Commonwealth v. Betts

1

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. TASAI MARQUISE BETTS Appellant

No. 1470 MDA 2022

No. J-S19031-23

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

October 27, 2023

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 19, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s) CP-22-CR-0001004-2014, CP-22-CR-0003339-2013

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM

SULLIVAN, J.

Tasai Marquise Betts ("Betts") appeals from the dismissal, following a hearing, of his first petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA").^[1] We affirm.

In a prior decision, we detailed the underlying facts:

The factual and procedural history of this case concerns two episodes of criminal behavior. On the evening of June 13, 2013, a man sleeping in his car near the 1700 block of Miller Street in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, was shot and robbed by a masked assailant [("the attempted murder case")]. In a separate incident, [Betts] was arrested on June 22, 2013, following a lengthy vehicle [police] pursuit . . . which ended in an officer-involved crash [("the vehicle chase case")].^[2] Officers recovered two handguns from [Betts's] car, one of which was forensically linked to the aforementioned shooting.

In connection with the [attempted murder case], a jury convicted [Betts] of attempted criminal homicide [and related offenses]. With respect to the vehicle chase [case], a jury convicted [Betts] of aggravated assault [and related offenses].

[T]he trial court sentenced [Betts] at both dockets to an aggregate term of twenty-one to forty-two years of imprisonment, followed by fifteen years of probation. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed [Betts's] judgment of sentence.^[3] See Commonwealth v. Betts, 159 A.3d 1018 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum). [O]ur Supreme Court denied [Betts's] petition for allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Betts, [] 169 A.3d 1039 ([Pa.] 2017) (per curiam order).

[Betts] filed a timely pro se PCRA petition alleging, inter alia, that [direct appeal] counsel had erred by challenging the weight, but not the sufficiency, of the evidence underlying [Betts's] convictions. [Attorney] Damian DeStefano [("PCRA counsel")], was appointed to represent [Betts]. He filed a supplemental PCRA memorandum arguing, inter alia, that [Betts's] trial counsel was ineffective by "opening the door" to the introduction of statements that [Betts] had previously robbed [Parker] at gunpoint.

Commonwealth v. Betts, 240 A.3d 616, 618 (Pa. Super. 2020) (dates, record citations, and footnote omitted, footnotes added).

The PCRA court held a hearing on Betts's PCRA petition on August 1, 2018. At the hearing, Betts and trial counsel testified about trial counsel's cross-examination of Parker. See N.T., 8/1/18, at 3-16. PCRA counsel also questioned Betts, over the Commonwealth's objections, about trial counsel's handling of a claim of after-discovered evidence, namely that Parker had allegedly recanted his trial testimony identifying the gun. Id. at 7-8.

After entertaining briefs from both parties, the [PCRA] court filed an opinion concluding that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance. The order attached to the opinion notified [Betts] of the PCRA court's intent to dismiss his petition[] and provided him an opportunity to respond pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.

[PCRA counsel] submitted a reply to the notice of dismissal that largely reiterated the prior arguments concerning trial counsel's allegedly erroneous cross-examination. Two days later, [Betts] filed pro se objections alleging that [PCRA counsel] had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to: (1) assert trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to refute fingerprint evidence tying [Betts] to [the victim's vehicle in the attempted murder case]; and (2) raise direct [appeal] counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to seek a new trial on the basis of allegedly inconsistent statements made by [] Parker post-trial. Appellant's timely pro se objections were accepted for filing and docketed in the trial court.

[T]he PCRA court entered a final order dismissing [Betts's] PCRA petition. In the text of this order, the PCRA court referenced only the arguments concerning trial counsel's cross-examinations of [] Parker. [Betts] filed a single pro se notice of appeal while still represented by [PCRA counsel]. Five days later, [PCRA counsel] submitted timely notices of appeal at both docket numbers noted above. That same day, he also filed a petition on [Betts's] behalf that purported to seek permission to proceed pro se and requested a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, [] 713 A.2d 81 (1998).

[T]he Grazier hearing was held. However, [Betts] advised the PCRA court that he had not requested a Grazier hearing[] but wished to discuss his allegations of [PCRA counsel's] ineffectiveness and obtain substitute counsel.

* * * *

After a colloquy, the PCRA court granted [Betts] leave to proceed pro se and [PCRA counsel] leave to withdraw.

Betts, 240 A.3d at 618-20 (dates, footnotes, and record citations omitted).

On appeal, after a discussion of the procedural irregularities in the matter, this Court found the PCRA court erred by forcing Betts to proceed pro se and not considering the claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel contained in his pro se response to the Rule 907 notice. Betts, 240 A.3d at 621-25. This Court remanded the matter for the appointment of new PCRA counsel and directed:

Newly-appointed [remand] counsel shall: (1) review [Betts's] pro se objections concerning [PCRA counsel's] ineffectiveness; (2) file supplemental briefing limited to discussing the merits of those claims within a reasonable time frame; and (3) continue to represent [Betts] for the duration of these PCRA proceedings. The Commonwealth shall have an opportunity to file a response to any supplemental filings from [Betts]. Thereafter, the PCRA court shall have the discretion to proceed as it deems fit under Pennsylvania law and the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, including ordering further proceedings and granting or denying [Betts's] PCRA petition.

Id. at 625. Of import to this appeal, this Court did not rule on Betts's claim trial counsel was ineffective for engaging in an improper cross-examination of Parker.

In March 2022, the PCRA court held a hearing on Betts's pro se objections. On September 19, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Betts's PCRA petition. Betts timely filed a notice of appeal.^[4] Betts's single notice of appeal listed the docket numbers of both the attempted murder and the vehicle chase cases.

On appeal, Betts raises the following issues for our review:

A. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in dismissing [Betts's] PCRA petition where [Betts] presented claims of ineffective assistance of counsel which undermined the truth-determining process so that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place?

1. Trial counsel failed to retain a fingerprint expert.

2. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to adequately cross-examine Commonwealth witness [] Parker.

3. Trial counsel [failed] to seek a new trial based upon Commonwealth witness [] Parker's post-trial comments.

Betts's Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization and underlining omitted).

Before reaching Betts's issues, we address our jurisdiction. As noted, Betts's single notice of appeal contained two docket numbers. In Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), our Supreme Court held "where a single order resolves issues arising on more than one docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed for each case," or the appeal will be quashed. Id. at 976-77; see also Pa.R.A.P. 341, note. Here, the PCRA court order dismissing Betts's petition informed Betts he had the right to appeal within 30 days of the order, not that he needed to file a separate appeal for each docket number. Order, 9/19/22. Pursuant to Commonwealth v. Larkin, 235 A.3d 350 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc), and Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157 (Pa. Super. 2019), this language constitutes a breakdown in court operations, and we thus decline to quash Betts's appeal. See Larkin, 235 A.3d at 354 (finding breakdown in court operations and declining to quash, where defendant was misinformed of his appellate rights); Stansbury, 219 A.3d at 159 (breakdown in court operations occurred where PCRA court advised appellant he could appeal dismissal of petition by filing within 30 days "a written notice of appeal to the Superior Court") (emphasis in original). Accordingly, we address Betts's substantive claims.

Betts asserts he received ineffective assistance of trial, Rule 1925, direct appeal, and PCRA counsel. Betts's Brief at 14-23. We review ineffectiveness claims under the following standard:

Appellate review of a PCRA court's dismissal of a PCRA petition is limited to the examination of whether the PCRA court's determination is supported by the record and free of legal error. The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record could support a contrary holding. In contrast, we review the PCRA court's legal conclusions de novo.

Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 232 A.3d 739, 744 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, a "PCRA court's credibility findings are to be accorded great deference, and where supported by the record, such determinations are binding on a reviewing court." Commonwealth v. Williams, 141 A.3d 440, 452 (Pa. 2016).

With respect

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