Commonwealth v. Branthafer

1

2024 PA Super 67

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ALLEN BRANTHAFER Appellant

No. 1745 MDA 2022

No. J-S03012-24

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

April 5, 2024

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 12, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Criminal Division at No(s) CP-31-CR-0000265-2000

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J.

OPINION

OLSON J.

Appellant Allen Branthafer, appeals from the December 12, 2022 order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County that dismissed his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.^[1] We affirm.

On February 16, 2002, a jury convicted Appellant of second-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, burglary, robbery, and two counts of theft by unlawful taking.^[2] Verdict Slip, 2/16/02; see also N.T., 2/13/02, at 840.^[3]Appellant's convictions stemmed from an incident that occurred on April 17, 2000, whereby Appellant shot and killed the victim at his hunting cabin in Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania. Prior to the shooting, Appellant and two accomplices, Tommy Duvall ("Duvall") and Chris Muckle ("Muckle"), burglarized a nearby home and stole several guns and a cross-bow. In fleeing the nearby home out of fear of getting caught, Appellant and the two accomplices came upon the victim's hunting cabin where the victim's truck was parked. While the accomplices were attempting to steal the truck to use as a get-away vehicle, the victim confronted the men. During the interaction between the victim and the two accomplices, Appellant appeared and shot the victim four times. After hiding the victim's body under a canoe behind the hunting cabin, the three individuals fled in the victim's truck. The three individuals were apprehended shortly thereafter. See generally, PCRA Court Opinion, 12/6/22, at 2-9.

On May 20, 2002, Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for his second-degree murder conviction.^[4] Sentencing Order, 5/20/02. On August 17, 2004, this Court affirmed Appellant's judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court denied Appellant's petition for allowance of appeal on December 22, 2004. Commonwealth v. Branthafer, 860 A.2d 1124, 1699 MDA 2003 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 17, 2004) (non-precedential decision), appeal denied, 864 A.2d 528 (Pa. 2004). Appellant did not seek further discretionary review by the Supreme Court of the United States. As such, Appellant's judgment of sentence became final March 22, 2005, upon expiration of the time for seeking discretionary review with the Supreme Court of the United States. See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) (stating, "A petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a judgment of a lower state court that is subject to discretionary review by the state court of last resort is timely when it is filed with the Clerk within 90 days after entry of the order denying discretionary review."); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (stating, "a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review").

On March 15, 2005, Appellant filed pro se a PCRA petition, his first. PCRA counsel was subsequently appointed to represent Appellant, and filed an amended petition on August 15, 2006.^[5] After conducting multiple hearings related to Appellant's petition, the PCRA court denied the petition on September 28, 2011. On December 24, 2012, this Court affirmed the PCRA court order denying Appellant's petition,^[6] and our Supreme Court denied Appellant's petition for allowance of appeal on June 27, 2013. Commonwealth v. Branthafer, 64 A.3d 35, 2012 WL 7831640, 1878 MDA 2011 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 24, 2012) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 64 A.3d 35 (Pa. 2013).

On February 1, 2014, Appellant filed pro se a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, asserting claims of ineffective assistance of initial-PCRA counsel and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Branthafer v. Glunt, 2015 WL 5569128, at *4 (M.D.Pa. filed Sept. 22, 2015) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 15-3571 (3^rd Cir. filed Mar. 24, 2016). On September 22, 2015, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied Appellant's petition and dismissed the case. Branthafer, 2015 WL 5569128, at *1.

On July 26, 2018, Appellant filed pro se the instant PCRA, his second. Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition on July 31, 2019. Thereafter, Appellant retained PCRA counsel, and new PCRA counsel filed a second amended petition on July 28, 2021.^[7] The PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing on January 5, 2022. On December 12, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant's petition. This appeal followed.^[8]Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

[1.] Is the limitation period under 42 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 9545(b) non-jurisdictional?

[2.] If the PCRA time-limitation is "jurisdictional," is the time-limitation, as applied to [Appellant], unconstitutional?

[3.] Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant's] first claim was untimely?

[4.] Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant's] fourth claim was untimely?

[5.] If McCoy[ v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018)] did not announce a new constitutional rule, did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant's] fifth claim was untimely?

[6.] Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant's] first claim lacked merit?

[7.] Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant's] second claim lacked merit?

[8.] Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant's] third claim lacked merit?

Appellant's Brief at 8 (extraneous capitalization omitted).^[9]

Jurisdictional Argument It is a well-settled principle that if a PCRA petition is untimely, neither the PCRA court nor this Court has jurisdiction over the petition and cannot address the substantive claims. Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1143 (Pa. 2020), citing Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006). Recognizing this well-settled principle, Appellant's first issue, nonetheless, alleges that the one-year time-bar pertaining to the filing of PCRA petitions, as set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1),^[10] is not jurisdictional in nature. Appellant's Brief at 71-73. Appellant asserts that our Supreme Court's "decisional law declaring the PCRA deadlines[, set forth in Section 9545(b)(1),] as jurisdictional was erroneously decided and that the time-provision[ of one year] was intended to be a statute of limitations." Id. at 71. Appellant argues that "[t]he time-bar was never originally intended to serve as a jurisdictional hurdle" as evidenced by the fact that Section 9545(b)(1) never utilizes the word "jurisdiction." Id. at 71-72. Rather, Appellant contends our Supreme Court's "holdings to the contrary have resulted in what should have been unnecessary attempts to escape the Gordian [K]not^[11] of its own creation in rare circumstances." Id. at 72.

Alternately, Appellant's second issue asserts that, if Pennsylvania courts continue to apply Section 9545(b)(1) as a jurisdictional rule, then Section 9545(b)(1) is unconstitutional. Id. at 73-79. Appellant contends that the jurisdictional nature of the time limitation violates his due process rights and right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, i.e., imprisonment, under the Pennsylvania and United States constitutions. Id. at 73. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the time limitation "deprives [him] of an enforcement mechanism for his due process right to effective PCRA counsel." Id. at 78-79 (asserting that, the jurisdictional time-bar prevents him from raising an ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel claim in a timely petition). Appellant contends that because the time limitations prevent him from presenting a "timely petition," he is deprived of his freedom of movement and freedom from punishment as an innocent man, which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 76-77.

In the seminal case, Commonwealth v. Peterkin, our Supreme Court, for the first time, declared that the PCRA one-year time-bar under Section 9545(b)(1) was jurisdictional in nature. Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 772 A.2d 638, 641 (Pa. 1998); see also Reid, 235 A.3d at 1167. The Peterkin Court further rejected the argument that the jurisdictional nature of the one-year time-bar was unconstitutional, finding no due process violation, as the time for filing a petition is reasonable, and no ex post facto violation existed because the time limitation "is procedural in nature and does not fall within the categories of retrospective laws prohibited by the ex post facto clause." Peterkin, 772 A.2d at 642-643, n.8 (stating, the PCRA time limitation "strikes a reasonable balance between society's need for finality in criminal cases and the convicted person's need to demonstrate that there has been an error in the proceedings that resulted in his[, or her,] conviction"). For more than two decades, Pennsylvania courts have steadfastly held to the view that the PCRA one-year time-bar was jurisdictional in nature and constitutionally sound. See Reid, 235 A.3d at 1167 (collecting cases that have held to the principles that the PCRA time limitation is jurisdictional in nature and constitutional).

Recently our Supreme Court, in Reid, supra, roundly rejected a call for "fine-tuning" the precedent first announced in Peterkin. Reid, 235 A.3d at 1168 (rejecting the argument that a court's inability to afford a petitioner relief based on lack of jurisdiction means the PCRA failed to afford sufficient due process and the statute is, therefore, constitutionally infirm). Finding "no present need" to...