Commonwealth v. Campbell

260 A.3d 272

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Griffin CAMPBELL, Appellant

No. 518 EDA 2020

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted March 9, 2021

Filed September 01, 2021

George H. Newman, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Lawrence J. Goode, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Grady J. Gervino, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.^*

OPINION BY NICHOLS, J.:

Appellant Griffin Campbell appeals from the order denying his timely first petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act¹ (PCRA) without a hearing. Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in rejecting his claims that trial counsel was ineffective based on counsel's alleged conflicts of interests and his failure to object during the Commonwealth's closing arguments. We affirm.

The underlying facts of this matter are well known to the parties. Briefly, Appellant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and related offenses for his role in a 2013 building collapse that killed and injured multiple people at the Salvation Army thrift store in Philadelphia. On June 8, 2016, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of fifteen to thirty years’ incarceration. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Appellant's sentence. See Commonwealth v. Campbell , 1810 EDA 2016, 2018 WL 4214642 (Pa. Super. filed Sep. 5, 2018) (unpublished mem.), appeal denied , 650 Pa. 633, 201 A.3d 149 (2019). Appellant was represented by William Hobson, Esq. (Attorney Hobson) at trial and on direct appeal.

Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on February 12, 2019. The PCRA court appointed counsel who subsequently filed an amended petition on Appellant's behalf. Therein, Appellant alleged that Attorney Hobson was ineffective for failing to object to statements by the prosecutor during closing arguments. Am. PCRA Pet., 5/13/19, at 4 (unpaginated). Appellant also claimed that Attorney Hobson's "multi-level conflict of interest" rendered him ineffective. Id. at 3. Specifically, he claimed that Attorney Hobson (1) "clearly had divided loyalties" due to his prior representation of two witnesses, Frank Parker and Sean Benschop; and (2) was a possible fact witness. Id. However, Appellant did not explain how he was prejudiced by Attorney Hobson's alleged conflicts. See id.

On November 22, 2019, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss Appellant's petition without a hearing. Appellant did not file a response. The PCRA court issued an order dismissing Appellant's petition on January 10, 2020.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues:

1. Was not [Appellant] deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel in that [Attorney Hobson] had multiple conflicts of interests?

2. Did not the prosecutor commit multiple acts of misconduct by vouching for four Commonwealth witnesses, by testifying as to facts not on the record, by commenting improperly about [Appellant's] character witnesses, and by urging the jury to feel sorry for the victims?

Appellant's Brief at 7 (some formatting altered).

Attorney Hobson's Conflicts of Interest

In his first claim, Appellant argues that he was deprived of the right to a fair trial because trial counsel had multiple conflicts of interest. Id. at 11. First, he claims that Attorney Hobson had personal knowledge about the building collapse because he visited the site "numerous times before the collapse and was involved in negotiations for [Appellant] to gain roof access, an important issue in the case." Id. at 16. He asserts that "[c]learly, this testimony made [Attorney Hobson,] in the eyes of the jury, a witness they would have wanted to hear from." Id.

Second, Appellant asserts that because Attorney Hobson previously "represented another co-defendant,^{[2 ]} [Parker], in a prior criminal case," his representation "may well have had the effect of inhibiting [Attorney] Hobson's cross-examination of Parker" in Appellant's case. Id.

Third, Appellant claims that Attorney Hobson had a conflict because he previously represented co-defendant Benschop, who testified for the Commonwealth. Id. Specifically, Appellant notes that Attorney Hobson appeared as Benschop's counsel at the hospital after the building collapse, at which time he told Benschop not to answer questions by the OSHA investigators. Id. at 13-14. Although Attorney Hobson's representation of Benschop was limited to a single instance, Appellant argues that "[p]ermitting Attorney Hobson to remain as [Appellant's] attorney created a structural defect in [Appellant's] right to due process and a fair trial (and appeal)" and that he is entitled to a new trial. Id. at 20-21.

The Commonwealth responds that Appellant's conflict-of-interest claims are meritless. Commonwealth's Brief at 9. The Commonwealth argues that the trial court inquired about any potential conflict concerning the "fact witness" issue prior to trial and that, "in any event ... [Appellant] has not demonstrated that counsel's testimony was at all necessary to his defense." Id. at 23. The Commonwealth explains that "there was no dispute (and plenty of evidence was presented that showed) that at the time of the collapse the relevant parties were trying to reach an agreement that would permit [Appellant] to have access to the roof" and "other than the roof-access issue, [Appellant] has not identified any other matters that supposedly necessitated counsel's testimony." Id.

The Commonwealth also argues that Appellant failed to show that Attorney Hobson actively represented conflicting interests or that the alleged conflicts adversely affected his representation of Appellant. Id. at 10. The Commonwealth notes that Parker was a defense witness, not a co-defendant. Id. at 19. Further, because Parker was a defense witness, the Commonwealth notes that "counsel did not cross-examine him" and "[i]ndeed, because his testimony was favorable to defendant, counsel did not need to challenge it in any way." Id. at 19. The Commonwealth also contends that Attorney Hobson's "previous representation of Parker had nothing to do with this case—it stemmed from robbery and related charges that Parker had faced—and those charges had been resolved in his favor" before Appellant's trial. Id.

With respect to Benschop, the Commonwealth argues that Attorney Hobson's representation "was of an extremely transient and limited nature, and there is no basis for concluding that it had an adverse impact on his subsequent representation of [Appellant] at trial." Id. at 12. Specifically, the Commonwealth asserts that the representation "consisted of nothing more than [Attorney Hobson] going, at [Appellant's] request, to the hospital where Benschop was being treated, advising him with respect to whether he should speak with the OSHA investigators at that time, and ensuring that he would be represented by another attorney who would be free of any conflicts." Id. at 14. Further, the Commonwealth argues that "a review of the record confirms that counsel was not in any way inhibited in his ability to vigorously challenge Benschop's testimony at trial." Id.

Our standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition "is limited to examining whether the PCRA court's determination is supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error." Commonwealth v. Ousley , 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). "The PCRA court's credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court's legal conclusions." Commonwealth v. Mitchell , 629 Pa. 572, 105 A.3d 1257, 1265 (2014) (citation omitted).

We presume that the petitioner's counsel was effective. Commonwealth v. Williams , 557 Pa. 207, 732 A.2d 1167, 1177 (1999). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant "must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place." Commonwealth v. Turetsky , 925 A.2d 876, 880 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the following prongs: "(1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different." Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, "[a] failure to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the claim of ineffectiveness." Commonwealth v. Daniels , 600 Pa. 1, 963 A.2d 409, 419 (2009) (citation omitted).

The prejudice standard for an ineffectiveness claim is a higher standard than the harmless error analysis typically applied when assessing allegations of trial court error. See Commonwealth v. Gribble , 580 Pa. 647, 863 A.2d 455, 472 (2004). Instead, a petitioner must prove "actual prejudice," which our Supreme Court has defined as follows:

[A] reasonable probability that, but for counsel's lapse, the result of the proceeding would have been different. In making this determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support. Ultimately, a reviewing court must question the reliability of the proceedings and ask whether the result of the particular proceeding was unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results.

Commonwealth v. Crispell , 648 Pa. 464, 193 A.3d 919, 932 (2018) (citations omitted and formatting altered).

To succeed on a claim that counsel had a...