Commonwealth v. Dockery

258 A.3d 521 (Table)

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Jharon DOCKERY, Appellant

No. 504 EDA 2020

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Filed: June 14, 2021

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:

Appellant, Jharon Dockery, appeals from the January 27, 2020 order that denied his motion to dismiss the felony charge of possession of controlled substances with the intent to deliver.¹ In light of our Supreme Court's recent decision in Commonwealth v. Johnson , 247 A.3d 981 (Pa. 2021), we reverse the trial court's January 27, 2020 order as it pertains to the denial of Appellant's motion to dismiss the felony offense of possession of controlled substances with the intent to deliver.²

The trial court summarized the factual history as follows:

[Appellant's] arrest in this case arose from a [ ] stop of his vehicle by officers of the Philadelphia Police Department on March 1, 2019. During the [vehicle] stop, the [police] officers recovered crack cocaine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia from the vehicle. Although [Appellant] fled from the area before the [police] officers could take him into custody, he was arrested 12 days later and charged with [the] felony [offense of possession with the intent to deliver controlled substances (cocaine and marijuana)] and [the] three [aforementioned] misdemeanor drug [offenses]. See Docket, CP-51-CR-0004424-2019.

The [police] officers who [ ] stopped [Appellant's vehicle] also [ ] issued a traffic citation to him for operating a vehicle without headlights [in violation of] 75 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 4303(a), a charge that was docketed separately from the instant case. See Traffic Docket, Citation I8S0485763 [ ( ]attached as "Exhibit A" to [Appellant's] Motion to Dismiss[ ) ]. On May 3, 2019, [Appellant] was found guilty in absentia for the traffic offense in the Traffic Division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court.

On January 22, 2020, [Appellant] moved to dismiss the four drug charges in this case, claiming that the Commonwealth had been required to try those charges simultaneously with the traffic charge. Given that he had already been tried and convicted for the traffic offense in the [Traffic Division of the] Philadelphia Municipal Court, [Appellant] argued that further prosecution of the drug charges would violate the protection from subsequent

prosecutions afforded to him by Pennsylvania's compulsory joinder statute, 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 110. In his motion[ to dismiss the four drug charges, Appellant] acknowledged that dismissal of the felony [possession with the intent to deliver] charge would be contrary to the holding in Commonwealth v. Johnson , 221 A.3d 217 (Pa. Super. 2019),^[3] but contended that the holding in Johnson was erroneous.

On January 27, 2020, [the trial c]ourt granted[, in part, Appellant's] dismissal motion as to the three misdemeanor [drug] charges but denied [the dismissal motion, in part,] as to the felony [possession with the intent to deliver] charge.²

² At the hearing on [Appellant's] dismissal motion, the Commonwealth conceded that dismissal of the three misdemeanor drug charges was appropriate in light of [ ] Johnson , [supra ,], and Commonwealth v. Perfetto , 207 A.3d 812 (Pa. 2019).

Trial Court Opinion, 4/28/20, at 2-3 (some record citations omitted). This appeal followed.⁴

Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

Did [ ] the [trial] court err in denying Appellant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.[A. § 110(1)(ii) ] where Appellant had previously been convicted of [a summary traffic offense] which arose from the same criminal episode [and] in the same judicial district as the [possession with intent to deliver] offense in the instant case?

Appellant's Brief at 3.

Preliminarily, we note that although the trial court failed to adhere to the requirements of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 587(B),⁵ which pertains to motions for dismissal on grounds of double jeopardy, "an order denying a double jeopardy motion, that makes no finding that the motion is frivolous, is a collateral order"⁶ under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313 and, therefore, is immediately appealable. Commonwealth v. Gross , 232 A.3d 819, 832-833 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc ), appeal denied , 242 A.3d 307 (Pa. 2020) ; see also Pa.R.A.P. 313(a) (stating, "[a]n appeal may be taken as of right from a collateral order of a trial court"). Therefore, this Court has appellate jurisdiction over the trial court's collateral order denying, in part, Appellant's double jeopardy motion. Gross , 232 A.2d at 833 n.1.

Appellant's challenge to the trial court's denial of his double jeopardy motion presents a pure question of law because the relevant facts of the case are undisputed. Consequently, as with all questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Perfetto , 207 A.3d at 821.

Section 110 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, also known as the compulsory joinder statute, states, in pertinent part,

§ 110. When prosecution barred by former prosecution for different offense

Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:

(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former prosecution for the same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for:

...

(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and occurred within the same judicial district as the former prosecution unless the court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense[.]

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110(1)(ii).

Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder statute clearly and unambiguously contains four primary elements, which, if met, preclude a prosecution due to a former prosecution for a different offense:

(1) the former prosecution must have resulted in an acquittal or conviction;

(2) the current prosecution is based upon the same criminal conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the former prosecution;

(3) the prosecutor was aware of the instant charges before the commencement of the trial on the former charges; and

(4) the current offense occurred within the same judicial district as the former prosecution.

Perfetto , 207 A.3d at 821 (citation omitted).

Section 112(1) of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code operates as an exception to Section 110, however, permitting subsequent prosecution of an offense when the "former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 112(1). Our Supreme Court recently held that, "the offense" referred to in Section 112(1) "means the offense that was the subject of an initial prosecution resulting in a conviction or acquittal." Johnson , 247 A.3d at 987. The Johnson Court explained, "[t]he ultimate purport, with respect to the summary-and-greater-offenses paradigm, is that the Commonwealth must generally assure that known offenses are consolidated at the common pleas [court] level, when they arise out of a single criminal episode and occur in the same judicial district." Id.

In Johnson , Johnson was charged with a summary traffic offense and two felony drug offenses stemming from a single traffic stop. Id. at 982. The felony drug offenses each prescribed a maximum penalty of fifteen years’ incarceration. Id. The Philadelphia Traffic Court, a division of Philadelphia's Municipal Court, convicted Johnson in absentia of the summary traffic offense. Id. The Commonwealth subsequently filed felony drug charges against Johnson in the Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia County, whereupon Johnson moved to dismiss the charges on the ground of double jeopardy, "contending that the [Commonwealth] was required to try all of the offenses simultaneously, per the compulsory joinder requirements of Section 110 [.]" Id. The Commonwealth argued that its subsequent prosecution of the felony drug charges was permitted by Section 112(1). Id. at 982-983. Ultimately, our Supreme Court held that Section 112(1) does not provide an exception permitting the Commonwealth's subsequent prosecution of a felony crime at the common pleas court level on the ground that the municipal court, or a division of the municipal court such as the traffic court, lacked jurisdiction over the felony crime due to the potential penalty which could be imposed if the defendant were convicted.⁷ Id. at 987. Rather, the Commonwealth was required to consolidate both the summary traffic offense and the greater felony offense arising out of a single criminal episode and occurring in the same judicial district by filing all of the charges with the common pleas court. Id.

Here, Appellant argues that he satisfied the four-prong test for application of Section 110(1)(ii), as set forth in Perfetto , and, therefore, his possession with intent to deliver charge should have been dismissed on double jeopardy grounds. Appellant's Brief at 9. Appellant asserts that the circumstances in the instant case are indistinguishable from the facts presented in Johnson , and the Commonwealth, therefore, was required to consolidate the charges stemming from the traffic stop and bring those charges before the common pleas court. Appellant's Petition for Reconsideration, 4/21/21, at 9. We agree.

In denying Appellant's request to dismiss the possession with intent to deliver charge on double jeopardy grounds, the trial court stated,

a key question in this case is whether the Philadelphia Municipal Court could have exercised jurisdiction over the [possession with intent to deliver] charge when it adjudicated [Appellant's] traffic citation for operating a vehicle without headlights. Clearly, the [Philadelphia] Municipal Court could not have done so. The [Philadelphia] Municipal Court's

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