Commonwealth v. Cannavo

199 A.3d 1282

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.James Maurice CANNAVO, Jr., Appellant

No. 3729 EDA 2017

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued September 26, 2018

Filed December 3, 2018

Reargument Denied January 29, 2019

Norris E. Gelman, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Nicholas J. Casenta, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, West Chester, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS,^* P.J.E.

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:

Appellant, James Maurice Cannavo, Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County on June 22, 2017, following his conviction by jury of attempted murder in the first degree, aggravated assault, recklessly endangering another person, and simple assault, along with his bench-trial conviction of persons not to possess a firearm.¹ For the following reasons, we affirm.

Appellant was staying at a carriage house near West Chester University on Halloween night in 2015. That night, the victim and his friends went out into the town of West Chester with minimal Halloween costumes. Some testimony indicated they were intoxicated. At 1:17 a.m., they purportedly attempted to enter what they believed to be a party around the carriage house, but were denied entry. The victim, and possibly others, subsequently banged on Appellant's door. Testimony varied as to the number of times the group banged on Appellant's door, though Appellant testified that he heard repeated, loud strikes.

Testimony also revealed that Appellant had a closed-circuit television that permitted him to see the area outside his door. Appellant fired a .40 caliber semiautomatic pistol at the door, without opening it. The bullet went through the door and struck the victim through his small intestine and colon. The police would later discover that, due to Appellant's prior criminal record, Appellant did not lawfully possess the gun he fired at the door. The victim survived, and police charged Appellant with the above crimes.

Appellant raised a claim of self-defense at trial. Prior to the court's instructions to the jury, Appellant requested a charge directing the jury to consider the castle doctrine, 18 Pa.C.S. § 505, which would inform the jury of a presumption of a reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary for Appellant to defend himself. The trial court denied Appellant's request.

The jury convicted Appellant of the above crimes, and the trial court subsequently convicted Appellant, following a bench trial, of persons not to possess a firearm. The court sentenced Appellant on June 22, 2017, to an aggregate term of twenty-five to fifty years' imprisonment. Appellant filed post-sentence motions on June 30, 2017, which the trial court denied, after a hearing, on October 24, 2017. This appeal followed on November 15, 2017. Appellant filed a timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and the trial court filed a responsive opinion.

Appellant raises two claims on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's request to instruct the jury on the castle-doctrine presumption; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction of attempted murder?

Our standard of review in regard to a trial court's decisions on jury instructions is well-settled: "[O]ur standard of review when considering the denial of jury instructions is one of deference—an appellate court will reverse a court's decision only when it abused its discretion or committed an error of law." Commonwealth v. Galvin , 603 Pa. 625, 651, 985 A.2d 783, 788-89 (2009). "[Our] key inquiry is whether the instruction on a particular issue adequately, accurately and clearly presents the law to the jury, and is sufficient to guide the jury in its deliberations." Commonwealth v. Hamilton , 766 A.2d 874, 878 (Pa.Super. 2001). Appellate review of a court's decision as to whether the castle doctrine is applicable, however, is less clear. At issue are the following subsections of 18 Pa.C.S. § 505 :

(b) Limitations on justifying necessity for use of force

* * *

(2.1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2.2), an actor is presumed to have a reasonable belief that deadly force is immediately necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat if both of the following conditions exist:

(i) The person against whom the force is used is in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or has unlawfully and forcefully entered and is present within, a dwelling, residence or occupied vehicle; or the person against whom the force is used is or is attempting to unlawfully and forcefully remove another against that other's will from the dwelling, residence or occupied vehicle.

(ii) The actor knows or has reason to believe that the unlawful and forceful entry or act is occurring or has occurred.

(2.2) The presumption set forth in paragraph (2.1) does not apply if:

(i) the person against whom the force is used has the right to be in or is a lawful resident of the dwelling, residence or vehicle, such as an owner or lessee;

(ii) the person sought to be removed is a child or grandchild or is otherwise in the lawful custody or under the lawful guardianship of the person against whom the protective force is used.

(iii) the actor is engaged in a criminal activity or is using the dwelling, residence or occupied vehicle to further a criminal activity; or

(iv) the person against whom the force is used is a peace officer acting in the performance of his official duties and the actor using force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a peace officer.

18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2.1), (2.2).

The castle doctrine was formalized into statute by our legislature in 2011. Since that time, the trial court and the parties agree there has been sparse case law addressing the applicability of the castle doctrine. Our Supreme Court in 2016, however, provided some clarity on the application of the castle doctrine in Commonwealth v. Childs , 636 Pa. 322, 142 A.3d 823 (2016). In Childs , although the primary issue was whether the defendant was entitled to a castle-doctrine instruction when his trial took place after enactment of the castle-doctrine statute, but the act took place before enactment of the statute, our Supreme Court noted that the Section 505(b)(2.1) presumption did not actually alter the elements of a castle-doctrine defense. Instead, subsection 2.1 "provides an evidentiary mechanism to aid in the factfinder's evaluation of the merits of a castle doctrine defense." Childs , 636 Pa. at 335-36, 142 A.3d at 831-32. Subsection 2.1 consequently

creates a presumption that impacts the evidentiary burden of a defendant seeking its protection as well as the factfinder's analysis of the evidence in order to determine whether the defendant has established a castle doctrine defense. It is a law that provides a method to enforce the right of self defense as embodied by the castle doctrine. In short, it is a procedural statute.

Id. at 338, 142 A.2d at 833.

Viewed in this light, and considering the castle doctrine's inclusion within the self-defense statute, it is apparent that the castle doctrine is an evidentiary means by which a defendant may attempt to prove justification by self-defense. Thus, it is subject to a similar, initial standard by which courts must assess the appropriateness of a self-defense instruction, namely, that "a valid claim of self-defense [or the castle doctrine] must be made out as a matter of law, and this determination must be made by the trial judge. Such claim may consist of evidence from whatever source." Commonwealth v. Mayfield , 401 Pa.Super. 560, 585 A.2d 1069, 1070 (1991) (en banc ). In the case sub judice , the trial court was tasked with determining whether Appellant made a valid claim for the castle doctrine as a matter of law.

Subsection 2.1 requires both subsections 2.1(i) and 2.1(ii) to be met in order for the castle doctrine to apply. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2.1) (reasonable belief of deadly force is presumed necessary "if both of the following conditions exist" (emphasis added) ). Subsection 2.1(i) lists, inter alia , the following requirements: (A) the victim is in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or has unlawfully and forcefully entered and is present within, (B) a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle. 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2.1)(i). Subsection 2.1(ii) then provides that the defendant must have known, or had reason to believe, that the unlawful and forceful entry or act is occurring.

Appellant initially argues that the trial court erred when it considered whether the castle doctrine applies to be a question of law. Appellant contends that such treatment by the trial court results in an unclear burden of proof for the trial court to make its determination, as well as removing the fact-finding province from the jury. Appellant argues that the result is the denial of his right to due process of law. Appellant's argument fails.

Trial courts have long been tasked with the responsibility of determining whether the facts evinced at trial permit a self-defense instruction. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tilley , 528 Pa. 125, 138-39, 595 A.2d 575, 581-82 (1991) (affirming trial court's refusal to instruct jury on self-defense because defendant "was unquestionably the aggressor" and because of lack of sufficient evidence to support finding that defendant was protecting himself from unlawful force); Commonwealth v. Serge , 837 A.2d 1255, 1265-66 (Pa.Super. 2003) (affirming trial court's refusal to give instruction on imperfect self-defense when facts introduced at trial supported nothing more than defendant's voluntary intoxication).

We have established that the standards for permitting a castle-doctrine instruction are the same as when reviewing whether a self-defense instruction is appropriate. Thus, a court does not necessarily assess burdens of proof when considering the applicability of a castle-doctrine...