Commonwealth v. Caesar

287 A.3d 838 (Table)

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Robert Dean CAESAR, Appellant

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

v.Robert Dean Caesar, Appellant

No. 649 EDA 2021

No. 650 EDA 2021

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Filed October 06, 2022

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:

Appellant, Robert Dean Caesar, appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his conviction of multiple counts of statutory sexual assault, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, corruption of minors, endangering the welfare of children, indecent assault, and unlawful contact with a minor, and a single count of sexual abuse of children.¹ We affirm.

Appellant was arrested in 2018 and charged with numerous sexual crimes arising out of inappropriate sexual contact with three minor boys: two Amish brothers, M.K. and S.K., and an unrelated boy, M.R. Although Appellant was convicted of charges related to each of the three minor victims, in this appeal, Appellant only challenges evidentiary rulings with respect to the Commonwealth's proof concerning his offenses against the two brothers, M.K. and S.K.

The evidence at trial showed that Appellant's abuse of the brothers began when M.K., the older of the two, was approximately 14 and he began going to Appellant's house on a monthly basis to perform yard work. After M.K. would finish the yard work, Appellant would invite M.K. into his home and ask the boy to disrobe and place the boy's clothes into the washing machine. The two then went into Appellant's bedroom to watch movies on Appellant's television. On various of the visits, Appellant touched M.K.’s penis and placed M.K.’s hand on his own penis while the two lay on the bed watching movies. On one occasion, Appellant also made oral contact with M.K.’s penis. Appellant sometimes provided M.K. with alcohol and showed him pornography on the computer during the visits. In addition, on certain occasions after M.K. had disrobed, Appellant would provide him with underwear to wear so that he was not entirely naked. M.K. continued visiting Appellant until he was 15 years old when his parents discovered that Appellant had supplied him with moonshine.

S.K. described a similar pattern of abuse in his testimony, involving Appellant asking S.K. to perform yardwork on a weekly basis and inviting the boy inside afterward to watch movies and drink alcohol, while Appellant performed sex acts on S.K. S.K.’s visits to Appellant's house began when he was approximately 12 years old and on the first few occasions, he went with M.K. although no abuse occurred during those visits. After M.K. was forbidden from seeing Appellant, S.K. continued to work at Appellant's house in secret from his parents and he stayed in contact with Appellant through a cellular phone that Appellant provided. Like M.K., S.K. also testified that Appellant provided him with underwear to wear while his clothes were being washed. Appellant also asked S.K. if he could keep some of S.K.’s underwear. S.K.’s visits to Appellant's house ended when the boy was 14 when M.K. reported the abuse to a member of their community.

On August 28, 2020, at the conclusion of a five-day jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of three counts of statutory sexual assault, three counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, three counts of corruption of minors, three counts of endangering the welfare of children, seven counts of indecent assault, three counts of unlawful contact with a minor, and one count of sexual abuse of children. On March 5, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate sentence of 22 years to 74 years’ incarceration.

Appellant filed timely notices of appeal on March 29, 2021.² Before this Court, Appellant raises the following issues:

1) Did the trial court err in limiting counsel's cross-examination of the alleged victims regarding their experience and exposure to investigations of child sexual assault, particularly their experience in connection with allegations against their father which resulted in charges and a conviction of father's abuse of the alleged victims’ sister?

2) Did the trial court err in allowing testimony regarding [Appellant's] eBay purchases and eBay communications [ ] as the eBay material was not related to the charged offenses and were calculated to prejudice the jury?

3) Did the combination of the above errors deprive [Appellant] of a fair trial requiring the grant of a new trial?

Appellant's Brief at 3 (suggested answers omitted).

Appellant's issues concern the trial court's evidentiary rulings, and our review of these issues is guided by the following:

The admissibility of evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only where there is a clear abuse of discretion. Our standard of review of a challenge to an evidentiary ruling is therefore limited. Abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but rather where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.

Commonwealth v. Williams , 241 A.3d 1094, 1101 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Harrington , 262 A.3d 639, 646 (Pa. Super. 2021) (this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the trial court's denial of a motion in limine ).

"Evidence is admissible if it is relevant—that is, if it tends to establish a material fact, makes a fact at issue more or less probable, or supports a reasonable inference supporting a material fact—and its probative value outweighs the likelihood of unfair prejudice." Commonwealth v. Clemons , 200 A.3d 441, 474 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.E. 401 ("Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action."); Pa.R.E. 402 ("Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible."). "Evidence will not be prohibited merely because it is harmful to the defendant. [E]xclusion is limited to evidence so prejudicial that it would inflame the jury to make a decision based on something other than the legal propositions relevant to the case." Commonwealth v. Gad , 190 A.3d 600, 605 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). Further, "[a] trial court is not required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury's consideration." Commonwealth v. Danzey , 210 A.3d 333, 342 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred and abused its discretion by limiting his ability to cross-examine victims M.K. and S.K. regarding the criminal prosecution of their father ("Father") for sexual assault perpetrated on the boys’ sisters. Appellant asserts that the trial court's decision hindered "the defense's ability to properly present its theory of the case to the jury," and that M.K. and S.K. "had not only the motivation (i.e., the defiance of an authority figure) but familiarity with the details of sexual assault investigations would allow the two to manipulate law enforcement officials to target" Appellant. Appellant's Brief at 15. Appellant contends that, by not permitting cross-examination on the topic of Father's sexual assault investigation and conviction, the trial court violated his due process right and his right to confront the witnesses against him and also infringed on the jury's exclusive authority to weight the victims’ credibility.

Our review of the record in this matter reveals that the trial court did not entirely foreclose any mention of Father's sexual assault case at trial. Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Alicyn March Stuart, who conducted a forensic interview of the third victim in this case, M.R., testified on direct that she was assigned to investigate Father's sexual abuse of his daughters in 2017, that the original report of abuse emanated from M.K., and that Father had removed himself from the family home by the time that Appellant's abuse of M.K. and S.K. came to light. N.T., 8/26/20, at 235-36. Defense counsel cross-examined Trooper Stuart concerning her investigation, eliciting testimony that M.K. was not interviewed by law enforcement in connection with his Father's case. Id. at 239-41. The trial court, however, sustained the Commonwealth's relevance objections when the questioning delved into the facts of Father's case, such as which of M.K. and S.K.’s siblings were interviewed and the details of the guilty plea. Id. Appellant was also allowed to cross-examine Corporal Stefano Gallina, the lead investigator in the instant case, regarding his familiarity with the investigation of Father and whether Corporal Gallina asked M.K. or S.K. any questions about their Father. N.T., 8/27/20, at 47-50.

During Appellant's cross-examination of M.K., the following exchange occurred:

Q Okay. [M.K.], you said that you were in foster care. When did that happen?

...

A About a year and a half ago. It would be this coming Christmas two years ago.

Q Okay. And that was when you were first separated from your family, or had you been separated before that?

A I had been separated before that.

Q Okay. And it was actually back in 2018 that that happened?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And was that relating to some charges against your father?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And you and your siblings were removed from the home?

A Yes.

...

Q Were the charges against your father of a sexual nature?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Were the victims of that case siblings of yours?

A That is correct.

Q Okay. And you know that your father pled guilty to those offenses?

A I believe he did.

Q Okay. And is your mother still living with your father?

[COMMONWEALTH]: Objection to relevance.

THE COURT: Sustained.

...

Q When you had spoken to Trooper Gallina in January of 2018, it had only been about two weeks after that that your father was arrested; is that correct?

[COMMONWEALTH]: Objection to relevance.

THE COURT: The objection is sustained.

N.T., 8/26/20, at 67-68. Appellant did not...