Commonwealth v. Farnan

55 A.3d 113

2012 PA Super 221

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.John FARNAN, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued June 28, 2012.

Filed Oct. 11, 2012.

Michael J. Witheral, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Karen T. Edwards, Assistant District Attorney and Michael W. Streily, Deputy District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: OLSON, WECHT and PLATT,^* JJ.

OPINION BY OLSON, J.:

Appellant, John Farnan, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on August 18, 2011 in the Criminal Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. We affirm.

Following a bench trial on August 18, 2011, the court found Appellant guilty of driving under the influence (DUI-general impairment),¹ driving under the influence (DUI-highest rate),² driving while operating privilege suspended/revoked,³ and driving without a license.⁴ Immediately thereafter, the court sentenced Appellant to 90 days' restrictive intermediate punishment, 18 months' probation, and fines, costs and other restrictions.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural background in this case as follows:

On September 21, 2010, Sergeant David Mazza of the Sewickley Borough Police Department responded to a call received at approximately 4:40 p.m. The call involved a potential problem involving a custody dispute. [K.L. (Appellant's ex-wife) ] requested police assistance at her home on Bank Street. [K.L.] informed Sergeant Mazza that [Appellant] was on his way to pick up the couple's children, contrary to their custody order. She indicated to Sergeant Mazza that she thought that there was going to be a problem between she and [Appellant], which was why she called the police. Sergeant Mazza was familiar with both [K.L.] and [Appellant], having been involved in past incidents between the two.

Sergeant Mazza was one of three (3) officers in two (2) marked cars who arrived at the scene. At the time of his arrival, [Appellant] was not present at [K.L.'s]. While the officers were speaking with [K.L.], she pointed to a vehicle that was traveling along Bank Street and said “Here he comes.” A vehicle approached [K.L.'s] house and then proceeded down the street without stopping. Sergeant Mazza was able to identify [Appellant] as the driver of the vehicle, as well.

Sergeant Mazza testified that, within thirty (30) days before this incident, [K.L.] had informed him that [Appellant] was driving with a suspended license. Upon receiving the information, Sergeant Mazza had confirmed that [Appellant's] license was suspended for a DUI-related matter. [Appellant] drove past [K.L.'s] house after looking at the officers and [K.L.] standing outside. Sergeant Mazza then got into his police car and followed [Appellant]. After approximately 20 seconds, Sergeant Mazza activatedhis lights and [stopped Appellant]. Sergeant Mazza testified that he pulled [Appellant] over [ ] for three (3) reasons: (1) the suspended license; (2) the suspicious behavior in driving past [K.L.'s] house due to the presence of police vehicles and personnel; and (3) the need to investigate [K.L.'s] complaint.

Sergeant Mazza was the sole witness who testified at the suppression hearing. [The trial court found Sergeant Mazza's testimony to be credible and concluded that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, including the fact that Sergeant Mazza articulated specific grounds to support his belief that Appellant was operating his vehicle with a suspended driver's license. Accordingly, the trial court] denied [Appellant's] [s]uppression [m]otion pursuant to an [o]rder dated July 19, 2011. [Appellant] proceeded to a stipulated non-jury trial on August 18, 2011[. At trial, evidence was introduced that Appellant failed four field sobriety tests and that his blood alcohol content was .185%.] [Appellant] was found guilty on all counts.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/2/11, at 1–3.⁵

Appellant's brief raises the following questions for our consideration:

Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in failing to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful traffic stop, where there was no reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot or that a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code was occurring[?]

Whether the [trial court] erred in finding reasonable suspicion to justify [the] traffic stop where facts articulated by the arresting [o]fficer and found by the [t]rial [c]ourt in support of reasonable suspicion, consisted of stale information regarding a past Motor Vehicle Code [v]iolation and/or a potential civil custody, dispute, rather than fresh information or facts which might infer a current Code violation or involvement in actual criminal activity[?]

Appellant's Brief at 8.

Because Appellant challenges an order that denied his motion to suppress, we review his claims pursuant to the following standard and scope of review:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. Where, as here, the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 46 A.3d 781, 783–784 (Pa.Super.2012) (citations omitted).

Appellant's claims center on his contention that Sergeant Mazza lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. Specifically, Appellant argues that Sergeant Mazza's prior knowledge regarding the suspended status of Appellant's driver's license was approximately 30 days old when the vehicle detention occurred and, therefore, constituted stale information. Appellant reasons that, because Sergeant Mazza relied upon stale information, the trial court erred in concluding that the Commonwealth came forward with sufficient facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that Appellant had been driving with a suspended license at the time he was detained.⁶ Appellant concludes that because the stop was invalid, the evidence recovered as a result should have been suppressed and his judgment of sentence must be vacated. We disagree.⁷

In Pennsylvania, a police officer has authority to stop a vehicle when he or she has reasonable suspicion that a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code is occurring or has occurred.⁸ Our Supreme Court defines reasonable suspicion as:

a less stringent standard than probable cause necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest, and depends on the information possessed by police and its degree of reliability in the totality of the circumstances. In order to justify the seizure, a police officer must be able to point to “specific and articulable facts” leading him to suspect criminal activity is afoot. In assessing the totality of the circumstances, courts must also afford due weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in light of the officer's experience and acknowledge that innocent facts, when considered collectively, may permit the investigative detention. Thus, under the present version of Section 6308(b), in order to establish reasonable suspicion, an officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which led him to reasonably suspect a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code[.]

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 609 Pa. 1, 14 A.3d 89, 95–96 (2011) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). “[W]hether an officer had reasonable suspicion that criminality was afoot so as to justify an investigatory detention is an objective one, which must be considered in light of the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 96.

We have been unable to locate, and the parties have not cited, any Pennsylvaniadecision that addresses the precise issue raised in this case, i.e. whether information possessed by an officer for approximately 30 days is too stale to furnish reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity in support of a traffic stop. In Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 832 A.2d 1123 (Pa.Super.2003), this Court held that the passage of three years invalidated an officer's reliance on license suspension information to justify a vehicle detention. At the other end of the spectrum, in Commonwealth v. Hilliar, 943 A.2d 984 (Pa.Super.2008), appeal denied,598 Pa. 763, 956 A.2d 432 (2008), we determined that an officer's acquisition of license suspension information immediately prior to a traffic stop did, in fact, establish reasonable suspicion; however, we invalidated the detention on other grounds.

Although no Pennsylvania decisions have considered the freshness, reliability, and validity of license suspension information that falls between the limits examined in Stevenson and Hilliar, the Commonwealth has brought to our attention several authorities emanating from our sister states which hold that an officer's recent knowledge regarding a license suspension, including information acquired within 30 days of a traffic stop, may be sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. See e.g., State v. Batts, 281 Conn. 682, 916 A.2d 788, 795–796 (2007), cert. denied,552 U.S. 1047, 128 S.Ct. 667, 169 L.Ed.2d 524 (2007) (information obtained within past two to three weeks established reasonable suspicion to believe defendant was driving under suspension); State v. Harris, 236 Ga.App. 525, 513 S.E.2d 1,...