Commonwealth v. Arrington

233 A.3d 910

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.William ARRINGTON, Appellant

No. 1117 WDA 2018

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued July 31, 2019

Filed June 9, 2020

Steven A. Tehovnik, Public Defender, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Michael W. Streily, Deputy District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

OPINION BY MUSMANNO, J.:

William Arrington ("Arrington") appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following his convictions of one count each of firearms not to be carried without a license, disregard traffic lane, failure to keep right, and possession of drug paraphernalia, and two counts each of possession of a controlled substance and possession with intent to deliver.¹ We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

On October 25, 2016, Pittsburgh Police Officers Gino Macioce ("Officer Macioce") and Rob Connors ("Officer Connors") (collectively, "the officers") were on patrol in the Homewood neighborhood of Pittsburgh. At around 2:00 a.m., the officers observed Arrington's vehicle driving towards them in their lane of travel. Arrington's vehicle remained in the incorrect lane of travel for several seconds before returning to the correct side of the road. The officers suspected that Arrington was driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol and conducted a traffic stop.

When the officers approached Arrington's vehicle, they witnessed Arrington exhibit several signs of intoxication, and asked Arrington to step out of the vehicle. Arrington failed to immediately respond, and the officers removed Arrington from the vehicle, conducted a pat down search, and placed him in handcuffs.

Officer Connors supervised Arrington, at the rear of Arrington's vehicle, while Officer Macioce ran Arrington's name through the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC"). The NCIC search revealed that Arrington had a revoked concealed-carry permit. The officers asked Arrington if he was in possession of any weapons, which Arrington denied. Officer Macioce searched the vehicle's passenger compartment, and discovered a handgun in a closed shoe box that was sitting on the vehicle's back seat. Officer Macioce ended his search, and ran the handgun's serial number through the NCIC, which indicated that the weapon was stolen.

The officers placed Arrington under arrest, and conducted a second search of Arrington and the vehicle. Officer Connors discovered U.S. currency and a stamp bag of heroin in Arrington's pockets. Officer Macioce discovered 81 bags of heroin, U.S. currency, and a digital scale in the vehicle's center console, and four cell phones on the driver and passenger seats. A third Pittsburgh Police Officer arrived and transported Arrington to a hospital for a blood draw, which he refused.

Arrington filed a pre-trial suppression Motion, challenging the search of his vehicle, which the trial court denied. Following a non-jury trial, Arrington was found guilty of the above-mentioned offenses. The trial court sentenced Arrington to an aggregate term of fifteen months of probation. Arrington filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of errors complained of on appeal.

On appeal, Arrington raises the following questions for our review:

I. Whether the police had probable cause of a [M]otor [V]ehicle [C]ode infraction to support initially stopping [ ] Arrington beyond the momentary and minor actions testified to?

II. The government searched [ ] Arrington's vehicle while he was handcuffed behind the vehicle, out of reach. Was the search supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion that [ ] Arrington was dangerous and may have gained immediate control of a weapon in his vehicle?

III. At the time police searched his vehicle incident to arrest, was [ ] Arrington unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment[,] or was it reasonable to believe the vehicle contained additional evidence of his possessing a firearm?

IV. Did the trial court err in denying [ ] Arrington's suppression [M]otion[,] because police conducted the search for criminal investigatory, rather than non-criminal inventory, purposes?

V. Given the momentary and minor nature of [ ] Arrington's violation of the [M]otor [V]ehicle [C]ode, was the evidence insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?

VI. Where a gun was found within a shoebox on the back seat, and drugs were found in the center console of a rental vehicle, was the evidence insufficient to prove [ ] Arrington possessed these items beyond a reasonable doubt[,] without any evidence of [ ] Arrington's knowledge of, or intent to possess, these items?

Brief for Appellant at 6-7 (issues renumbered).

Arrington's first four claims challenge the trial court's denial of his pretrial Motion to suppress evidence.

We review the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress to determine whether the record supports the trial court's factual findings and whether it reached its legal conclusions in error. If the record supports the trial court's findings of fact, we will reverse only if the trial court's legal conclusions are incorrect.

Commonwealth v. Fleet , 114 A.3d 840, 843 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

In his first claim, Arrington alleges that the officers lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle. See Brief for Appellant at 53-56. Citing Commonwealth v. Garcia , 859 A.2d 820 (Pa. Super. 2004), Arrington argues that his violation of the Motor Vehicle Code was "minor and momentary." Brief for Appellant at 55. Arrington directs us to Officer Macioce's testimony that Arrington's vehicle crossed the centerline for "seconds," and posed no safety hazard to other vehicles. Id. Arrington claims that he did not swerve, fishtail, or otherwise violate the Motor Vehicle Code, beyond momentarily crossing the centerline. Id. at 55-56.

Section 3301(a) of the Motor Vehicle Code provides, in relevant part, that "a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway...." 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(a). This Court has previously held that a police officer has probable cause to believe that Section 3301(a) has been violated where the officer witnesses a driver's vehicle cross the double-yellow centerline into the oncoming lane, and remain there for approximately 2-3 seconds, while another vehicle is approaching in the oncoming lane. Commonwealth v. Enick , 70 A.3d 843, 847-48 (Pa. Super. 2013). But see id. at 848 (stating that "[o]ur analysis here does not foreclose the possibility that a momentary and minor violation of § 3301 might, in a different case, be insufficient to establish probable cause for a vehicle stop.").

Here, Officer Macioce testified that Arrington's vehicle crossed the double-yellow centerline, into the oncoming lane, and the entirety of Arrington's vehicle travelled in the oncoming lane for more than two seconds. See N.T., 2/14/18, at 7-8, 35. Additionally, Arrington's vehicle was in the wrong lane as he approached the officers’ vehicle, which was less than a city block away. Id. at 8. Officer Macioce testified that the officers’ vehicle would not have been able to continue in their direction of travel had Arrington maintained his vehicle's position in the wrong lane. Id. Therefore, we conclude that the officers had probable cause to believe that Arrington was in violation of Section 3301(a). See Enick , supra .²

In his second claim, Arrington alleges that the officers’ initial search of his vehicle was unconstitutional, and any evidence found during the search should have been suppressed at trial. See Brief for Appellant at 26-42. Arrington argues that his initial interaction with the officers was an investigatory stop, and the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that he was dangerous and able to gain control of a weapon. Id. at 27-42. Arrington points out that he made no furtive movements, was not overtly nervous, and did not make any actions, or display any characteristics, that would indicate he was armed and dangerous. Id. at 31-39. Arrington states that after he was removed from the vehicle, he was immediately handcuffed, moved to the rear of his vehicle, out of reach of the passenger compartment, and supervised by Officer Connors. Id. at 39-41.

[I]t is hornbook law that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution[,] as well as Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution [,] protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless searches and seizures ... are unreasonable per se , unless conducted pursuant to specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357 ... (1967). One such exception, the Terry [v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968),] "stop and frisk," permits a police officer to briefly detain a citizen for investigatory purposes if the officer "observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity may be afoot." ... Terry [, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868 ].

Terry further held that "when an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others[,]" the officer may conduct a pat down search "to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon." Terry , 392 U.S. at 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868.... "The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence." Adams v. Williams , 407 U.S. 143, 146 ... (1972).

In order to conduct an investigatory stop, the police must have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Terry , 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868. In order to determine whether the police had reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture—must be considered. United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 417 .

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