Commonwealth v. Eakin

1

2024 PA Super 222

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. STEVEN G. EAKIN

No. 1113 WDA 2021

No. J-E02001-24

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

September 25, 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered September 8, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County Criminal Division at No(s) CP-61-CR-0000647-2017

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BECK, J.

OPINION

BOWES, J.:

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order granting Steven G. Eakin's suppression motion. The trial court granted the motion on the basis that the traffic stop was conducted by an officer operating outside of his primary jurisdiction, and his actions were not authorized by the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act ("ICA") or the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act ("MPJA"). Since we conclude that suppression was not an appropriate remedy for the technical violations in this case, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Prior to reciting the undisputed facts of this case, we begin by briefly setting forth the framework within which Chief Edward Sharp of the Polk Borough Police Department encountered Appellee in Frenchcreek Township. In 2006, Polk Borough and Frenchcreek Township entered into a joint municipal police agreement whereby Frenchcreek paid Polk to provide law enforcement services. Those services, which had been provided from 2006 through the time of the stop at issue in this case in 2017, included Polk Borough police patrolling within Frenchcreek to enforce the Vehicle and Crimes Codes. See Joint Municipal Agreement, 4/13/06, at ¶ 2(a)(1), (2).

The version of the ICA in effect at the time of the agreement required adoption of such an agreement by ordinance. Specifically, that version provided in pertinent part as follows: "A local government may enter into intergovernmental cooperation with or delegate any functions, powers or responsibilities to another governmental unit or local government upon the passage of an ordinance by its governing body. If mandated by initiative and referendum in the area affected, the local government shall adopt such an ordinance." 53 Pa.C.S. § 2305 (effective 1996-2020).^[1] Polk Borough properly passed an ordinance adopting the 2006 agreement, but Frenchcreek Township only entered a resolution to adopt the agreement.

With this background, we turn to the disputed stop. On August 11, 2017, Chief Sharp was traveling on Georgetown Road in Frenchcreek Township and observed Appellee's vehicle driving east in the westbound lane for approximately one-half mile. Chief Sharp conducted a traffic stop shortly before 9:00 p.m., and immediately recognized Appellee, his longtime friend, as the driver. The two had, among other things, worked together on the campaign for Venango County Court of Common Pleas President Judge Oliver Lobaugh. Chief Sharp observed a martini glass with two olives in the center console. When asked about the glass, Appellee "picked it up" and "threw it onto the . . . floor on the side[.]" N.T. Suppression, 8/27/21, at 48. As Chief Sharp and Appellee began to converse, Appellee stated that "Ollie's not gonna like this." Id. Chief Sharp replied, "Let's not go there[,]" but Appellee continued to say "Ollie's not gonna like this" and "[y]ou and I are friends." Id. Based on the foregoing, Chief Sharp radioed for another officer to take over the traffic stop.

Sergeant Alan Heller, also of the Polk Borough Police Department, arrived on scene to relieve Chief Sharp.^[2] After independently determining that Appellee exhibited signs of driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"), Sergeant Heller inquired about conducting field sobriety tests, but Appellee indicated he was unable to perform the tests. Therefore, Sergeant Heller transported Appellee for a blood draw to determine his blood alcohol content level. Since Appellee agreed to the blood draw, the sergeant did not inform him of the consequences of refusing to comply. The blood draw confirmed his blood alcohol content level as 0.16%. Based on the foregoing, Sergeant Heller decided to charge Appellee with DUI.

Appellee, proceeding pro se, filed a suppression motion, which the court denied, and was convicted following a jury trial. On direct appeal, this Court vacated his judgment of sentence because he had not properly waived his right to counsel prior to his suppression hearing. See Commonwealth v. Eakin, 242 A.3d 387, 2020 WL 6392480 (Pa.Super. 2020) (non-precedential decision). Therefore, we remanded the matter back to the trial court for a new suppression hearing where Appellee could either proceed with counsel or validly waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. After electing to proceed pro se, Appellee filed another motion to suppress the results of his blood draw and the evidence obtained during the traffic stop. It is the result of this second suppression motion that is the subject of this appeal.

Of relevance, Appellee challenged the validity of the extra-jurisdictional traffic stop by Polk Borough police in Frenchcreek Township. Since the version of the ICA in effect at the time of the stop required adoption of a joint municipal agreement by ordinance, and Frenchcreek had only entered a resolution, Appellee argued that the evidence from the stop should be suppressed because the Polk Borough officers were not acting pursuant to an ICA-compliant joint agreement. Similarly, he contended that while the MPJA provides six exceptions for extra-judicial police conduct, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 8953(a), none of them applied. See Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 4/23/21, at ¶¶ 16-21. Thus, he averred that the officers lacked the authority to stop him and that the evidence obtained during the traffic stop should be suppressed.

Noting that Polk Borough police had been providing policing services to Frenchcreek Township since 2006, and that "Frenchcreek clearly intended to permit Polk Borough Police Department to perform law enforcement duties within Frenchcreek[,]" the Commonwealth insisted that the legislative purposes behind the MPJA were met in this case and suppression was therefore unwarranted. See Commonwealth's Answer, 6/3/21, at ¶¶ 11-18.

The court held a suppression hearing on August 27, 2021, and heard from Sergeant Heller and Chief Sharp. The parties agreed to the admission of the 2006 Joint Municipal Agreement, the 2018 Joint Municipal Agreement, the 2018 ordinance from Polk Borough, and emails between the two jurisdictions regarding the agreement to provide police services. In summarizing the import of those documents, the parties stipulated "that the 2006 Joint Municipal Agreement was amended [after the traffic stop at issue] and fixed to cure legal deficiencies[.]" N.T. Suppression, 8/27/21, at 59-60. Those "legal deficiencies" form the crux of this appeal.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth argued that suppression was not an appropriate remedy because, despite the improper procedure to enforce the 2006 agreement, the local governments had been operating pursuant to that agreement for over ten years. Id. at 71-72, 77. Appellee, meanwhile, contended that the agreement was a legal nullity because it did not comply with the ICA. Id. at 73. He relied upon Commonwealth v. Hlubin, 208 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2019), wherein the High Court considered the intrusiveness of a sobriety checkpoint involving cooperation among multiple police jurisdictions, and implored the court to grant his suppression motion.

After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court granted Appellee's motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the traffic stop.^[3]The Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration, noting, inter alia, that the legislature had, in direct response to Hlubin, amended § 8953(a)(3), one of the MPJA exceptions, because it disagreed with the Supreme Court's interpretation. See Motion for Reconsideration, 9/9/21, at unnumbered 1-2. The trial court denied the Commonwealth's motion, finding that § 8953(a)(3) did not apply, and that because an ordinance was not passed, Chief Sharp "lacked authority to stop [Appellee]" in Frenchcreek Township. Order, 9/14/21, at 2-3.

This appeal followed, wherein the Commonwealth certified that the suppression order substantially handicapped the prosecution of Appellee in this case. The Commonwealth complied with the court's order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. In lieu of a Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court directed us to its September 14, 2021 order. On appeal, the Commonwealth sets forth three issues for our consideration:

1. Whether the trial court erred in granting Appellee's motion to suppress by relying only on Hlubin, where Hlubin involved a police sergeant who conducted a stop and arrest in a prearranged sobriety checkpoint located outside of his primary jurisdiction.

2. Whether the trial court erred in granting Appellee's motion to suppress, as our learned Superior Court has consistently found that suppression of evidence is not an appropriate remedy for a technical violation of the [MPJA].

3.Whether the trial court erred in granting [Appellee]'s motion to suppress, due to the Pennsylvania legislature amending [§] 8953 of the [MPJA] with the "explicit intent to reverse the Supreme Court's interpretation of the MPJA in Hlubin."

Commonwealth's brief at 4 (cleaned up).

In essence, the Commonwealth seeks reversal of the trial court's conclusion that suppression was an appropriate remedy for the ICA and MPJA violations. A panel of this Court considered these issues and filed a memorandum decision affirming the trial court's order.^[4] The Commonwealth sought reargument before this Court en banc, which we granted. As a result, we withdrew our prior p...