Commonwealth v. Day

287 A.3d 878 (Table)

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Elijah Malik Hall DAY, Appellant

No. 1380 MDA 2021

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Filed October 20, 2022

Reargument Denied December 29, 2022

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:

Appellant, Elijah Malik Hall Day, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench trial convictions for multiple counts of driving under the influence of a controlled substance ("DUI") and one count each of disorderly conduct and windshield obstructions.¹ We affirm.

The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal as follows:

On May 15, 2020, Appellant was the driver and sole occupant of a 2002 Cadillac Deville within the borough of Mount Holly Springs, Cumberland County, when his vehicle was observed by Pennsylvania State Police Troopers David Highhouse and Christine Fow to have window tint which potentially exceeded the level permitted by law. The troopers initiated a traffic stop of Appellant, who pulled over into the parking lot of a nearby Sheetz gas station, in order to further investigate the window tint. The interaction between Appellant and the troopers quickly became adversarial, with Appellant repeatedly rolling his window back up while Trooper Highhouse attempted to speak with him, Appellant refusing to follow instructions to shut off his vehicle and exit it, and a shouting match quickly developing between Appellant and Trooper Highhouse. During that time, Trooper Highhouse detected an aroma of marijuana emanating from Appellant's vehicle, observed that Appellant had red and watery eyes, and Appellant conceded that he had marijuana inside his vehicle.

After Appellant was removed from his vehicle, a protective search of his person was performed by Trooper Highhouse. The search led to another outburst from Appellant, which resulted in his being placed in the back of the troopers’ vehicle so that he could cool down before the continuation of the on-scene investigation. While Appellant was in the rear of the troopers’ vehicle, a warrantless search of the vehicle was performed⁷ and the vehicle's window tint was measured, with the window tint level being in excess of the amount permitted by law.

⁷ Prior to the suppression hearing, the Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Alexander , 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020) was announced, establishing that a warrantless vehicle search required both probable cause and exigent circumstances to be constitutionally valid. Due to the lack of exigent circumstances in this case, the Commonwealth withdrew the charge relating to the evidence resulting from the search of the vehicle.

After the search was conducted, Appellant was asked to perform standard field sobriety tests ("SFST"). Prior to the start of those tests, Appellant was read the Miranda^[2] warnings; the results of the SFSTs suggested that Appellant was impaired while driving.... As a result, Appellant was placed under arrest on suspicion of driving under the influence, read the DL-26B form, and consented to a blood draw. As stipulated by counsel prior to the non-jury trial, the results of the blood draw were that Appellant had THC and its metabolites in his bloodstream.

Based on the stipulations, [the trial c]ourt found Appellant guilty of the above-listed charges, and on September 28, 2021, sentenced him to not less than 72 hours to not more than 6 months of incarceration. At the request of counsel, Appellant was permitted to remain on bail pending appeal, and Appellant's notice of appeal was filed on October 28, 2021. On that same date, Appellant was ordered to file his concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, which he timely did on November 16, 2021.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/2/21, at 2-4) (some footnotes omitted).

Appellant now raises two issues on appeal:

Whether [Appellant] was subjected to a custodial detention without probable cause when he was forcibly removed from the vehicle and physically detained in handcuffs?

Whether [Appellant] was subjected to a custodial detention without probable cause when he was read his Miranda rights while handcuffed in the back of the police cruiser?

(Appellant's Brief at 6).

Appellant's issues are related, and we address them together.³ Appellant contends that an arrest must "be supported by probable cause and not merely reasonable suspicion or an educated hunch." (Id. at 13). Appellant posits that there were two occasions when he was effectively under arrest in this case: 1) when the trooper ordered him out of his vehicle and placed him in handcuffs; and 2) when the trooper placed him in the back of the cruiser and provided Miranda warnings. At either of these points, Appellant insists that the trooper did not have probable cause to support an arrest for DUI. Appellant admits that "the initial stop in this case may have been only an investigative detention," but he argues that once he "was forced to exit his vehicle, handcuffed, placed in the back of the police car, and read his Miranda rights, there was an arrest and probable cause was required." (Id. at 19). Moreover, regarding the trooper's observation of the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle, Appellant complains that "the odor alone is insufficient [to establish] probable cause." (Id. at 20). Based upon the foregoing, Appellant concludes that this Court must reverse the order denying his suppression motion. We disagree.

The following principles govern our review of an order denying a motion to suppress:

An appellate court's standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by [those] findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Ford , 175 A.3d 985, 989 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal denied , 647 Pa. 522, 190 A.3d 580 (2018).

Contacts between the police and citizenry fall within three general classifications:

The first [level of interaction] is a "mere encounter" (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an "investigative detention" must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or "custodial detention" must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Bryant , 866 A.2d 1143, 1146 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied , 583 Pa. 668, 876 A.2d 392 (2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Phinn , 761 A.2d 176, 181 (Pa. Super. 2000) ).

An "investigative detention" is interchangeably labeled as a "stop and frisk" or a "Terry stop." Commonwealth v. Brame , 239 A.3d 1119 (Pa. Super. 2020), appeal denied , ––– Pa. ––––, 251 A.3d 771 (2021).

An investigative detention, unlike a mere encounter, constitutes a seizure of a person and thus activates the protections of Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. To institute an investigative detention, an officer must have at least a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Reasonable suspicion requires a finding that based on the available facts, a person of reasonable caution would believe the intrusion was appropriate.

* * *

Reasonable suspicion exists only where the officer is able to articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in that activity.

Commonwealth v. Jones , 874 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal citations omitted).

"[W]hen an officer detains a vehicle for violation of a traffic law, it is inherently reasonable that he or she be concerned with safety and, as a result, may order the occupants of the vehicle to alight from the car." Commonwealth v. Brown , 654 A.2d 1096, 1102 (Pa. Super. 1995), appeal denied , 544 Pa. 642, 664 A.2d 972 (1995). During a traffic stop, the officer "may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions." Commonwealth v. Wright , 224 A.3d 1104, 1109 (Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied , ––– Pa. ––––, 237 A.3d 393 (2020). "[F]or their safety, police officers may handcuff individuals during an investigative detention." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Harris , 176 A.3d 1009, 1021 (Pa. Super. 2017) ).

"The key difference between an investigative and a custodial detention is that the latter ‘involves such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest.’ " Commonwealth v. Gonzalez , 979 A.2d 879, 887 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pakacki , 587 Pa. 511, 519, 901 A.2d 983, 987 (2006) ).

The court considers the totality of the circumstances to determine if an encounter is investigatory or custodial, but the following factors are specifically considered: the basis for the detention; the duration; the location; whether the suspect

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