Commonwealth v. Fleury

489 Mass. 421

183 N.E.3d 1145

COMMONWEALTH

v.Edward FLEURY.

SJC-13148

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampshire.

Argued December 8, 2021.

Decided March 31, 2022.

Thomas E. Robinson, for the defendant.

Cynthia M. Von Flatern, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

GEORGES, J.

This case presents the question whether firearms found to be improperly secured, according to the requirements of G. L. c. 140, § 131L, are subject to forfeiture under G. L. c. 276, § 3 (b ), which regulates the disposal of certain firearms seized during the execution of a search warrant. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that they are not. Accordingly, the Superior Court judge's order allowing the forfeiture must be vacated and set aside.

1. Background. The facts are undisputed; in reciting them, we reserve some details for further discussion. In 2014, Edward Fleury, a former chief of police and firearms instructor, was charged with assault by means of a dangerous weapon following an altercation with a friend. Police obtained a search warrant to search Fleury's home for the firearm allegedly used in the altercation. During the search, officers found that some of the firearms in Fleury's extensive collection, which featured over 240 firearms, appeared to be improperly secured, in violation of G. L. c. 140, § 131L. Fleury subsequently was indicted on twenty-seven counts of improperly securing a firearm, one count for each gun the Commonwealth alleged had been secured improperly.

The indictments were divided into two groups, and the Commonwealth proceeded against Fleury at two separate trials. Fleury ultimately was acquitted of the assault and of fifteen of the twenty-seven counts of improperly securing a firearm. He was convicted of the twelve charges relating to the other twelve firearms, each of which was a "large capacity" firearm within the meaning of G. L. c. 140, § 121, which provides definitions for key terms used throughout G. L. c. 140, §§ 122 to 131Y.¹

After Fleury had exhausted all avenues of appellate review of his convictions,² he moved under Rule 61 of the Rules of the Superior Court³ for the return of all twenty-seven of the seized firearms to a person designated to sell them on his behalf. A designee was necessary because, due to his convictions, Fleury is no longer authorized to possess a firearm or to permit the storage of a firearm in his home, see discussion, infra.

The Commonwealth agreed to return the firearms seized during the execution of the search warrant, except for the twelve that had been found to have been improperly secured in violation of G. L. c. 140, § 131L. In reaching this position, the Commonwealth relied on the view that G. L. c. 276, § 3 (b ), which pertains to certain weapons seized during the execution of a search warrant, covers firearms that are not stored according to the requirements of G. L. c. 140, § 131L. A Superior Court judge agreed with the Commonwealth and ordered that the twelve firearms be forfeited and destroyed. The judge also denied Fleury's motion for reconsideration. Fleury appealed, and we transferred this case from the Appeals Court on our own motion.

2. Statutory overview. The issue here hinges on the relationship between the forfeiture statute, G. L. c. 276, § 3, and the storage statute, G. L. c. 140, § 131L.

The forfeiture statute contains guidance for the forfeiture of property seized during the execution of a search warrant. A version of the statute first was enacted in 1836, see R.S. 1836, c. 142, § 5; after more modest amendments, the statute was substantially amended in 1964, to a form very similar to the language that remains today, see St. 1964, c. 557, §§ 1-4. The statute last was amended in 1996, when the Legislature modified subsection G. L. c. 276, § 3 (b ), in a manner not relevant to this case. See St. 1996, c. 151, § 497. General Laws c. 276, § 3 (b ), provides:

"Rifles, shotguns, pistols, knives or other dangerous weapons which have been found to have been kept, concealed or used unlawfully or for an unlawful purpose shall be forfeited to the commonwealth and delivered forthwith to the colonel of the state police for destruction or preservation in the discretion of the colonel of the state police" (emphasis added).

The storage statute was enacted in 1998, two years after the forfeiture statute was last amended. See St. 1998, c. 180, § 47. General Laws c. 140, § 131L (a ), states:

"It shall be unlawful to store or keep any firearm, rifle or shotgun including, but not limited to, large capacity weapons, or machine gun in any place unless such weapon is secured in a locked container or equipped with a tamper-resistant mechanical lock or other safety device, properly engaged so as to render such weapon inoperable by any person other than the owner or other lawfully authorized user.... For purposes of this section, such weapon shall not be deemed stored or kept if carried by or under the control of the owner or other lawfully authorized user." (Emphases added.)

3. Discussion. In the Commonwealth's view, the twelve firearms that were found to have been improperly secured, in violation of G. L. c. 140, § 131L, are covered by the provision of G. L. c. 276, § 3 (b ), mandating forfeiture of firearms "found to have been kept ... unlawfully." Fleury argues, by contrast, that the forfeiture statute is applicable only to firearms that were possessed or used unlawfully, and not, like the storage statute, to firearms lawfully possessed but unlawfully stored.⁴ The question before us, then, is whether the Legislature intended that firearms found to be improperly secured under the storage statute be subject to forfeiture under the forfeiture statute.

a. Standards of review. As with all questions of statutory interpretation, we exercise de novo review.⁵ See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agric. Resources, 477 Mass. 280, 285-286, 76 N.E.3d 227 (2017).

"[A] statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 464 Mass. 365, 368, 982 N.E.2d 1173 (2013). "If the language is clear and unambiguous, we ‘must give effect to its plain and ordinary meaning and ... need not look beyond the words.’ " Shaw's Supermkts., Inc. v. Melendez, 488 Mass. 338, 341, 173 N.E.3d 356 (2021), quoting Doherty v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 486 Mass. 487, 491, 159 N.E.3d 653 (2020).

Where the language of a statute is ambiguous, however, we may seek guidance from "extrinsic sources, including the legislative history and other statutes, for assistance in our interpretation." Chandler v. County Comm'rs of Nantucket County, 437 Mass. 430, 435, 772 N.E.2d 578 (2002). We interpret statutes "not alone according to their simple, literal or strict verbal meaning, but in connection with their development, their progression through the legislative body, the history of the times, [and] prior legislation" (citation omitted). Guardianship of B.V.G., 474 Mass. 315, 321, 52 N.E.3d 988 (2016).

Here, the plain language of the contested provisions is ambiguous regarding the statutes’ relationship to each other. A thorough examination of both statutes in their entirety, however, convinces us that the Legislature did not intend to make improperly secured firearms subject to automatic forfeiture under G. L. c. 276, § 3 (b ).

b. Plain language. At first glance, the plain language of the forfeiture statute would seem to encompass improper storage of a firearm. The statute authorizes forfeiture of firearms "found to have been kept ... unlawfully," G. L. c. 276, § 3 (b ), and the storage statute punishes those who have "stored or kept" a firearm without also taking specific security measures, G. L. c. 140, § 131L (a ). Both statutes, therefore, refer to firearms "kept" unlawfully (although only the storage statute contains the word "store"). In this view, by their plain language, the storage and forfeiture statutes could be interpreted to encompass each other.

Closer examination, however, complicates the analysis. Neither statute defines "store" or "keep," or their various tenses. When a term is left undefined in a statute, "we give the term its ‘usual and accepted meaning,’ as long as it is ‘consistent with the statutory purpose’ " (citation omitted). Curtatone v. Barstool Sports, Inc., 487 Mass. 655, 658, 169 N.E.3d 480 (2021). "We derive the words’ usual and accepted meanings from sources presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as their use in other legal contexts and dictionary definitions" (citation omitted). Id.

The common definitions of each word reveal significant overlap and suggest a critical point of departure -- namely, that "store" connotes the placement of an object at a greater distance from the owner, and suggests future, rather than immediate, use. For instance, Webster's Dictionary defines "store" (among other definitions) as "to deposit in a storehouse, warehouse, or other place for keeping;" "to supply or stock with something, as for future use;" and "to accumulate or put away, for future use (usually [followed] by up or away )." Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 1877 (2003). "Keep" is defined as "to hold in a given place; store" or to "retain in one's possession; hold as one's own." Id. at 1048. Black's Law Dictionary defines "store" as "[t]o keep (goods, etc[.]) in safekeeping for future delivery in an unchanged condition." Black's Law Dictionary 1717 (10th ed. 2014). In a similar vein, the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language notes that to store an object means "[t]o reserve or put away for future...