Commonwealth v. Edwards

287 A.3d 847 (Table)

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Aaron EDWARDS, Appellant

No. 2496 EDA 2021

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Filed October 12, 2022

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:

Aaron Edwards appeals from the order dismissing his timely first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9541-9546. Upon careful review, we affirm

From 2016 to 2017, Edwards and Christopher Hines were both romantically involved with the same woman. In the early afternoon of July 19, 2017, Hines was sitting in his vehicle, which was parked on the street outside of his home. Edwards approached the vehicle, and the two men had a verbal exchange. The men offered slightly differing accounts as to what transpired after the verbal exchange ended.¹ However, there is no question that Edwards pulled a gun and fired a shot through the driver's side door. The bullet hit Hines in the abdomen.² When Hines reversed his vehicle, Edwards fired a second shot that hit the windshield. Edwards was arrested on July 21, 2017.

On October 13, 2017, the Commonwealth filed an information charging Edwards with attempted murder, aggravated assault, possessing an instrument of crime ("PIC"), simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person ("REAP"). Edwards entered a guilty plea on October 7, 2019, and then filed a motion to withdraw. The trial court granted the motion to withdraw the guilty plea on October 30, 2019.

At the conclusion of a nonjury trial, Edwards was convicted of aggravated assault, simple assault, PIC and REAP. He was found not guilty of attempted murder. On July 28, 2020, the trial court sentenced Edwards to serve an aggregate term of incarceration of eleven and one-half to twenty-three months, followed by four years of probation. Edwards did not file a direct appeal.

On January 28, 2021, Edwards filed the instant, counseled PCRA petition. The PCRA court dismissed the petition on July 5, 2021. This timely appeal followed.

Our standard of review for an order denying PCRA relief is whether the record supports the PCRA court's determination, and whether the PCRA court's determination is free of legal error. See Commonwealth v. Phillips , 31 A.3d 317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011). The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. See id .

In his first issue on appeal, Edwards claims his trial counsel was ineffective.

Concerning ineffective assistance of counsel arguments, we presume counsel is effective, and the appellant bears the burden to prove otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Bennett , 57 A.3d 1185, 1195 (Pa. 2012). The appellant must demonstrate: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests; and (3) but for counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. See Commonwealth v. Solano , 129 A.3d 1156, 1162-63 (Pa. 2015).

Pursuant to the first prong, we note that where an appellant is not entitled to relief on the underlying claim upon which his ineffectiveness claim is premised, he is not entitled to relief on his ineffectiveness claim. See Commonwealth v. Ousley , 21 A.3d 1238, 1246 (Pa. Super. 2011). In short, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim. See Commonwealth v. Loner , 836 A.2d 125, 132 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc ). Regarding the second prong, we have long reiterated that trial counsel's approach must be "so unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have chosen it." Commonwealth v. Ervin , 766 A.2d 859, 862-863 (Pa. Super. 2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. Miller , 431 A.2d 233 (Pa. 1981) ). In addition, we are mindful that prejudice requires proof that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. See Commonwealth v. Pierce , 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa. 2001). "A failure to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the claim of ineffectiveness." Commonwealth v. Daniels , 963 A.2d 409, 419 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted).

Edwards contends that the judge who accepted his guilty plea, which was later withdrawn, should not have presided over his nonjury trial. He asserts that the trial judge was tainted by the prior guilty plea. He therefore asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to file a motion to recuse. See Appellant's Brief at 9-19.

The party requesting recusal must "produce evidence establishing bias, prejudice or unfairness [that] raises a substantial doubt as to the jurist's ability to preside impartially." Commonwealth v. Tedford , 960 A.2d 1, 55–56 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Postie , 110 A.3d 1034, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted) (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying recusal motion where the court had sat as suppression court because the defendant made no argument that his admissions at the suppression hearing were inadmissible or that trial proceedings were flawed and, it observed that a trial judge is capable of disregarding prejudicial evidence).

Our Supreme Court has long clarified that the rule regarding the same judge hearing pretrial proceedings and presiding over the subsequent trial is that "a judge should honor a request for recusation where prejudicial information is received in a pre-trial proceeding that would be otherwise inadmissible during the trial of the cause." Commonwealth v. Goodman , 311 A.2d 652, 654 (Pa. 1973). "Whether a trial judge should recuse himself thus depends upon the type of evidence that the judge hears; if the evidence is inadmissible and is of a highly prejudicial nature, the judge should recuse himself or declare a mistrial if it is too late for recusal." Commonwealth v. Lewis , 460 A.2d 1149, 1151 (Pa. Super. 1983) (citation omitted).

The following language from our decision in Commonwealth v. Postie , 110 A.3d 1034 (Pa. Super. 2015), is instructive:

[T]he mere participation by the trial judge in an earlier stage of the proceedings does not provide a per se basis for requiring recusal of the trial judge.

The determination of whether a trial judge should recuse himself depends upon the following: the type of evidence that the judge hears; if the evidence is inadmissible and is of a highly prejudicial nature , the judge should recuse himself or declare a mistrial if it is too late for recusal. The judge should also recuse himself whenever there is substantial doubt as to his ability to preside impartially. The burden to show prejudice, however, is on the party seeking recusal. If the evidence is admissible , or not of a highly prejudicial nature, recusal is not required , and while it may be the better practice to have a different judge preside over trial than preside over pre-trial proceedings, such a practice is not constitutionally required and has not been made the basis for setting aside a verdict reached in an otherwise proper trial. This principle appears to be based on the prevailing view that judicial fact-finders are capable of disregarding prejudicial evidence.

Postie , 110 A.3d at 1038 (quoting Commonwealth v. Lott , 581 A.2d 612, 615 (Pa. Super. 1990) ) (emphases added).

The PCRA court addressed Edwards's claim of ineffective assistance and determined he failed to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test, which includes a failure to establish merit to the underlying issue. See PCRA Court Opinion, 1/24/22, at 4-7. As the court noted, the "issue [at trial] was not whether [Edwards] actually shot at the complaining witness, but whether the shooting was done in self-defense." Id . at 5. Further, the court observed that at his nonjury trial "[Edwards] acknowledged that he shot the complaining witness but claimed it was in self-defense." Id . at 6 (citing N.T., 1/10/20, at 236). The PCRA court opined that "[n]othing about the guilty plea or any other pretrial proceedings would have left the trial court incapable of rendering an impartial verdict on this simple issue." Id . Moreover, the PCRA court recognized that "[n]o inadmissible evidence was heard by the trial court." Id . We agree with the PCRA court's conclusions.

Our review of the record reflects that the trial court, after conducting an extensive colloquy, accepted Edwards's guilty plea. See N.T., 10/7/19, at 4-18, 19. Prior to accepting the plea, the Commonwealth set forth the following facts that it would have introduced at trial:

[O]n July 19, 2017, in the 500 block of Widener Street, ..., the complainant, Christopher Hines, ..., was on the phone in his vehicle with his girlfriend, ....

At that time, [Edwards] approached Mr. Hines’ vehicle, and with his gun, shot into the vehicle on the driver's side door, striking the complainant, Mr. Hines, in his left side of the abdomen. The victim then reversed his vehicle, and [Edwards] shot one more bullet into the car, which struck the windshield of the car.

Mr. Hines then drove himself to Albert Einstein Hospital, where he underwent surgery and was in the hospital, approximately, for a month.

N.T., 10/7/19, at 17-18.

The record further establishes that the court held a hearing on Edwards's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. At the hearing, defense counsel stated, "[A]t this time, the defense would motion the [c]ourt to allow [Edwards] to withdraw his guilty plea upon the basis that he maintains his innocence, and has a self-defense claim that he wishes to put before this [c]ourt." N.T., 10/30/19, at 7. The court immediately granted the request to withdraw and set a trial date. See id .

Thereafter, the following transpired between the trial court and defense counsel:

THE COURT: ... I heard the guilty plea in this matter. Certainly, your client has the right to ask me to recuse myself since I did hear the guilty plea in this matter.

Have you had a chance to speak

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