hereby ordered to be paid." On September 5, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to reargue, which was denied by the court on September 7, 2017. On September 27, 2017, the defendant filed the present appeal. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

Before we address the defendant's claims, we first set forth the applicable standard of review and relevant legal principles. "Because the [defendant challenges] the trial court's legal conclusion that the agreement was summarily enforceable, we must determine whether that conclusion is legally and logically correct and whether [it finds] support in the facts set out in the [record]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kidder v. Read , 150 Conn. App. 720, 733, 93 A.3d 599 (2014). Our standard of review of legal questions is plenary. See State v. Hanisko , 187 Conn. App. 237, 245, 202 A.3d 375 (2019).

In Audubon , our Supreme Court determined that a settlement agreement resolving the issues in a pending case may be enforced prior to and without the necessity of a trial: "A trial court has the inherent power to enforce summarily a settlement agreement as a matter of law when the terms of the agreement are clear and unambiguous.... Agreements that end lawsuits are contracts, sometimes enforceable in a subsequent suit, but in many situations enforceable by entry of a judgment in the original suit. A court's authority to enforce a settlement by entry of judgment in the underlying action is especially clear where the settlement is reported to the court during the course of a trial or other significant courtroom proceedings.⁸ ...

"In Janus Films, Inc. v. Miller , [801 F.2d 578, 583 (2d Cir. 1986) ], Judge Newman, writing for the majority of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, noted the important policy behind a court's power to enforce summarily a settlement agreement: Due regard for the proper use of judicial resources requires that a trial judge proceed with entry of a settlement judgment after affording the parties an opportunity to be heard as to the precise content and wording of the judgment, rather than resume the trial and precipitate an additional lawsuit for breach of a settlement agreement. This authority should normally be exercised whenever settlements are announced in the midst of a trial.

"Summary enforcement is not only essential to the efficient use of judicial resources, but also preserves the integrity of settlement as a meaningful way to resolve legal disputes. When parties agree to settle a case, they are effectively contracting for the right to avoid a trial. The asserted right not to go to trial can appropriately be based on a contract between the parties.... The essence of that right [cannot] be vindicated effectively after the trial has occurred.... To hold that a jury trial is a necessary predicate to enforcement of a settlement agreement would undermine the very purpose of the agreement." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Audubon , supra, 225 Conn. at 811–12, 626 A.2d 729.

I

We first address the defendant's claim that the court, following the Audubon hearin...