Commonwealth v. 1997 Pontiac Sunfire, No. 2211 C.D. 2008 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 10/19/2009)

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Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. 1997 Pontiac Sunfire Appeal of: Ali Joobeen

No. 2211 C.D. 2008.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted: July 2, 2009.

Filed: October 19, 2009.

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

Before this Court is the appeal of Ali Joobeen (Appellant) from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court). This order stayed proceedings on the Commonwealth's Petition for Forfeiture (Forfeiture Petition) and Appellant's Petition for Intervention and Return of His Property (Return Petition), pending resolution of a future criminal case against Appellant's nephew Bijan Joobeen.¹ Appellant argues that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over both petitions and over the 1997 Pontiac Sunfire automobile (Property), which is the subject of both petitions, and that the trial court's order, Rule 588 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the act commonly known as the Controlled Substances Forfeiture Act (Act), 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 6801-6802, violate Appellant's right to due process of law.

Appellant's Return Petition alleges that police officers from North Philadelphia's 39th District (Philadelphia Police) seized the Property from the residence where Appellant was staying in Montgomery County (the Residence) on February 8, 2008. The Philadelphia Police then impounded the Property in Philadelphia County. The Commonwealth alleges that the Property belongs to Bijan Joobeen and "was possessed or used (or intended to be used), or is a proceed of an exchange conducted, in violation of the Pennsylvania Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 P.S. § 780-101 et seq.²" (Forfeiture Petition ¶ 3.) Appellant alleges that he is the owner of the Property.

The following narrative is drawn from allegations made in the Return Petition and in the Commonwealth's Motion to Stay Civil Return of Property and Forfeiture Proceedings (Motion to Stay). Following a report of a burglary at Bijan Joobeen's residence in Philadelphia, the Philadelphia Police obtained a warrant to search the residence, which Bijan Joobeen shared with other individuals. The Philadelphia Police executed this warrant on December 30, 2007, and found drugs and drug paraphernalia. As a result, the Philadelphia Police obtained a warrant for the arrest of Bijan Joobeen. The Commonwealth alleges that, when the Philadelphia Police went to arrest Bijan Joobeen, he fled in the Property. The Commonwealth avers that it then received information that Bijan Joobeen was staying at the Residence. The Philadelphia Police went to the Residence on February 8, 2008, to apprehend Bijan Joobeen. The Philadelphia Police did not find Bijan Joobeen, but did notice the Property, which they confiscated.

The Commonwealth filed its Forfeiture Petition on April 25, 2008. Appellant filed his Return Petition on June 19, 2008.³ The record does not contain full transcripts of all the hearings before the trial court. However, it appears that, in support of his Return Petition, Appellant introduced: (1) photographs of the Philadelphia Police seizing the Property, along with an accompanying narrative; (2) interrogatories served on Appellant by the Commonwealth relating to the Forfeiture Petition; (3) Michigan registration for the Property, expiring on September 18, 2008; (4) Insurance cards for the registration of the Property for the periods of October 12, 2007 to April 12, 2008, and April 12, 2008 to October 12, 2008, naming Appellant as the insured; (5) a Certificate of Title for the Property, issued by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on January 23, 2008,⁴ naming Bijan Joobeen as the registered owner and including a handwritten notation applying for a first lien by Appellant; and (6) a Certificate of Title for the Property issued by the State of Michigan on February 14, 2008,⁵ listing Appellant as the owner.

On July 7, 2008, Appellant filed a Motion to Compel Discovery requesting the trial court to order the Commonwealth to produce:

Any and all search warrants, and their corresponding affidavits, related to the instant matter.

Any and all arrest warrants, and their corresponding affidavits, related to the instant matter.

Any and all 75-48 documents produced by the Philadelphia Police Department related to the instant matter.

Any and all 75-49 documents produced by the Philadelphia Police Department related to the instant matter.

Any and all statements made in [sic] to the Philadelphia Police Department in reference to occurrences or transactions related to the instant matter.

(Motion to Compel Discovery at 2, July 7, 2008.) The trial court granted this motion. Subsequently, the Commonwealth filed its Motion to Stay alleging that it had been unaware that Bijan Joobeen was still at large, and that complying with Appellant's discovery request could harm a future criminal case against Bijan Joobeen. The trial court granted the Motion for Stay (Stay Order), and it is from this order that Appellant now appeals.⁶

On appeal, Appellant argues that: (1) the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Return Petition and the Forfeiture Petition because the Property was seized in Montgomery County, not Philadelphia County; (2) the trial court lacks personal or in rem jurisdiction over the Property; (3) Appellant was deprived of a prompt hearing following the seizure of the Property, in violation of his due process rights; (4) any questions of fact must be resolved by a jury; (5) Rule 588 is unconstitutional; and (6) Section 6801 and Section 6802 of the Act are unconstitutional. The Commonwealth, in turn, argues that the trial court's order in this matter is interlocutory, and that Appellant lacks standing.

As a preliminary matter, we must first address the Commonwealth's argument that the trial court's order granting a stay pending the resolution of the underlying criminal case is an interlocutory order from which an appeal may not be taken, and that Appellant's appeal in the instant matter must, therefore, be quashed. Section 762(a)(1)(ii) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 762(a)(1)(ii), gives this Court exclusive jurisdiction over "appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas" over civil actions brought by the Commonwealth. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction over appeals from final orders of courts of common pleas on forfeiture petitions brought pursuant to the Act. Rule 341(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure defines a final order as one that "disposes of all claims and of all parties," or "is expressly defined as a final order by statute," or is expressly defined as a final order by the trial court. Pa. R.A.P. 341(b). The trial court's order granting a stay does not fall into any of these three categories.

However, Rule 311 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "[a]n appeal may be taken as of right" from "[a]n order confirming, modifying or dissolving or refusing to confirm, modify or dissolve an attachment, custodianship, receivership or similar matter affecting the possession or control of property." Pa. R.A.P. 311(a)(2) (emphasis added). We hold that, under the unique circumstances of this case, the trial court's order qualifies as an interlocutory order appealable as of right under Rule 311(a)(2). In this case, the trial court has stayed the proceedings on the Forfeiture Petition and the Return Petition pending the outcome of the underlying criminal case. However, as Appellant argues, this would appear to be an indefinite stay, given that the underlying criminal case has not yet been initiated and the presumed defendant in that case, Bijan Joobeen, is still at large. Therefore, the underlying criminal case may never be initiated, much less resolved. Under these specific facts, the trial court's order is, effectively, a refusal to confirm or dissolve a matter affecting the possession or control of property.

We now turn to Appellant's argument that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Return Petition and the Forfeiture Petition because the Property was seized in Montgomery County, not Philadelphia County. This Court has addressed this issue previously in Commonwealth v. Perez, 941 A.2d 778 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). In Perez, Philadelphia police arrested Francisco Perez (Perez) in Philadelphia County on charges of attempted murder and seized, inter alia, $2,176.00 in cash that the Commonwealth alleged was stolen during the crime, along with an automobile. The Commonwealth filed a forfeiture petition pursuant to the Act, which the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County granted. Perez did not appeal that decision. Later, however, Perez petitioned for return of the cash and the automobile, arguing, in part, that the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Commonwealth's forfeiture petition because the property at issue was not seized in Philadelphia County, but in Berks County. Id. at 781. With regard to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, this Court stated:

Subject matter jurisdiction is jurisdiction over the nature of the cause of action and relief sought that allows a court to exercise its power. The in rem jurisdiction of the property is determined by whether the defendant property had sufficient contacts with the forum that the court's exercise of power constituted fair play and substantial justice. The matter of jurisdiction over the property is a question of personal jurisdiction.

. . . . It is clear that Perez confuses subject matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the subject property. . . .

. . . .

Assuming arguendo that Perez's objection to subject matter jurisdiction demands a holding that the long ago forfeiture had been barred, "[a]ll Pennsylvania courts of common pleas have statewide subject matter jurisdiction in cases arising under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code." Commonwealth v. Bethea, 574 Pa. 100, 113, 828 A.2d 1066, 1074 (2003). Because of the...