Commonwealth v. Adams

205 A.3d 1195

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Edward Thomas ADAMS, Appellant

No. 7 WAP 2018

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: October 24, 2018

Decided: March 26, 2019

OPINION

JUSTICE DONOHUE

This discretionary appeal requires the Court to consider once again when an interaction between an ordinary citizen and a law enforcement official ripens from a mere encounter, requiring no level of suspicion, to an investigative detention, which must be supported by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. We conclude, based on longstanding precedent of this Court and the United States Supreme Court, that the line is crossed when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, and that a detention effectuated by police in the interest of officer safety is impermissible in the absence of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. We therefore reverse the decision of the Superior Court and remand the matter to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The pertinent facts are largely undisputed. At approximately 2:56 a.m. on January 10, 2016, during a routine patrol, Officer James Falconio of the Pleasant Hills Police Department observed a white Dodge Dart enter a parking lot that served two closed businesses – a hobby store and a pizza shop – and drive behind the buildings. Believing that the vehicle may have made a wrong turn, Officer Falconio waited and watched for the vehicle to exit the parking lot. When it did not, the officer drove into the parking lot and behind the buildings to "simply check[ ] to see why a car drove behind two dark, closed businesses at [three] o'clock in the morning," as he recognized the potential for "drug activity or an attempted burglary." N.T., 8/25/2016, at 9.

When he arrived behind the buildings, Officer Falconio observed a white Dodge Dart parked behind the pizza shop. The engine was not running and the vehicle's lights were off. Although there were no "no parking" signs,¹ there were also no marked parking spots. Officer Falconio did not believe that this was an area where the public would generally park, but that the area might be used for deliveries and employee parking.

Officer Falconio pulled behind the vehicle in his marked police cruiser but did not activate his overhead lights or siren. He radioed for backup, but prior to backup arriving, he exited his police cruiser and walked over to the parked vehicle. It was late at night in a poorly lit area, and Officer Falconio utilized his flashlight, shining it into the vehicle as he approached. He reached the driver's side door and knocked on the window, at which time the occupant, Appellant Edward Thomas Adams ("Adams"), opened the car door. Officer Falconio pushed the door closed and instructed Adams to roll down his window. According to Officer Falconio, he did not feel safe allowing Adams, who was "not a short guy," to exit his vehicle without another officer present. Id. at 21. Adams explained to the officer that he could not open the window because he did not have the keys to the vehicle. Officer Falconio observed a set of keys (which he believed to be the keys to the vehicle) on the floor of the back of the car.² Adams remained in his vehicle until backup arrived, which occurred approximately one minute later.

With another officer present, Officer Falconio opened Adams' door and began to speak with him. Adams conveyed that he was the owner of the pizza shop and stated that he had just been inside his business. The officer knew the latter statement was not true, as he had just observed Adams drive into the parking lot. As they spoke, Officer Falconio detected a strong odor of alcohol on Adams' breath and observed that he had glassy eyes and slurred speech. He requested that Adams perform several field sobriety tests, and although "argumentative," Adams complied and failed the tests. Id. at 9-10. Officer Falconio then placed him under arrest for suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. He transported Adams to Jefferson Regional Hospital, where Adams consented to a blood draw. Adams declined to provide the name of a person who could pick him up, and so he remained in jail until police believed he was sober enough to leave on his own, which occurred around 10:00 that morning.

Adams filed an omnibus pretrial motion asserting, inter alia, that the officer subjected him to an illegal detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Of relevance to the case at bar, he contended that his detention by Officer Falconio was not supported by probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and that all information and evidence obtained following his detention must be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion on August 25, 2016, at which Officer Falconio provided the above-recited testimony. The trial court denied suppression, finding that the interaction between Adams and Officer Falconio was a mere encounter that did not convert to an investigative detention until Officer Falconio detected several indicia of intoxication, providing him with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to support the temporary detention. Regarding Officer Falconio's refusal to allow Adams to open his car door, the trial court found that it was done in the interest of officer safety and "was not unreasonable under these specific circumstances," as "[t]his was a dark area behind ... closed businesses" and "backup arrived one minute later." Trial Court Opinion, 12/5/2016, at 6.

A stipulated bench trial followed immediately thereafter. The trial court convicted Adams of driving under the influence of alcohol³ and sentenced him to six months of probation and a $ 300 fine.

Adams appealed to the Superior Court, and a majority of that court affirmed based on the trial court's opinion, finding:

When Officer Falconio approached the vehicle, a mere encounter ensued, not an investigatory detention. Officer Falconio merely approached a parked vehicle in an empty parking lot at approximately 3:00 a.m. He did not need reasonable suspicion or probable cause to do so. Officer Falconio's subsequent observations, as well as [Adams'] actions, permitted Officer Falconio to transform this mere encounter into an investigatory detention based upon articulable facts that suggested criminal activity might be afoot.

Commonwealth v. Adams , 1445 WDA 2016, 2017 WL 2424726, at *2 (Pa. Super. June 5, 2017) (non-precedential decision). Senior Judge Strassburger filed a concurring opinion, which the majority author joined. The concurrence differed from the majority, finding instead that the original mere encounter ripened into an investigative detention when Officer Falconio refused to allow Adams to open his car door because at this point, "only an unreasonable person would feel free to exit the car or drive away."⁴ Id. at *2 (Strassburger, J., concurring). Judge Strassburger further concluded that Officer Falconio had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to support the investigative detention, and thus, like the majority, would have affirmed the trial court's denial of suppression. "Officer Falconio had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot based upon the car's lingering presence in a parking lot behind closed businesses around 3 a.m.," and that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity "certainly" arose upon Adams' assertion that "he could not open his car door [sic] because he did not have his car keys, yet his car keys were in plain sight." Id.

We granted allowance of appeal to determine whether the courts below erred in concluding that the interaction between Adams and Officer Falconio did not ripen into an investigative detention prior to the officer detecting indicia of intoxication. We review this case mindful that the trial court's findings of fact are binding upon us to the extent they have record support, but we conduct a de novo review of its legal conclusions. Commonwealth v. Valdivia , ––– Pa. ––––, 195 A.3d 855, 861 (2018).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects private citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials.⁵ See Byrd v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 1518, 1526, 200 L.Ed.2d 805 (2018). Not every encounter between a law enforcement officer and a citizen constitutes a seizure warranting constitutional protections. "Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred." Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ); see also Commonwealth v. Lyles , 626 Pa. 343, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (2014) (recognizing that the central focus of the determination of whether a seizure occurred is whether an individual is somehow "restrained by physical force or show of authority").

We have long recognized three types of interactions that occur between law enforcement and private citizens. The first is a mere encounter, sometimes referred to as a consensual encounter, which does not require the officer to have any suspicion that the citizen is or has been engaged in criminal activity. This interaction also does not compel the citizen to stop or respond to the officer. Commonwealth v. Strickler , 563 Pa. 47, 757 A.2d 884, 889 (2000). A mere encounter does not constitute a seizure, as the citizen is free to choose whether to engage with the officer and comply with any requests made or, conversely, to ignore the officer and continue on his or her way. See id. The second type of interaction, an investigative detention, is a temporary detention of a citizen. I.N.S. v. Delgado , 466 U.S. 210, 215, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) ; In the Interest of A.A. , ––– Pa. ––––, 195 A.3d 896, 904 (...