Commonwealth v. Cramer

195 A.3d 594

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Ronald Paul CRAMER III, Appellant

No. 436 MDA 2017

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued December 5, 2017

Filed September 06, 2018

Sean P. Audley, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Michael M. Osterberg, Assistant District Attorney, Bellefonte, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: OTT, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.^*

OPINION BY DUBOW, J.:

Appellant, Ronald Paul Cramer III, appeals from the Judgment of Sentence of three to six years' incarceration followed by two years' probation entered by the Centre County Court of Common Pleas following his convictions for Sexual Assault and Indecent Assault.¹ After careful review, we affirm.

The relevant facts, as gleaned from the certified record and the trial court's Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, are as follows. The Victim met Appellant at a bar. The Victim and her roommate, Tiffany Rivera, went to Appellant's studio apartment. After arriving at the apartment, the Victim went to the bathroom. Appellant followed her into the bathroom. She was washing her hands and Appellant undid his pants. He started penetrating her from behind. The Victim told Appellant "he didn't want to do that." N.T. Trial, 11/8/16, at 96. Appellant did not stop until the Victim "turned around and told him that she didn't want to do this again and that I wasn't on the pill." Id. at 96-97. Appellant then started kissing her again. Appellant wanted to have oral sex and the Victim "went along with it ...." Id. at 144. She stopped giving him oral sex and told him "you don't want this. I don't want this. This is going to end badly for both of us." Id. at 147. She then left the bathroom. Tiffany Rivera testified that she heard the Victim say "no stop, you don't want to do this." Id. at 184.

When they left the apartment, a man she met in the hallway, Erik Frasca, asked her if she was alright. Id. at 149-50, 232-33. He had noticed one of them "appeared rattled." Id. at 233. The Victim and Tiffany went into his apartment and when Tiffany went to the bathroom, the Victim told Frasca and his girlfriend about the incident. Id. The Victim then started crying. Id. They stayed in the apartment long enough for Tiffany to use the restroom. Id. When they got on the bus, she told Tiffany about the incident. Id. at 151.

At trial, the jury heard testimony from, inter alia , Dr. Veronique Valliere, who testified as an expert regarding the manner in which a victim's response to sexual violence may be counterintuitive. N.T. Trial, 11/9/16, at 271-318. On November 10, 2016, the jury convicted Appellant of Sexual Assault and Indecent Assault.² The trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of three to six years' imprisonment followed by two years' probation.

Appellant filed a Post-Trial Motion challenging, inter alia , the exclusion of DNA evidence, the admissibility of Dr. Valliere's testimony under Frye , and the weight of the evidence. The court denied the Motion and Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents seven issues for our review:

I. Were the verdicts of guilty as to Sexual Assault and Indecent Assault Without the Consent of Other against the weight of the evidence?

II. Were the verdicts supported by sufficient evidence?

III. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err when it excluded from the Appellant's case DNA evidence regarding [the Victim's] sexual activity with David Bodin?

IV. Did the Trial Court err in permitting the Commonwealth to present the testimony of [Dr.] Veronique Valliere where:

a. The trial Court did not require a Frye hearing prior to determining the admissibility of this evidence and for admitting said evidence;

b. Said testimony exceeded the permissible scope of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5920(b)(3) in that the Commonwealth used hypothetical facts identical to the testimony of the [Victim], thus securing Dr. Valliere's testimony as to the credibility of the victim thereby bolstering her credibility in violation of § 5920(b)(3) ?

c. Such evidence was presented to the jury without the jury being provided with instructions as to the limited nature of such evidence, allowing the jury to consider such evidence in bolstering the credibility of the victim in violation of § 5920(b)(3) ?

V. Did the Commonwealth fail to comply with its discovery obligations when it failed to preserve or turn over video surveillance evidence of significant exculpatory value to the Defense and which showed the [Victim's] playful, upbeat demeanor immediately after the alleged assault, and did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in refusing to impose any penalty on the prosecution or to dismiss the charges against Appellant, which remedies are amply supported by caselaw discussing the repercussions for a Brady^[3] violation?

VI. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in refusing to turn over juror contact information which the Defense needed to investigate the possibility that jurors were coerced into reaching a verdict?

VII. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred in sentencing Appellant [sic ] three to six years^['] incarceration, given the voluminous evidence he presented as to his good character, his law-abiding conduct since his arrest, and the minimal evidence suggesting his guilt[.]

Appellant's Brief at 5-6.

Weight of the Evidence

Appellant first contends that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence because Appellant presented convincing evidence that he and the Victim had engaged in consensual activity, the Victim fabricated her claim that the encounter was not consensual to preserve her relationship with her ex-boyfriend, and the Victim's high blood alcohol level made her observations and recollection about the incident unreliable.

When considering challenges to the weight of the evidence, we apply the following precepts. "The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, none or some of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses." Commonwealth v. Talbert , 129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied , 635 Pa. 773, 138 A.3d 4 (2016) (citation omitted). "Resolving contradictory testimony and questions of credibility are matters for the factfinder." Commonwealth v. Hopkins , 747 A.2d 910, 917 (Pa. Super. 2000). It is well-settled that we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact. Talbert , 129 A.3d at 546.

Moreover, when a trial court finds that the evidence was not against the weight of the evidence, we must give the gravest consideration to the trial court's conclusion because it is the trial court, and not the appellate court, that "had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented." Id. at 546 (citation omitted). Furthermore, a defendant will only prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence when the evidence is "so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court." Id. (citation omitted).

In particular, Appellant argues that the only evidence from which the jury could infer that the Victim did not consent was the Victim's testimony about what she was thinking. Appellant highlights evidence that supports his own narrative that the Victim did consent. Appellant's Brief at 21-23. Our review of the record contradicts this assertion. The Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the Victim did not consent. Just because the jury chose to disbelieve Appellant's narrative does not mean that the jury only relied upon the Victim's thoughts to determine that the Victim did not consent.

Similarly, Appellant argues that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence because, according to Appellant's narrative, the Victim fabricated her testimony that she did not consent because the Victim "regretted her alcohol-fueled actions and [was] concerned about her former boyfriend's reaction to her infidelity." Appellant's Brief at 21. Once again, the jury, who observed the Victim testify, rejected this proposition and it is not for this court to disregard the jury's credibility determination.

Appellant finally argues that the Victim's testimony about the incident is unreliable because the Victim's blood alcohol level was so high that she could not accurately observe and recall the incident. Appellant's Brief at 22. Defense counsel, however, cross-examined the Victim about her intoxication and thus, the jury was aware of it; the jury, however, still chose to give weight to her testimony. It is not for us to re-weigh this evidence.

Appellant essentially asks us to reassess the credibility of the Victim and reweigh the evidence presented at trial. We cannot do so. See Talbert , 129 A.3d at 546. Our review of the record leads to the conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it held that the verdict was not so contrary to the evidence as to shock the court's conscience. We, thus, conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief on his weight of the evidence claim.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant argues that the evidence was not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant engaged in sexual activity without the Victim's consent. Appellant's Brief at 24. Appellant further argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Appellant knew that the Victim did not consent to the sexual activities. Id. at 26, 28.

We review claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence by considering whether, "viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Melvin , 103 A.3d 1, 39 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). Further, the court may sustain a conviction wholly on circumstantial evidence, and the trier of fact—while passing on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence—"is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence." Id. at 40 (citation omitted).

The Crimes Code defines Sexual...