Commonwealth v. Davis

242 A.3d 923

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Curtis DAVIS, Appellant

No. 1665 WDA 2019

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued August 25, 2020

Filed November 19, 2020

Brandon Paul Ging, Public Defender, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Kevin Francis McCarthy, Assistant District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

OPINION BY OLSON, J.:

Appellant, Curtis Davis, appeals from an order entered on November 12, 2019, denying his motion to dismiss charges he alleges the Commonwealth pursued in violation of the principles of compulsory joinder and his rights against double jeopardy. We affirm, but remand with instructions.

The underlying facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On September 21, 2019, officers with the City of Pittsburgh Police Department charged Appellant by criminal complaint with one count of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer (fleeing or eluding),¹ a third-degree felony,² and six related summary traffic offenses.³ A preliminary hearing was held on October 3, 2019 in the Pittsburgh Municipal Court.⁴ During the hearing, the charging officer, Officer Nicholas Bonaccorise, testified. N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 10/3/19, at 3-9. At or near the conclusion of the hearing, Magisterial District Judge ("MDJ") Thomas Caulfield dismissed the charge of fleeing or eluding, after finding a lack of prima facie evidence, but subsequently stated that he would "take jurisdiction [of the remaining summary offenses]." Id . at 12. Thereafter, MDJ Caulfield convicted Appellant of the six summary offenses and imposed fines. Id . MDJ Caulfield did so even though the prosecutor did not request him to exercise jurisdiction and in fact, attempted to withdraw the six summary offenses. Id . at 13.

Later that same day, the Commonwealth re-filed all of the above-listed charges against Appellant. The re-filed complaint was presented to, and approved by, MDJ Sokoian Eichler who was also sitting as an MDJ in the Pittsburgh Municipal Court. The parties again appeared at the Pittsburgh Municipal Court for a preliminary hearing on October 17, 2019, but this time, they were before MDJ Mikhail Pappas. During the hearing, the Commonwealth requested a postponement. Appellant's counsel, however, objected and argued that MDJ Pappas should dismiss the re-filed charges because the Commonwealth failed to comply with Pa.R.Crim.P. 544,⁵ which sets forth the procedures for reinstitution of charges following their withdrawal or dismissal. In addition, Appellant's counsel stated:

Your Honor, it is our position today that [Appellant] is currently serving a sentence [which was imposed on October 3, 2019 by MDJ Caulfield. On October 3, 2019, the] fleeing [charge] was dismissed and the other traffic violations were moved to traffic court where [Appellant] is now currently serving a sentence by paying the fines on [it.] So[,] it is our position today that[,] in order to go forward with this re[-]file, the Commonwealth should appeal [the October 3, 2019 judgment of sentence] as [Appellant] is currently serving a sentence [following those convictions].

N.T. Hearing, 10/17/19, at 2-3. In response, the Commonwealth argued that MDJ Caulfield lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Appellant's six summary offenses because the prosecutor attempted to withdraw them and, as such, his ruling was a "nullity as a matter of law." Id . at 3. Ultimately, MDJ Pappas granted the Commonwealth's request for a postponement, but advised the parties to bring the issue before the court of common pleas. Id . at 7.

On November 8, 2019, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Appellant's Motion to Dismiss, 11/8/19, at *1-13 (un-paginated). On November 12, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the matter. During the hearing, Appellant argued that the re-filed charges must be dismissed because the Commonwealth failed to comply with Pa.R.Crim.P. 544. N.T. Hearing, 11/12/19, at 5-6. Appellant also claimed that the Commonwealth's failure prejudiced him because the charges, as re-filed, violated both the principles of compulsory joinder and his right to be secure against double jeopardy. Id . at 11-12. In response, the Commonwealth argued that it complied with Rule 544 and that jeopardy did not attach because MDJ Caulfield lacked jurisdiction to address Appellant's six summary offenses and the judgment of sentence, therefore, constituted a legal nullity. Id . at 11. The trial court ultimately denied Appellant's motion to dismiss.

Thereafter, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court, invoking Pa.R.A.P. 313 and the collateral order doctrine as the basis for appellate jurisdiction.⁶ On December 19, 2019, this Court issued an order directing Appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be quashed as interlocutory. Show Cause Order, 12/19/19, at 1. Appellant filed a timely⁷ response to this Court's order on December 30, 2019, in which he asserted that he "satisfied all three prongs of the collateral order doctrine." Response to Show Cause Order, 12/30/19, at 12. By order filed on January 10, 2020, this Court discharged its show cause order and referred the matter to the panel assigned to decide the merits of this appeal. Order, 1/10/20, at 1.

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

I. Whether this Honorable Court has jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to the collateral order doctrine?

II. Whether the re-filed charges against [Appellant] must be dismissed as a matter of law where the Commonwealth failed to meaningfully comply with Pa.R.Crim.P. 544 [?]

III. Where the Commonwealth wishes to challenge the issuing authority's exercise of subject[ ] matter jurisdiction but failed to file a petition for writ of certiorari and/or notice of appeal, whether the re-filed charges against [Appellant] must be dismissed as a matter of law based on principles of double jeopardy and compulsory joinder?

Appellant's Brief at 5.

Before we address the merits of Appellant's claims, we must determine whether we possess appellate jurisdiction over the instant appeal. Appellant argues that jurisdiction is proper pursuant to the collateral order doctrine and Pa.R.A.P. 313. Appellant's Brief at 17-28. For the foregoing reasons, we agree.⁸

"[W]e note that with respect to criminal cases, appeals are generally taken from a final order or judgment of sentence. Despite the general rule, an appeal may be taken from a non[-]final order if the order is a collateral order, as codified at Pa.R.A.P. 313 (Collateral Orders)." Commonwealth v. Alston , 233 A.3d 795, 799 (Pa. Super. 2020) (internal citations omitted). "A collateral order is an order separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost." Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). Consistent with the definition that appears in our appellate rules, our Supreme Court has identified three elements that define a collateral order—separability, importance, and irreparable loss if review is postponed. See Ben v. Schwartz , 556 Pa. 475, 729 A.2d 547, 550 (1999). "Whether an order is appealable under the collateral order doctrine under Pa.R.A.P. 313 is a question of law, subject to a de novo standard of review, and the scope of review is plenary." Shearer v. Hafer , 644 Pa. 571, 177 A.3d 850, 855 (2018).

"The first prong of the collateral-order doctrine requires that the appealed order is collateral to and separate from the main cause of action." Alston , 233 A.3d at 799. "An issue is separable if it can be examined without analysis of the claims presented in the underlying litigation." A.A. v. Glicken , 237 A.3d 1165, 1169 (Pa. Super. 2020) (internal citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Schultz , 133 A.3d 294, 308 (Pa. Super. 2016) ("In the instant case, the order is separable from the main action because it does not require a merits analysis of the underlying criminal allegations."). Herein, whether Appellant is guilty of the charged offenses is independent of his claim that the Commonwealth, in re-filing the charges, violated Pa.R.Crim.P 544, the rules concerning compulsory joinder, and the principles of double jeopardy. Thus, the "separability factor is easily met." Schultz , 133 A.3d at 309.

As to the second prong, this Court previously explained:

To determine whether an issue is sufficiently important to support application of the collateral order doctrine, "[a court should] weigh the interests implicated in the case against the costs of piecemeal litigation." "[I]t is not sufficient that the issue be important to the particular parties. Rather it must involve rights deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand." "[A]n issue is important if the interests that would potentially go unprotected without immediate appellate review [ ] are significant relative to the efficiency interests sought to be advanced by adherence to the final judgment rule."

Glicken , 237 A.3d at 1169 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Appellant argues that his claims implicate the constitutional right of due process, as well as double jeopardy and, as such, the issues involve rights too important to be denied review. "Moreover, we note that review of this order will apparently affect more than just the parties in this matter." Commonwealth v. Shearer , 584 Pa. 134, 882 A.2d 462, 470 (2005). Thus, we conclude that the second prong is satisfied. See Commonwealth v. Brady , 510 Pa. 336, 508 A.2d 286, 288 (1986) (holding that a non-frivolous appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds involves a right deeply rooted in public policy because the denial potentially undermined the constitutional "right to be free from a second prosecution ... for the same offense") (internal quotations and citations omitted); Alston , ...