Commonwealth v. Beauchamps

320 A.3d 717

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Nickers BEAUCHAMPS, Appellant

No. 1216 MDA 2023

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 7, 2024

Filed July 30, 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 15, 2023, In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-28-CR-0000448-2022, Todd M. Sponseller, J. Shawn J. Stottlemyer, Carlisle, for appellant.

Veronica I. Brestensky, District Attorney, Chambersburg, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.:

Nickers Beauchamps appeals from the judgment of sentence of sixteen to thirty-six months of incarceration imposed following his two convictions for failing to comply with his Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA") obligations.¹ We affirm.

Appellant was required to register due to his conviction for child pornography charges, for which he was arrested on June 18, 2018. He entered a plea on July 18, 2018, and was sentenced on August 29, 2018, to a period of nine months of incarceration in the county jail, followed by five years of restrictive intermediate punishment. Appellant initially registered as a sexual offender in Pennsylvania on March 15, 2019.² See Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/23, at 2 ("[Appellant] completed his initial [registration] … on March 15, 2019, and … is required to register every [twelve] months until March 15, 2034."). Appellant signed paperwork acknowledging his SORNA obligations.

Appellant was ordered to return to Pennsylvania from Florida for violations of his intermediate punishment program sometime in October of 2020, which resulted in his incarceration through December 28, 2021.³ Thereafter, Appellant, according to his testimony, "stay[ed] with [his] friend for about a week" before he had enough money "to go back down to Florida." N.T. Trial, 12/1/22, at 72. Pennsylvania State Police ("PSP") trooper Erica Polcha testified that she received a request to investigate Appellant for noncompliance on February 2, 2022. She learned through her investigation that Appellant had initially registered a Florida address with that jurisdiction’s equivalent of the PSP no later than February 28, 2020. She identified October 27, 2020, as Appellant’s last update with the PSP.⁴ See N.T. Trial, 12/1/22, at 51. Trooper Polcha determined that Appellant last updated his address with Florida authorities on or about February 28, 2022, and she testified that Appellant never informed the PSP that he had moved to Florida or otherwise satisfied his annual registration obligations. Id. at 50. Appellant was arrested and charged with one count each of violating 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1) and (2).

A jury convicted Appellant of both counts. Following imposition of the aforementioned sentence, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which was denied. He lodged a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial court’s order to file a concise statement. The trial court authored its responsive opinion, and we now turn to the eight issues raised on appeal.

I. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict [Appellant] of count one … when the Commonwealth failed to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] was an individual who was required to register with the [PSP] ….

II. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict [Appellant] of count two … when the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] knowingly failed to register with the [PSP] ….

III. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict [Appellant] of count one … when the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] was an individual required to verify his current address with or to be photographed by the [PSP] by appearing at the [PSP] station as required ….

IV. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict [Appellant] of count two … when the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] knowingly failed to verify his current address with or to be photographed by the [PSP] by appearing at the [PSP.]

V. Whether the trial court erred in failing to merge counts one and two for sentencing purposes as both counts have the same elements and arose from a single act[.]

VI. Is it not apparent from the record that trial counsel was ineffective due to failing to object to the hearsay testimony, including double hearsay of unnamed residents, from Trooper Polcha?

VII. Is it not apparent from the record that trial counsel was ineffective due to failing to object to the relevancy of [Appellant’s registration status in Florida?

VIII. Is it not apparent from the record that trial counsel was ineffective due to failing to object to, or attempt to correct, the inaccurate conclusion of law of Trooper Polcha that [Appellant] was required to register while he was incarcerated?

Appellant’s brief at 4-6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

[1-8] Appellant’s first four claims collectively challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his two convictions. The following well-settled principles apply to our review:

We assess the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict-winner. We must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to have found every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact[-]finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered.

Commonwealth v. Wallace, 244 A.3d 1261, 1273-74 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned up). "Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict is a question of law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary." Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 792 (Pa.Super. 2015).

Appellant asserts, with respect to each of his two convictions, that the Commonwealth failed to establish that (1) he had to register with the PSP and (2) he knowing- ly failed to comply with his obligations. We begin with the statutory text of 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1) and (2):

(a) Offense defined.-An individual who is subject to registration under 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.18 (relating to applicability) commits an offense if he knowingly fails to:

(1) register with the Pennsylvania State Police as required under 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.15 (relating to period of registration), 9799.19 (relating to initial registration) or 9799.25 (relating to verification by sexual offenders and Pennsylvania State Police);

(2) verify his address or be photographed as required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15, 9799.19 or 9799.25 ….18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1.

[9] Regarding the § 4915.1(a)(1) conviction, the parties agreed that Appellant "is a person required to register under … [§] 9799.56, otherwise known as [SORNA]." N.T. Trial, 12/1/22, at 43. During closing argument, Appellant’s counsel acknowledged that Appellant was required to register, albeit without reference to a specific statute. Id. at 86 ("We heard that [Appellant] is required to register … and he admitted that. That’s not a question here."). The trial court concluded, and the Commonwealth agrees, that this stipulation was sufficient. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/23, at 6 ("[W]e respectfully … find that [Appellant] was required to register under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.56[.]").

The concession that Appellant had to register pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.56 is confusing, as that statute is not referenced within § 4915.1(a)(1). Briefly, we observe that § 4915.1 is the enforcement mechanism for Subchapter H of SORNA, whereas § 4915.2 addresses Subchapter I.⁵ Notably, § 4915.2 criminalizes failures to "register … as required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.56[.]" 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.2(a)(1). Thus, the parties agreed that Appellant had to "register" pursuant to statute that has no applicability to this case.⁶ Nonetheless, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to discharge for the violation of § 4915.1(a)(1) for two reasons: (1) the stipulation is binding regardless of the error, and (2) Appellant fails to develop any argument establishing that he is entitled to relief.

[10] Beginning with the first point, in Commonwealth v. Padilla, 622 Pa. 449, 80 A.3d 1238, 1272 (2013), a capital case, the defendant stipulated that he committed the killing while in the perpetration of a felony. The stipulation was legally incorrect as the crime at issue was only a misdemeanor. Our Supreme Court held that the stipulation was nonetheless binding for purposes of sufficiency review. "[R]egardless of whether the stipulation was legally correct, we consider only if the stipulation … constituted sufficient support for the jury’s finding[.]" Id. at 1272 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, despite the confusing nature of this stipulation, the jury was entitled, if not required, to accept what the court and parties told them is true.⁷

[11] We now address whether the stipulation is conclusive, mindful that the Padilla Court cautioned that a stipulation must still constitute sufficient support for the jury’s finding. We observe that sufficient proof to support a § 9799.15(a)(1) conviction is met if the Commonwealth establishes that the individual failed to: initially register; periodically appear for a photograph and disclosure of information such as phone numbers, Internet identifiers, and employment status; or register for the applicable number of years. The trial...